33 research outputs found

    Replication Data for: (Mis)allocation of Renewable Energy Sources

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    This file describes the data and code for "(Mis)allocation of Renewable Energy Sources" by Stefan Lamp and Mario Samano

    COMENTARIOS AL ESTUDIO DE LA OCDE Y AL ARTÍCULO DE HAUSMAN Y ROS DE LA FALTA DE COMPETITIVIDAD EN EL SECTOR DE TELECOMUNICACIONES EN MEXICO

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    Este artículo comenta cada uno de los dos informes de la falta de competitividad en el sector de telecomunicaciones en México: el primero es el de la OCDE que fue encargado por la Comisión Federal de Telecomunicaciones en México, y el segundo es el de Hausman y Ros [publicado en este número de la revista] que fue comisionado por América Móvil para comentar y revisar el primero. Los comentarios se centran en aspectos técnicos de los estudios con propósitos estrictamente académicos. Los dos estudios usan datos agregados, lo que motiva el uso de modelos de oferta y demanda que corresponderían más a un mercado competitivo, no al de competencia monopo-lística como es el caso de la industria de telecomunicaciones

    Comments on the OECD Study and the Hausman and Ros' Paper about the Lack of Market Competition in the Telecommunications Sector in Mexico *

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    Abstract This article examines the two reports on the Telecommunications sector in Mexico. The first study is the OECD report, while the second was written by Hausman and Ros and criticizes the former one. Comments are only technical and are made with academic purposes. Both studies construct methodologies that are carried out using aggregated data and assess the problem assuming a perfect competition model, when the structure of the market in this sector calls more for a monopolistic competition analysis

    Incentivized mergers and cost effciency: Evidence from the electricity distribution industry

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    In an effort to lower costs of provision, authorities have encouraged the consolidation of providers for a number of services such as electricity distributors, school boards, hospitals, and municipalities. In this paper we propose an endogenous merger process to evaluate the impact of government-provided incentives on consolidation patterns, and to evaluate the resulting outcomes. The process takes as input estimates from a stochastic frontier cost model, which yields an average cost curve for the industry. Policy parameters are used to simulate final configurations using offers that are the output of a Nash Bargaining problem. The efficiency of candidate merged entities is determined by a relative-influence function that measures the degree to which the combination of the involved firms' levels of efficiency results in cost-increasing amalgamations, and an interconnection cost that measures the impact of the size of the conglomerate that is formed. We calibrate parameters by applying the merger process to replicate the observed industry reconfiguration and then use these parameters to simulate the consolidation patterns that would have resulted from different policy incentives. We apply the method to the case of Ontario, where past mergers of local electricity distribution companies were incentivized by transfer tax reductions and a further round of mergers was recently proposed. Our findings suggest that the proposed tax incentive would have no impact on efficiency levels and consolidation patterns, and that even a substantial subsidy would still leave about five times as many LDCs as desired by policy makers

    To Rebate or Not to Rebate: Fuel Economy Standards vs. Feebates?

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    We compare the welfare effects in equilibrium of two environmental regulations that aim at increasing the new cars fleet’s average fuel efficiency: the fuel economy standards and the feebate policies. Maintaining the same environmental benefit and tax revenue, we simulate the implementation of each policy in France and the United States. Standard-type policies have larger negative welfare effects, up to 3.2 times those from the feebate. Effects on manufacturers are heterogeneous: some are better of under the standard regulation. The addition of a market to trade levels of fuel efficiency dominates the simple standard regulation but not always the feebate. We also consider the attribute-based standard, technological improvements, and the equivalence with fuel taxes as extensions
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