60 research outputs found
Pravica do dela
No full textThe right to work is an important human right. The state must create possibilities for every individual to have the right to choose her/his profession, to work under healthy working conditions and to receive an adequate payment in order to attain a proper standard of living for herself/himself and her/his family.The Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia determines "the freedom of work" instead of "the right to work" (Article 49 of the Constitution). The freedom of work contains the same elements as the right to work set out in the international legal acts, such as the right to choice of employment, the right to access each employment under equitable conditions and the prohibition of forced labour. Forced labour has been lately increasingly evident due to human trafficking, although international legal acts clearly stipulate that no one should be held in slavery or servitude or be required to perform forced or compulsory labour. In her paper, the author argues that voluntary work is a fundamental human right confirming the essence of a human being and human dignity.Pravica do dela je pomembna človekova pravica. Država mora ustvarjati možnosti, da si lahko vsak sam izbere poklic, da ga opravlja v zdravih delovnih pogojih in za opravljeno delo dobi primerno plačilo, ki zagotavlja njemu kot delavcu in njegovi družini dostojni življenjski standard. V Ustavi RS ni določena besedna zveza pravica do dela, ampak svoboda dela (49. člen ustave), ki vključuje enake elemente kot pravica do dela določena v mednarodnih aktih. Ti so: prosta izbira zaposlitve, dostopnost do vsakega delovnega mesta pod enakimi pogoji in prepoved prisilnega dela. Slednje, prisilno delo, se v zadnjem času vse več pojavlja s trgovanjem z ljudmi, čeprav mednarodni akti jasno določajo, da se nikogar ne sme držati v suženjstvu (slavery) ali podložništvu (servitude) in od nikogar se ne sme zahtevati, da opravlja prisilno ali obvezno delo (forst or compolsory labour) Prostovoljno delo je temeljna človekova pravica, ki potrjuje bit človeka in njegovo dostojanstvo, sporoča avtorica z vsebino prispevka
Svoboda izražanja in pravica do zasebnosti
No full textSodba ESČP v zadevi Von Hannover se zdi, kot ugotavlja avtor njene analize, sporočilno nedvoumna: (1) Medijem je priznan ožji obseg pravice do poseganja v zasebnost javnih osebnosti, če te javne osebnosti niso politiki oziroma če ne izvršujejo politične funkcije; (2) medijem ni priznana pravica do poseganja v zasebnost osebnosti z relativno javnim značajem, če podrobnosti iz njihovega zasebnega življenja niso splošno pomembne za javno družbeno razpravo o zadevah, ki so v javnem družbenem interesu; (3) zvedavost javnosti in medijsko ponudbo razvedrilnih vsebin v smislu rumenega ali komercialnega tiska ni mogoče opredeliti kot javnega interesa, ki bi dovoljeval nelegitimne in v tem smislu prekomerne posege v zasebnost oseb z relativnim javnim značajem; (4) ne pravica do svobodnega izražanja ne pravica do zasebnosti po značaju nista absolutni, za to ju je potrebno v primeru njunega medsebojnega konflikta primerno uravnotežiti. Avtor poda kritični komentar strasbourške sodbe in pritrdi njenemu končnemu rezultatu, hkrati pa utemeljuje stališče, za kaj je treba po njegovem mnenju varstvo zasebnosti priznati tudi izpostavljenosti relativno javne osebnosti na javnem kopališču. Argumentirano in primerjalnopravno se zavzema za osredotočenost na posameznika in ne na javni značaj prostora, ko gre za vprašanje razumnega pričakovanja zasebnosti: posameznik je tisti, ki s svojimi značilnostmi vnaša razumno pričakovanje zasebnosti v določen prostor in ne obratno. Avtor v tem oziru kritizira tudi ustavnosodni pristop slovenskega ustavnega sodišča do varstva zasebnosti.ECHR judgment in Von Hannover case seems, as the author suggests, unambiguous: (1) the media are given narrower extent of the right to encroach in to privacy of public persons if these persons are not politicians or if they do not exercise political functions; (2) the media do not have the right to encroach in to privacy of the relative public persons, if the details from their personal life are not generally important for the public debate about issues that are in public interest; (3) public curiosity, tabloids and media entertainmentcan not be defined as public interest allowing illegitimate and unproportionate intrusions in to privacy of the relative public persons; (4) freedom of expression and the right to privacy are not absolute rights by their nature so they have to be adequately balanced. Author gives critical comment on the Strasbourg judgment and agrees with its final result, but gives legal reasoning why the right to privacy should also be acknowledged to the exposure of relative public figure in a public swimming pool. He also articulates reasons, including those from comparative law, for the focusing on individual and not on public nature of particular area or location as such when the reasonable expectation of privacy is in question. Indivi dual is the one who makes the area or location (space) private by his own attributes and not vice versa. Author makes critical assertions about decision making of the Slovenian Constitutional Court when deciding privacy cases
Miranda: ustavna pravica ali ne?
