1,720,998 research outputs found

    L'evoluzione degli assetti proprietari delle società quotate italiane: un'indagine empirica riferita al periodo 1996-2000

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    This paper investigates the evolution of ownership structure of the Italian listed companies before and after the recent Corporate Governance Law Reform («Riforma Draghi»). While, recently the high separation between ownership and control has dramatically narrowed, this result seems not to be driven by a real spread tendency to reduce the risk of expropriation. Pulling together all findings we suggest that the typical equity structure of Italian firms continuously persists to be the only possible answer to the general market forces

    Local IPO waves, local shocks, and the going public decision

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    Local IPO waves occur when firms from different industries, but located in the same area, go public in the same time period. We classify IPOs within industry IPO waves and within local IPO waves, and see that the sub-samples of IPOs on the wave by industry only slightly overlap IPOs on the wave by region; IPO waves by region are similar to IPO waves by industry: for example, early-in- the-wave IPOs are equally more underpriced than late-in-the-wave IPOs. We also find the listing decision is sensitive not only to high valuations of firms in the same industry but also to high valuations of firms in the same region but in different industries. Our results do not support information spillover as a driver of local IPO waves, as the post-IPO fall in profitability is more pro- nounced for on-the-wave than for off-the-wave IPO firms and the IPO price revision is not sensitive to the information revealed by concurrent IPOs. Using a difference-in-difference approach, we show that regions hosting IPO waves experience a parallel increase in several economic ratios post the wave. Over- all, our results provide support to local IPO waves originating in positive local shocks

    Family firm local involvement and the Local Home Bias phenomenon

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    Research has documented that most of retail and institutional investors exhibit a strong preference for stocks issued by nearby listed firms (i.e. Local Home Bias). This phenomenon shapes corporate market value and the cost of funding. In this paper, we investigate whether the Local Home Bias is enhanced in family firms as a consequence of their symbiotic connection with the local community. Using a dataset of 2,951 Italian firm-year observations (1,481 are family firms) over the period 1999–2011, we find that Local Home Bias is not a widespread phenomenon and mainly occurs in founding family firms where the founder serves as CEO. The Local Home Bias is absent in non-family firms or in family firms where the owner has acquired control through a market transaction. Overall, results suggest that locally committed family firms trigger investor preference for local stocks and, in doing so, exploit the dedicated local clientele which shrinks the cost of funding. Ultimately, we argue the social contributions of family firms to the local community could even have opportunistic traits and a non-trivial economic effect

    Effect of Governance Reforms on Corporate Ownership in Italy: Is it Still Pizza, Spaghetti and Mandolino?

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    This paper describes the logic that guides the implementation of corporate governance reforms and investigates the extent to which the logic leads to an increase in investor protection. We use the example of Italy, where major governance reforms were passed in 1998 to protect minority shareholders from the risk of expropriation

    The decision to go public and the IPO underpricing with locally biased investors

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    We provide new evidence that local investors are peculiarly biased towards local IPO stocks. Taking the well-known investor preference for local stocks a step further, we contribute by showing that local IPOs boost stock market participation far more intensely than local listed firms. Interestingly, the effect is driven by individuals born and raised in the region, having zero effect for those who have moved to the area. Consistent with underwriters significantly under-estimating the local investors’ demand in local IPOs, the probability of a private firm to go public, the IPO underpricing and the cross-sectional volatility of IPO initial returns, increase in remote firms where the local investors’ demand in local IPOs is particularly high. Overall, our results suggest that local investors are crucial for the IPO decision

    Geographical Influences on IPOs

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    Firm geographic location matters in IPO decision and outcome. Firms headquartered in wealthier areas with fewer geographically neighboring listed firms are more prone to go public and to be exposed to the “money left on the table” effect. Even controlling for the geographic self-selection bias, first-day return is still negatively affected by the proximity to other listed firms. Findings are consistent with a location premium that comes out suddenly, i.e. when firm goes public, and the myopia of actors taking part of the going public decision process

    Geographic Influences on IPO

    No full text
    Firm geographic location matters in IPO decision and outcome. Firms headquartered in wealthier areas with fewer geographically neighboring listed firms are more prone to go public and to be exposed to the “money left on the table” effect. Even controlling for the geographic self-selection bias, first-day return is still negatively affected by the proximity to other listed firms. Findings are consistent with a location premium that comes out suddenly, i.e. when firm goes public, and the myopia of actors taking part of the going public decision process

    La violazione del principio di additività del valore nei gruppi di imprese

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    A double counting market capitalization bias occurs when listed firms own securities issued by other listed firms. In this paper, we investigate this issue in the Italian Stock Exchange, studying intercorporate shareholding and its effect upon both pyramidal groups and market as a whole. We extend previous models in order to take into right account gearing and voting premium of interlocking securities
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