1,721,008 research outputs found
Global Justice: Practical Approaches to Discharge Responsibility
No full textWhat moral obligations do agents have towards others in the global community? What conceptual framework and ethical grounding best capture the complex nature of global injustice? Towards answering these questions, this paper accomplishes two things. First, it identifies and taxonomizes three philosophical conceptions of global injustice and how to redress it. I term these categories the "top-down structuralist approach", the "bottom-up structuralist approach", and the "individualist approach". Next, I identify the central shortcomings of these types of theories. Specifically, I argue that in attempting to redress global injustice we cannot practically separate so-called structural and individual levels of reform. Moreover, I argue that redressing global injustice is a challenge separately distinct from theorizing the nature of the injustice itself. That is, it is not a matter of either logical or real necessity that a problem of a (so-called) structural nature will require a solution that is itself fully structural in nature. Diagnosing the structural nature of injustice is relevant but not sufficient for the development of a solution. The nature of injustice is complex, containing both structural and individual level components that must be addressed in conjunction with each other. The framework offered attempts to provide sufficient guidance to both evaluate the nature of injustice and suitability of intervention.Oral Presentatio
A case for ethical & epistemic perversion
No full textIn discussing how we should, and should not, live, the Ancient Greek philosopher Aristotle discusses what I call ethical perversion. Ethical perversion refers to the disavowal and subjugation of established ethical truths. A person is said to be ethically perverse when they disavow established moral norms in favor of their own moral beliefs. This paper argues that, if ethical perversion exists, then epistemic perversion must also exist. Epistemic, or knowledge-related, perversion refers to the creation and imposition of one's moral beliefs on others. This paper will provide analytical evidence for the cogency of epistemic perversion, and further argue that epistemic perversion is a necessary condition for ethical perversion. Most individuals choose to be governed by what may be considered similarly interpreted moral truths that respect and value each others' autonomy. Aristotle believed that most people are neither completely perfect (or virtuous) nor completely evil (or vicious). Instead, most of us are morally "in-between" or weak, on a continuum between virtue and vice. Morally weak persons are at least capable of living in accordance with virtue, and many of us choose to live this way. But as the term suggests, morally weak persons are incomplete, or fallible, and can be easily disposed towards vice. But there are also some individuals who choose to install their own moral governance into reality, at the expense of others. Such persons that choose to manufacture, distribute and replace prevailing moral systems with their own moral principles are identified in the present paper as being ethically and epistemically perverse
Phenomenology of Drug Addiction: Exploring Substance Abuse and Recovery Through Experience
No full textAmerica, much like the rest of the world, is currently in the midst of battling record breaking drug addiction. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime reported in 2018 that prescription drug abuse, cocaine and opioid addiction have recently shattered the metrics from previous years. And while remarkable amounts of resources have been dedicated to slowing down the global dependency on addictive substances (and indeed many developments have been made), the consideration of victims of substance abuse and the experiences that are relevant to drug addiction has remained extremely underwhelming. In order to bridge the gap between those suffering from drug addiction and the professionals and systems that are in place to address drug addiction, this essay will act as an inventory of the feelings, thoughts, and experiences associated with substance abuse and recovery. We have gathered qualitative data through interviews with victims of drug addiction, either presently or having recovered from past abuse. In order to corroborate the reports provided by the random individuals that were interviewed, we have conducted research into cognitive science and provided quantitative data from prior studies. The central findings of the research conducted here produce a new perspective through which to view drug addiction as an intersectional issue that is far more than simply a set of chemical reactions or criminal activity. Additionally, the paper posits several new methods and insights into recovery and rehabilitation from drug addiction, culminating in a brief guide created to provide support for victims of substance abuse
A Moral Case for Veganism
No full textConversion to veganism often occurs from a place other than that of moral obligation ("ethical veganism"), such as for environmental or personal health reasons. Although these are effective and practical arguments for veganism, I will not be directly presenting an argument from either of these cases. Instead, I will analyze the ethical nature of the human consumption of non-human animals
(hereinafter, simply, "animals") and objections to ethical veganism. I consider the following objections: that ethical veganism attempts to hold humans and animals as morally equivalent, that it leads to individuals sacrificing vital interests, and that animal consumption is permissible based on human traits deemed superior to animals. I argue that the aforementioned objections fail, by reason that one only has to accept that the killing of animals is not worth more than human sensory pleasure, that one may only have the moral obligation to act on ethical veganism if it is feasible to do so, and that there are no superior human traits that justify animal suffering, since the morally relevant trait is the capacity to suffer. In doing so, I attempt to illustrate that the way in which humans commodify animals for food is morally impermissible, by reason that there is no justification for the intentional suffering of animals for the sake of human sensory pleasure
Team Cut the Bias Final Report