No full textAvtorica v prispevku analizira razvoj mirande v ZDA od leta 1966 do danes in primerja današnjo ameriško mirando s slovensko. V prispevku zagovarja stališče, da je bistvena razlika med njima v tem, da ima slovenski kazenski postopek dve mirandi, ameriški pa eno. Ameriška miranda se namreč uporablja, ko je osumljencu od vzeta prostost in je ob tem zaslišan, medtem ko se slovenska miranda uporablja, ko je osumljencu odvzeta prostost ali ko je zaslišan s strani policije, ob tem da je miranda ob odvzemu prostosti ustavna pravica, miranda ob zaslišanju pa ne vedno. Avtorica z analizo odločb Vrhovnega sodišča ZDA pri kaže, da se je ameriška miranda v zadnjih letih zelo približala kontinentalnemu kazenskemu postopku, predvsem v smislu spreminjanja mirande v luči iskanja materialne resnice. Vrhovno sodišče ZDA je namreč s svojimi odločitvami uvedlo številne izjeme od originalne Mirande, ki so v lanskem letu pripeljale do tega, da se lahko na sojenju zoper obdolženca uporabi fizični dokaz, ki je bil pridobljen s kršenjem mirande. Avtorica je mnenja, da je takšna miranda zelo podobna slovenski mirandi v pred kazenskem postopku, ki dopušča policijsko zaslišanje osumljenca brez prisotnosti zagovornika, na podlagi katerega policija sicer res napravi »le« uradni zaznamek, vendar pa lahko policija na podlagi takega uradnega zaznamka zakonito zbira dokaze, hkrati pa se s takim za znamkom lahko seznani tudi sodnik, ki odloča o glavni stvari. Avtorica v razpravi opozori na pomembno dejstvo, da se slovenska in ameriška ureditev v svojih ustavnih določbah bistveno razlikujeta. Ustava ZDA namreč nima izrecnih določb o pravici do molka ali pravici do zagovornika ob odvzemu prostosti in policijskem zaslišanju, za to je miranda le eden iz med načinov varovanja privilegija zoper samoobtožbo. Miranda tako ni ustavno zavarovana pravica, njeno kršenje pa samo po sebi še ne predstavlja upravičenega razloga za izločitev tako pridobljenih dokazov. Ustava RS ima na drugi strani izrecno določbo o pravici do molka in pravici do zagovornika ob odvzemu prostosti, zato slovenska miranda ob odvzemu prostosti ni le način varovanja privilegija zoper samoobtožbo, tem več ustavna pravica. Prav zato ureditev policijske ga zaslišanja v pred kazenskem postopku v primerih, ko je to povezano z odvzemom prostosti in ko osumljencu obenem ni zagotovljena pomoč zagovornika, ni skladna z Ustavo RS. V takih primerih se na podlagi uradnega zaznamka ne bi smelo pridobivati drugih dokazov oziroma bi morali biti ta ki dokazi izločeni, prav tako pa bi moral bi ti izločen uradni za znamek, saj gre za neposredno kršitev ustavne določbe o pravici do zagovornika.The author analyzes and discusses the development of the American Miranda from 1966 until today and compares it with the Slovene miranda. She argues that the main difference between them is in the conditions under which Miranda applies and in the constitutional protection each of them is afforded. The American miranda applies when a suspect is taken into custody and she is interrogated, while the Slovene miranda applies if a suspect is either taken into custody or she is interrogated by the police. In the former case miranda is protected by the Slovene Constitution, but not in the latter. Through the analysis of the jurisprudence of the US Supreme Court the author demonstrates that the American regulation of miranda has become very close to what is considered to be the continental approach to the criminal procedure in the last few years, since the US Supreme Court, in the name of finding the material truth at trials has recognized numerous exceptions to miranda. The latest exception to miranda allows for the state at a trial to introduce the physical evidence derived from a statement of the defendant who had not been given the Miranda warnings. The author argues that the American miranda with the applicable exceptions is very similar to the miranda of the Slovene Criminal Procedure Act that allows for the police interrogation without the presence of an attorney, which is evidenced “only” by the official note, which is not regarded as a formal evidence, but on the basis of which the police may lawfully seek other evidence