1,721,054 research outputs found
The Revaluation Decision for Fixed Assets after the Covid-19 Crisis: The Italian Case
Full text linkQuesto articolo si propone di discutere le implicazioni principali della recente legge speciale che consente alle società che adottano i principi contabili nazionali italiani (Italian GAAPs) la possibilità di rivalutare le attività non correnti nei bilanci dell’esercizio 2020, uno dei vari interventi governativi per fronteggiare la crisi economica generata dalla pandemia da Covid-19. Ciò si presenta come un’opportunità interessante per le PMI italiane, le quali potrebbero beneficiare sia di un importante incremento del patrimonio netto, con conseguente riduzione dei loro indicatori di leva finanziaria, sia di rilevanti risparmi fiscali, derivanti da maggiori ammortamenti deducibili fiscalmente a fronte del pagamento di un’imposta sostitutiva di entità contenuta. Tuttavia, l’operazione richiede di essere analizzata attentamente dalle società nella sua complessità, al fine di prendere una decisione ottimale su basi razionali, considerando la necessità di un pieno rispetto delle procedure e dei requisiti contabili, di bilanciare gli effetti sugli indicatori finanziari e sui rischi di future svalutazioni per perdite durevoli di valore, oltre che di compatibilità con la strategia finanziaria complessiva della società e con gli effetti segnaletici al mercato finanziario. I bilanci dopo la rivalutazione dovranno altresì essere studiati esaustivamente dalle banche e dagli altri analisti finanziari, al fine di assegnare correttamente il rating alla società e di applicare adeguati covenant sui finanziamenti.This paper aims at discussing the major implications in the case of the recent special law which allows to Italian GAAPs compliant companies the possibility to revalue non-current assets in their 2020 financial statements, one of the various government interventions to face the economic crisis generated by the Covid-19 pandemic.
It appears to be an interesting opportunity for Italian SMEs, which could benefit both from an important increase in equity, with consequent reduction of their leverage ratios, and from relevant tax savings, stemming from tax-deductible higher depreciation against the payment of a moderate substitutive tax. Still, the operation has to be carefully analysed by companies in its complexity, in order to take an optimal decision on a rational basis, considering the need of full compliance with accounting procedures and requirements, of balancing effects on financial ratios and on risks of future impairment, as well as of compatibility with the company’s overall financial strategy and with signalling effects to the financial market. Financial statements after revaluation will also have to be thoroughly studied by banks and other financial analysts, in order to rate correctly the company and to apply adequate loan covenants
Politiche di transfer pricing e valore del gruppo multinazionale
No full textL'articolo discute il problema delle politiche di transfer pricing nei gruppi multinazionali e del loro impatto sul valore dei gruppi stessi. Si tratta di una questione strategica per gruppi che operino in nazioni differenti, a causa delle complessità e delle opportunità generate dalle relazioni infragruppo in una prospettiva internazionale, nonché dei valori spesso rilevanti dei flussi reali e finanziari intercompany, che danno luogo a un Sistema Finanziario Interno (SFI) nel gruppo. Le politiche di transfer pricing possono svolgere un ruolo particolarmente importante nella ricerca di scelte ottimali all'interno del SFI, in presenza di imperfezioni di mercato e di fattori organizzativi. In particolare, nel determinare il livello ottimale dei prezzi di trasferimento, le multinazionali dovranno considerare: imperfezioni fiscali e tariffarie; effetti di decisioni subottimali di allocazione interna delle produzioni; la struttura decisionale specifica del gruppo (centralizzata o decentrata) e le sue implicazioni su possibili conflitti e sulla necessità di adeguate misurazioni della performance dei manager periferici. Viene proposto un modello concettuale per guidare le decisioni, in termini di valore di mercato del gruppo in un orizzonte multiperiodale, nel quale sono considerati anche i costi di gestione e di monitoraggio del conflitto tra manager centrali e periferici.The article discusses the problem of transfer pricing policies in multinational groups and their impact on the value of groups themselves. This is a strategic issue for groups operating in different countries, due to the complexities and opportunities generated by intercompany relationships on an international scale, as well as to the frequently relevant values of real and financial intercompany flows, giving rise to an Internal Financial System (IFS) within the group. Transfer pricing policies can play an increasingly important role in optimal choices within the IFS, when market imperfections and organizational factors are at play. In particular, in fixing the optimal level of transfer prices, multinationals shall consider: tax and customs duties imperfections; effects of suboptimal internal production allocation decisions; the specific decisional structure of the group (centralized or decentralized) and its implications on possible conflicts and on the need of suitable measures of performance for local managers. A conceptual model for guiding decision, in terms of market value of the group in a multiperiod perspective, is proposed, in which management and monitoring costs of the conflict between central and local management are also considered