No full textCut the Bias is a project meant to bridge the gap between academia and the community through (1) community education, and (2) creative outlets such as performance arts. The project features events with presentations by experts on topics of race, prejudice, implicit biases, and other current social issues, as well as musical performances and other forms of art to create a comfortable space for learning and connecting. The project is aimed at both students and community members who wish to learn about and discover different ways they are affected by systemic issues. Moreover, by providing a venue outside of a college campus that allows for open discussion, we aim to engage with people who have historically been denied access to higher education. Another way that the team is organizing community education is through online reading groups with free reading materials through GroupMe and Zoom. We discuss topics themed around the empowerment of oppressed populations with a diverse group of people. Through these projects, we find innovative ways to use the resources given to us as college students to have direct application in communities that need it the most. Despite the challenges we have faced due to COVID 19 and the protests, we are finding ways to use our privilege in education for public service
A Theory on Romantic Love
No full textIn coming to understand different theories concerning love, I argue towards an account on a theory of romantic love, to which I advocate five necessary conditions throughout examples portrayed in pop culture and film. First, I argue that romantic love acquires the condition of nurturing the spiritual growth of one's beloved. Second, I adhere towards romantic love being associated with the characteristic of a robust concern for one's beloved's own sake. Third, a sexual desire for one another is necessary within a loving relationship, this is understood throughout a Platonic theory of eros love. Fourth, I argue that trust is essential and necessary throughout a loving relationship; and last, I argue for the importance of one unified narrative that establishes a union between lovers. In sum, I argued that each of these conditions are mutually interdependent of one another. Insomuch as, these five conditions are necessary and jointly sufficient of one another in order for a relationship to be labeled as loving
Going Beyond Counting First Authors in Author Co-citation Analysis
Full text linkThe present study examines one of the fundamental aspects of author co-citation analysis (ACA) - the way co-citation
counts are defined. Co-citation counting provides the data on which all subsequent statistical analyses and mappings
are based, and we compare ACA results based on two different types of co-citation counting - the traditional type that
only counts the first one among a cited work's authors on the one hand and a non-traditional type that takes into
account the first 5 authors of a cited work on the other hand. Results indicate that the picture produced through this non-traditional author co-citation counting contains more coherent author groups and is therefore considerably clearer. However, this picture represents fewer specialties in the research field being studied than that produced through the traditional first-author co-citation counting when the same number of top-ranked authors is selected and analyzed. Reasons for these effects are discussed
The Inevitability of Aiming for Virtue
Full text linkI defend Fricker’s virtue-theoretic proposals for grappling with epistemic injustice, arguing that her account is both empirically oriented and plausible. I agree with Fricker that an integral component of what we ought to do in the face of pervasive epistemic injustice is working to cultivate epistemic habits that aim to consistently neutralize the effects of such prejudices on their credibility estimates. But Fricker does not claim that her specific proposals constitute the only means through which individuals and institutions should combat epistemic injustice. I therefore build on Fricker’s account by beginning to sketch a fuller picture of the structure of cultivating epistemic virtue. Virtue cultivation must, I argue, occur on two broad but interrelated fronts: first, the direct retraining of more automatic and unreflective patterns of thinking, feeling, and reacting to epistemic social reality, and second, the cultivation of more reflective, metacognitive virtues, such as the ability to swiftly identify contexts in which our first-order epistemic intuitions are likely astray. Although I articulate a range of individual-level obligations, my account is not individualistic. With Fricker, I argue that individual self-transformation is a necessary but not sufficient component of the struggle for epistemic justice. Accordingly, I sketch several ways in which individual virtue cultivation must be a socially and institutionally embedded process. Moreover, I argue that this process is ongoing. While most individuals cannot actually achieve such moral-epistemic ideals, many can (and therefore should try to) get much closer than they already are
Social Psychology, Phenomenology, and the Indeterminate Content of Unreflective Racial Bias
Full text linkSocial psychologists often describe “implicit” racial biases as entirely unconscious, and as mere associations between groups and traits, which lack intentional content, e.g., we associate “black” and “athletic” in much the same way we associate “salt” and “pepper.” However, recent empirical evidence consistently suggests that individuals are aware of their implicit biases, albeit in partial, inarticulate, or even distorted ways. Moreover, evidence suggests that implicit biases are not “dumb” semantic associations, but instead reflect our skillful, norm-sensitive, and embodied engagement with social reality. This essay draws on phenomenological and hermeneutic methods and concepts to better understand what social-psychological research has begun to reveal about the conscious access individuals have to their own racial attitudes, as well as the intentional contents of the attitudes themselves.
First, I argue that implicit racial biases form part of the “background” of social experience. That is, while they exert a pervasive influence on our perceptions, judgments, and actions, they are frequently felt but not noticed, or noticed but misinterpreted. Second, I argue that our unreflective racial attitudes are neither mere associations nor fully articulated, propositionally structured beliefs or emotions. Their intentional contents are fundamentally indeterminate. For example, when a white person experiences a “gut feeling” of discomfort during an interaction with a black person, there is a question about the meaning or nature of that discomfort. Is it a fear of black people? Is it anxiety about appearing racist? There is, I argue, no general, determinate answer to such questions. The contents of our unreflective racial attitudes are fundamentally vague and open-ended, although I explain how they nevertheless take on particular shapes and implications—that is, their content can become determinate—depending on context, social meaning, and structural power relations. (If, for example, a perceived authority figure, such as a politician, parent, or scientist, encourages you to believe that your uncomfortable gut feeling is a justified fear of other social groups, then that is what your gut feeling is likely to become.
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