and which the trial judge is free to review. The author emphasizes the difference between the Slovene and the American constitutional provisions related to miranda, especially in the view of the nature of the protection that each provides for the miranda rights. Since the American Constitution has no explicit provisions regarding the right to remain silent and the right to the assistance of an attorney, miranda is only one of the ways to safeguard the privilege against self-incrimination. Therefore, miranda itself is not a constitutional right and a violation of miranda without more does not justify the exclusion of an evidence obtained in the violation of miranda. The Slovene Constitution, on the other hand, has explicit provisions concerning the right to remain silent and the right to the assistance of an attorney in cases where the freedom to move is restricted in a significant way, therefore the Slovenian miranda in cases where the suspect is taken into custody is not only a way of safeguarding the privilege against self-incrimination, but a constitutionally protected right. The author argues that precisely for this reason, the regulation of the police interrogation in cases where a suspect is taken into custody and is not afforded the assistance of an attorney is not in accordance with the provisions of the Slovene Constitution. In cases like that the evidence derived from such official note should be excluded as well as the official note itself, since it was obtained in a way that directly violates the constitutional provisions with respect to the right to the assistance of an attorney
Development of Ion Beam Nuclear Transmutation Doping (IBNTD) for Novel Electronics in Extreme Conditions
No full textDevelopment of IBNTD for electronics under extreme conditions.
•We hope to create novel wide bandgap devices using Ion Beam Nuclear Transmutation Doping (IBNTD). These devices may be used as rugged high power switches, and high current/low noise amplifiers. Diamond in itself represents a “Holy Grail” for electrical applications due to its very high thermal conductivity and excellent electrical characteristics. •We also hope to develop devices that can convert the enormous energy from high-energy nuclear particles (α2+,β-,β+, γparticles) into useful electricity and thus harness the enormous energy still contained in “spent” nuclear fuel. Developing these direct energy conversion (DEC) devices would significantly reduce conversion inefficiencies. •To create a radiation-rugged devices that can withstand high particle beam fluxes (e.g. outer space, and nuclear engineering sensors). •Reference:“A novel method to dope diamond -Ion Beam Nuclear Transmutation Doping (IBNTD),” M.G. Pravica, N.A. Guardala and J.L. Price, Diamond and Related Materials, 18, pp. 846-849(2009) •US Patent7,795,120:“Doping wide band gap semiconductors using proton induced transmutation.
Development of Ion Beam Nuclear Transmutation Doping (IBNTD) for Novel Electronics in Extreme Conditions
No full textDevelopment of IBNTD for electronics under extreme conditions.
•We hope to create novel wide bandgap devices using Ion Beam Nuclear Transmutation Doping (IBNTD). These devices may be used as rugged high power switches, and high current/low noise amplifiers. Diamond in itself represents a “Holy Grail” for electrical applications due to its very high thermal conductivity and excellent electrical characteristics. •We also hope to develop devices that can convert the enormous energy from high-energy nuclear particles (α2+,β-,β+, γparticles) into useful electricity and thus harness the enormous energy still contained in “spent” nuclear fuel. Developing these direct energy conversion (DEC) devices would significantly reduce conversion inefficiencies. •To create a radiation-rugged devices that can withstand high particle beam fluxes (e.g. outer space, and nuclear engineering sensors). •Reference:“A novel method to dope diamond -Ion Beam Nuclear Transmutation Doping (IBNTD),” M.G. Pravica, N.A. Guardala and J.L. Price, Diamond and Related Materials, 18, pp. 846-849(2009) •US Patent7,795,120:“Doping wide band gap semiconductors using proton induced transmutation.