La finanza aziendale
No full textIl capitolo si propone di presentare le tematiche principali della finanza aziendale, mettendone in evidenza i meccanismi fondamentali: i caratteri dell'approccio della finanza aziendale; il ruolo dei mercati dei capitali; le decisioni di investimento in capitale fisso; le decisioni di finanziamento; la finanza come fattore critico per lo sviluppo delle imprese.The aim of this chapter is to introduce the main themes of corporate financial management and to explain its fundamental processes and techniques: the approach of corporate finance; the role of financial markets; the capital budgeting decisions; the financial structure decisions; corporate finance as a key driver of corporate growth
La finanza aziendale
No full textQuesto capitolo presenta un’introduzione ad alcune delle principali problematiche della finanza aziendale: l'approccio metodologico; il ruolo dei mercati dei capitali; le decisioni di investimento; le decisioni di finanziamento; la finanza come fattore critico per lo sviluppo delle imprese.This chapter presents an introduction to some of the major problems in corporate finance: the methodological approach; the role of capital markets; the investment (capital budgeting) decisions; the financing decisions; corporate finance as a key driver for companies’ growth
Learning dynamics in limited-control repeated games
No full textIn imperfect-information games, a common assumption is that players can perfectly model the strategic interaction and always maintain control over their decision points. We relax this assumption by introducing the notion of limited-control repeated games. In this setting, two players repeatedly play a zero-sum extensive-form game and, at each iteration, a player may lose control over portions of her game tree. Intuitively, this can be seen as the chance player hijacking the interaction and taking control of certain decision points. What subsequently happens is no longer controllable-or even known-by the original players. We introduce pruned fictitious play, a variation of fictitious play that can be employed by the players to reach an equilibrium in limited-control repeated games. We motivate this technique with the notion of limited best response, which is the key step of the learning rule we employ. We provide a general result on the probabilistic guarantees of a limited best response with respect to the original game model. Then, we experimentally evaluate our technique and show that pruned fictitious play has good convergence properties
Il bilancio della banca
No full textIl capitolo esamina il bilancio bancario da due punti di vista, tra loro strettamente connessi: la struttura e l'articolazione del bilancio della banca alla luce della normativa vigente in Italia in seguito all'adozione dei principi contabili internazionali IFRSs; l'analisi dell'andamento gestionale della banca attraverso i principali indicatori ricavabili dal suo bilancio.This chapter analyses the financial statement of the bank from two strongly related points of view: the structure and key contents of the financial statement of the bank according to current regulation in Italy after the adoption of international accounting principles IFRSs; the analysis of the financial position and performance of the bank using key financial ratios
Computing a pessimistic Stackelberg equilibrium with multiple followers: the mixed-pure case
No full textThe search problem of computing a Stackelberg (or leader-follower) equilibrium (also referred to as an optimal strategy to commit to) has been widely investigated in the scientific literature in, almost exclusively, the single follower setting. Although the optimistic and pessimistic versions of the problem, i.e., those where the single follower breaks any ties among multiple equilibria either in favour or against the leader, are solved with different methodologies, both cases allow for efficient, polynomial-time algorithms based on linear programming. The situation is different with multiple followers, where results are only sporadic and depend strictly on the nature of the followers’ game.In this paper, we investigate the setting of a normal-form game with a single leader and multiple followers who, after observing the leader’s commitment, play a Nash equilibrium. When both leader and followers