1,721,014 research outputs found
Cartels: Deterrence, Leniency and Criminalisation
No full textCartels are generally recognised as the most serious violation of competition law. The Chapter, new to the 4th ed of the Text, explains the nature of cartels and their historical importance to European industry, before going on to explain the increasingly hostile attitude of competition law enforcement authorities and the tools used to detect and punish cartel activity
The Quiet Decline of the UK Cartel Offence : A Principled Victory in the Face of Practical Failure
Full text linkThe UK Cartel Offence was introduced in the Enterprise Act 2002 to challenge hard-core cartels and enhance the deterrent effect of the UK competition regime. In its initial phase of operation there was some success. However, a number of significant cases failed to secure convictions. This damaged confidence in the ability of the UK competition authorities to bring successful prosecutions, and ultimately questioned the usefulness of the Cartel Offence. This Chapter examines the problems that beset the original Cartel Offence and the lessons learned from the small number of prosecutions brought before the courts. It goes on to examine the reforms in 2013, that removed the controversial ‘dishonesty’ element from the offence, and replaced it with carve outs for openness and publication. Alongside the practical issues in relation to the development of the UK Cartel Offence consideration is also given to a parallel process which saw a form of consensus developing in the academic literature as to the nature of the wrong at the heart of individual cartel activity. It is suggested that this greater understanding can be used to direct efforts to rebuild confidence in the reformed UK Cartel Offence going forward. Increased importance should be given to the securing of good evidence of individual culpability in relation to cartel activity during the investigation phase. Once good evidence is secured, better prosecution cases can be built on the basis of the new narrative of wrongfulness for hard core cartel activity
Concurrency
No full textIn Chapter 10, Niamh Dunne tackles a key and developing enforcement issue which had not been dealt with in either of the preceding collections: ‘Concurrency’. The concurrency regime empowers certain sector regulators in the UK to apply the competition rules in tandem with the Competition and Markets Authority. Reflecting a strong ideological preference for the benefits of competition over more prescriptive forms of regulatory supervision, the regime has, however, struggled to deliver effective enforcement in practice. This chapter discusses the evolution of the concurrency framework with particular emphasis on the enhancements introduced by the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013, which sought both to encourage regulators to make greater use of their concurrent powers, and to give the CMA a more formal leadership role in assisting them to do so. Subsequent enforcement activity is discussed, alongside the future prospects of competition law in the regulated sectors
Unfinished Reform of the Institutions Enforcing UK Competition Law
No full textThe period since 1998 has seen major changes in competition law, including: public interest was replaced by promotion of competition as the primary duty; anticompetitive agreements and abuse of a dominant position were prohibited, with significant penalties for breach; and the Minister withdrew from case decisions, making the institutions determinative. There were also major organisational changes, including merger of the OFT and CC to form the CMA, and establishment of the CAT as an appeals body. I consider the evolution of these institutions from the perspective of how they frame and influence the quality of first instance determinations. Institutions are hostages to their history, and I trace some of the problems faced by the CMA to its institutional roots. New challenges beyond its control are also identified. Reform is needed. Some of the CMA’s suggestions for legislation are misguided, particularly in replacing its competition duty with ‘the consumer interest’, and reducing the standard of review by the CAT without reform of the CMA. Alternative proposals are considered, including a potential change to a prosecutorial system. I argue that genuinely independent decision-making within the CMA should be preferred and would permit a more limited standard of review
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