Pravica dostopa do informacij javnega značaja na podlagi EKČP
No full textAli je pravica dostopa do informacij javnega značaja kot temeljna človekova pravica varovana z Evropsko konvencijo o človekovih pravicah? Na to vprašanje teorija in praksa ne odgovarjata po vsem enotno, zato avtorica v pričujočem prispevku analizira judikaturo Evropskega sodišča za človekove pravice. Njena temeljna ugotovitev je, da v nasprotju s splošnim prepričanjem sodišče izrecno zanika, da bi iz »pravice sprejemati informacije« v 10. členu EKČP izhajala pozitivna dolžnost države, da zbira ali razširja informacije. Ta pravica državi prepoveduje le, da bi omejevala prejem informacij, ki jih posamezniku želijo posredovati druge osebe. Vendar posameznikom ne daje pravice dostopa do informacij v posesti javnih oblasti, prav tako tudi ne zajema dolžnosti države, da posamezniku takšne informacije posreduje. Priznanju pravice dostopa do informacij je ESČP bolj naklonjeno le, ko javne oblasti razpolagajo z dokumenti, ki vsebujejo bodisi osebne podatke posameznikov bodisi informacije, ki imajo neposreden vpliv na njihovo življenje in zdravje. Vendar v teh primerih dostop priznava na podlagi pravice do zasebnega in družinskega življenja iz 8. člena EKČP in ne na podlagi pravice prejemati informacije iz 10. člena EKČP.Is the right of access to public information as a human right protected by the European Convention on Human Rights? Since neither theory nor practice answer this question unanimously, the author analyzes the practice of the European Court of Human Rights in the present article. Her fundamental finding is that, contrary to common beliefs, the Court explicitly denies any positive duty of a government to collect or disseminate information to be derived from ‘the right to freedom to receive information’ in Article 10 ECHR. This right prohibits a government only from restricting a person from receiving information that others wish to impart to him. It does not, however, confer on an individual a right of access to information held by public authorities, nor does it embody an obligation on the government to impart such information to the individual. The Court is more favourable of recognizing the right of access to information only when the public authorities hold documents which contain either personal data of the individual or information which have immediate influence on their life and health. The recognition of a right of access in these cases is, nevertheless, based on the right to respect for private and family life in Article 8 ECHR, and not on the right to receive information in Article 10 ECHR. Resistance of the court to explicitly acknowledge the right of access to public information based on Article 10 ECHR is slowly becoming unbearable. This is shown not only by numerous dissenting opinions of the judges within the Court itself, but also by the convincing arguments of other experts. The adoption of a special, legally binding act is being mentioned as one of the possible solutions. This would build upon the legally non-binding recommendations of the Council of Europe regarding the right of access to official documents
Pravica dostopa do informacij javnega značaja na podlagi EKČP
No full textAli je pravica dostopa do informacij javnega značaja kot temeljna človekova pravica varovana z Evropsko konvencijo o človekovih pravicah? Na to vprašanje teorija in praksa ne odgovarjata po vsem enotno, zato avtorica v pričujočem prispevku analizira judikaturo Evropskega sodišča za človekove pravice. Njena temeljna ugotovitev je, da v nasprotju s splošnim prepričanjem sodišče izrecno zanika, da bi iz »pravice sprejemati informacije« v 10. členu EKČP izhajala pozitivna dolžnost države, da zbira ali razširja informacije. Ta pravica državi prepoveduje le, da bi omejevala prejem informacij, ki jih posamezniku želijo posredovati druge osebe. Vendar posameznikom ne daje pravice dostopa do informacij v posesti javnih oblasti, prav tako tudi ne zajema dolžnosti države, da posamezniku takšne informacije posreduje. Priznanju pravice dostopa do informacij je ESČP bolj naklonjeno le, ko javne oblasti razpolagajo z dokumenti, ki vsebujejo bodisi osebne podatke posameznikov bodisi informacije, ki imajo neposreden vpliv na njihovo življenje in zdravje. Vendar v teh primerih dostop priznava na podlagi pravice do zasebnega in družinskega življenja iz 8. člena EKČP in ne na podlagi pravice prejemati informacije iz 10. člena EKČP.Is the right of access to public information as a human right protected by the European Convention on Human Rights? Since neither theory nor practice answer this question unanimously, the author analyzes the practice of the European Court of Human Rights in the present article. Her fundamental finding is that, contrary to common beliefs, the Court explicitly denies any positive duty of a government to collect or disseminate information to be derived from ‘the right to freedom to receive information’ in