are allowed to play mixed strategies, the corresponding search problem, both in the optimistic and pessimistic versions, is known to be inapproximable in polynomial time to within any multiplicative polynomial factor unless P = NP. Exact algorithms are known only for the optimistic case. We focus on the case where the followers play pure strategies—a restriction that applies to a number of real-world scenarios and which, in principle, makes the problem easier—under the assumption of pessimism (the optimistic version of the problem can be straightforwardly solved in polynomial time). After casting this search problem (with followers playing pure strategies) as a pessimistic bilevel programming problem, we show that, with two followers, the problem is NP-hard and, with three or more followers, it cannot be approximated in polynomial time to within any multiplicative factor which is polynomial in the size of the normal-form game, nor, assuming utilities in [0, 1], to within any constant additive loss strictly smaller than 1 unless P = NP. This shows that, differently from what happens in the optimistic version, hardness and inapproximability in the pessimistic problem are not due to the adoption of mixed strategies. We then show that the problem admits, in the general case, a supremum but not a maximum, and we propose a single-level mathematical programming reformulation which asks for the maximization of a nonconcave quadratic function over an unbounded nonconvex feasible region defined by linear and quadratic constraints. Since, due to admitting a supremum but not a maximum, only a restricted version of this formulation can be solved to optimality with state-of-the-art methods, we propose an exact ad hoc algorithm (which we also embed within a branch-and bound scheme) capable of computing the supremum of the problem and, for cases where there is no leader’s strategy where such value is attained, also an α-approximate strategy where α > 0 is an arbitrary additive loss (at most as large as the supremum). We conclude the paper by evaluating the scalability of our algorithms via computational experiments on a well-established testbed of game instances
Computing the Strategy to Commit to in Polymatrix Games
No full textLeadership games provide a powerful paradigm to model many real-world settings. Most literature focuses on games with a single follower who acts optimistically, breaking ties in favour of the leader. Unfortunately, for real-world applications, this is unlikely. In this paper, we look for efficiently solvable games with multiple followers who play either optimistically or pessimistically, i.e., breaking ties in favour or against the leader. We study the computational complexity of finding or approximating an optimistic or pessimistic leader-follower equilibrium in specific classes of succinct games—polymatrix like—which are equivalent to 2-player Bayesian games with uncertainty over the follower, with interdependent or independent types. Furthermore, we provide an exact algorithm to find a pessimistic equilibrium for those game classes. Finally, we show that in general polymatrix games the computation is harder even when players are forced to play pure strategies
Committing to correlated strategies with multiple leaders
No full textWe address multi-agent Stackelberg settings involving many leaders and followers. In order to effectively model this kind of interactions, we extend the idea of commitment to correlated strategies to Stackelberg games with multiple leaders and followers. Correlation can be easily implemented by resorting to a device that sends signals to the players, and it also enables the leaders to reach better solutions than those achieved by committing independently. In this setting, a crucial question is how the leaders agree on a correlated-strategy commitment. To this end, we introduce a preliminary agreement stage that implements a natural non-cooperative negotiation protocol. The protocol proposes a correlated strategy to the leaders, who can then decide, in turn, whether to participate in the commitment or defect from it by losing the possibility of being part of the agreement. The goal is to design stable agreements in which no leader defects. We distinguish three solution concepts on the basis of the constraints that they enforce on the agreement reached by the leaders. We provide a comprehensive study of the properties of our solution concepts, in terms of existence, relation with other solution concepts, and computational complexity. As for the computational analysis, we prove that our solutions can be computed in polynomial time for certain classes of succinctly represented games. Interestingly, our results show that, in these games, introducing the agreement stage does not make computing equilibria a more challenging task, as finding a solution in our setting is as hard as computing an optimal correlated equilibrium
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