Article 10 ECHR. This right prohibits a government only from restricting a person from receiving information that others wish to impart to him. It does not, however, confer on an individual a right of access to information held by public authorities, nor does it embody an obligation on the government to impart such information to the individual. The Court is more favourable of recognizing the right of access to information only when the public authorities hold documents which contain either personal data of the individual or information which have immediate influence on their life and health. The recognition of a right of access in these cases is, nevertheless, based on the right to respect for private and family life in Article 8 ECHR, and not on the right to receive information in Article 10 ECHR. Resistance of the court to explicitly acknowledge the right of access to public information based on Article 10 ECHR is slowly becoming unbearable. This is shown not only by numerous dissenting opinions of the judges within the Court itself, but also by the convincing arguments of other experts. The adoption of a special, legally binding act is being mentioned as one of the possible solutions. This would build upon the legally non-binding recommendations of the Council of Europe regarding the right of access to official documents
Pravica do samoobrambe v Zemljini orbiti
No full textThe increasing presence of non-State actors in space raises a plethora of legal questions, including those related to the use of force, especially in the context of the right of self-defence. The first aim of this article is to explain the legal basis for resorting to force in the exercise of self-defence in space, specifically in the Earth\u27s orbit. The second goal is to contribute to the legal framework concerning how States may exercise self-defence against attacks committed by non-State actors in space. In this regard, the author distinguishes between the rules of attribution of the use of force to a State and the "unwilling or unable" doctrine. It is suggested that the latter may be transposed into the space domain, mutatis mutandis, by a re-conceptualisation of the notion of a State\u27s "territory", shifting from its sovereignty-based foundation towards State jurisdiction. Further on, in the realm of the rules of attribution of conduct to a State, the author compares the ARSIWA rules of State responsibility with the strict responsibility regime of the Outer Space Treaty (OST), to clarify which system applies when addressing State responsibility for the use of force by non-State actors in space. Three solutions are offered in this regard. The first rests on the premise that space law, specifically Article VI OST, may be seen as lex specialis in relation to ARSIWA. The second supports the view that the general rules of State responsibility in ARSIWA should apply, as they are secondary rules of international law, whereas Article VI OST encompasses primary rules. The third approach offers a combined reading of Article VI OST and ARSIWA, based on a systematic interpretation of the norms contained therein, to preserve the purpose of the secondary rules on State responsibility.Z razvojem vesoljske tehnologije so v vesolju poleg držav čedalje bolj prisotni tudi nedržavni akterji. Njihova vse večja prisotnost odpira številna pravna vprašanja, tudi v zvezi z uporabo sile, zlasti v okviru pravice do samoobrambe. Prvi cilj tega članka je pojasniti pravno podlago za uporabo sile pri izvajanju samoobrambe v vesolju, zlasti v Zemljini orbiti. Drugi cilj je prispevati k pravnemu okviru, kako lahko države izvajajo samoobrambo pred napadi nedržavnih akterjev v vesolju. Avtor razlikuje med pravili o pripisovanju uporabe sile državi in doktrino nepripravljenosti ali nezmožnosti države "gostiteljice". Predlaga, da se slednja lahko smiselno prenese na področje vesolja s pomočjo rekonceptualizacije pojma "ozemlja" države od paradigme državne suverenosti v smeri državne jurisdikcije. Nadalje avtor na področju pravil o pripisovanju ravnanja državi primerja določbe v Členih o odgovornosti držav za mednarodno protipravna dejanja (ARSIWA) o odgovornosti države in režim objektivne odgovornosti iz Pogodbe o vesolju (OST). Njegov namen je pojasniti, kateri sistem pravil naj se uporablja pri obravnavi vprašanja odgovornosti države za uporabo sile s strani nedržavnih akterjev v vesolju. Glede tega ponudi tri rešitve. Prva temelji na predpostavki, da se pravo vesolja, konkretno VI. člen OST, lahko obravnava kot lex specialis v razmerju do sistema pravil po ARSIWA. Druga podpira stališče, da bi se morala uporabljati splošna pravila o odgovornosti držav iz ARSIWA, saj gre za sekundarna pravila mednarodnega prava, VI. člen OST pa zajema primarna pravila. Tretji pristop ponuja kombinirano razlago VI. člena OST in ARSIWA, ki temelji na sistematični razlagi tam vsebovanih norm, da se ohrani namen sekundarnih pravil mednarodnega prava o odgovornosti držav
Constitutional violations in the operation and use of artificial intelligence systems
No full textPoglavje obravnava in kritično analizira delovanje in uporabo umetnointeligenčnih sistemov z vidika ustavnopravnih kršitev. Posegi v ustavnopravno varovane pravice, ki nastanejo pri delovanju in uporabi umetnointeligenčnih sistemov, se pojavljajo na dveh ravneh: pri razvoju in učenju teh sistemov ter pri njihovi uporabi s strani uporabnika. Avtor se pri tem osredotoča na pravice iz ustvarjalnosti (avtorska pravica), varstvo osebnih podatkov, enakost pred zakonom (prepoved diskriminacije), svobodo dela (pravica do dela), svobodo izražanja, pravico do osebnega dostojanstva in varnosti ter varstvo pravic zasebnosti in osebnostnih pravic. V tej zvezi obravnava tudi relevantne pravne akte EU, kot so Akt o umetni inteligenci, Direktiva (EU) 2019/790 o avtorski in sorodnih pravicah na enotnem digitalnem trgu in Akt o digitalnih storitvah.The chapter examines and critically analyses the operation and use of artificial intelligence systems from the perspective of constitutional law violations. Interferences with constitutionally protected rights arising from the operation and application of artificial intelligence systems occur on two levels: during their development and training, as well as in their use by end-users. The author focuses on intellectual property rights (copyright), protection of personal data, equality before the law (prohibition of discrimination), freedom of work (right to work), freedom of expression, right to personal dignity and safety, and protection of the rights to privacy and personality rights. In this context, the author also discusses relevant EU legal acts, such as the Artificial Intelligence Act, Directive (EU) 2019/790 on Copyright and Related Rights in the Digital Single Market, and the Digital Services Act
RIGHT TO PRIVACY WITH SPECIAL IMPACT TO PATIENT\u27S PRIVACY
No full textV tem diplomskem delu njegov avtor poskuša izpostaviti pomembnost bolnikove pravice do zasebnosti. Posameznikovo pravico do zasebnosti v državah z demokratično ureditvijo uvrščamo med varovane kategorije. V veliki večini si države prizadevajo za pravo mero pri urejanju poštenega ravnanja z osebnimi podatki, ki na eni strani omogoča varstvo posameznikove zasebne sfere in po drugi strani tudi dostopnost do podatkov, kadar tako narekujejo upravičeni interesi. V današnjem času obstajajo številni načini nepoštene in nedopustne manipulacije s podatki, zato je še toliko pomembneje, da se le te zaščiti. Vsaka pravica, pa je enako kot je podeljena tudi omejena z dolžnostmi. Nasprotni pol pravice do zasebnosti je dolžnost ohranitve skrivnosti oz. tajnosti oz. prepoved neupravičenega zbiranja in uporabe osebnih podatkov. V tem delu je pravica do zasebnosti obravnavana z drugega zornega kota, kot je to običajno v slovenskih diplomskih delih. Izhodišče ni slovenska ureditev, temveč ureditev Združenega kraljestva. Le ta je najprej predstavljena na splošno, predvsem v povezavi in sklicevanjem na angleški, ameriški, nemški, francoski in na koncu na slovenski pravni red. V drugem delu pa je posebej predstavljena pacientova pravica do zasebnosti v pravu Združenega kraljestva in v pravu RS.
Pravica do zasebnosti ima poseben položaj. Ne more veljati absolutno, kadar so drugi interesi pomembnejši (na primer javni interes ali uveljavljanje pravic drugih oseb). Vsak zasebni interes še ne more biti zadosten razlog za razkritje določenih osebnih podatkov.
Šele, če je podan upravičen interes, se lahko omeji pravica do zasebnosti in se upravičenemu uporabniku omogoči dostop. Te splošne ugotovitve so vodilo tudi ureditvi pacientove zasebnosti. V delu so predstavljeni tudi najpomembnejši vidiki in zlasti najpogostejše kršitve pacientove zasebnosti.In this thesis the author attempts to highlight the importance of the patient\u27s right to privacy. The individual\u27s right to privacy in countries with a democratic regime ranks among the protected categories. The vast majority of countries are striving for the right amount when editing a fair handling of personal data, on the one hand allows for the protection of the individual\u27s private sphere and on the other hand, the availability of data where the legitimate interests so require. Nowadays, there are many ways unfair and improper manipulation of data, and it is even more important that only this protection. Each right is the same as it is granted, limited to the duties. The opposite pole of the right to privacy is the duty of maintaining secrecy or confidentiality or prohibition of undue collection and use of personal data. In this paper, the right to privacy issue is examined from a different angle, as is usual in theses. The starting point is not Slovenian law regulation, but regulation of the United Kingdom. Only this is first presented, in general, especially in relation and reference to the English, American, German, French and at last Slovenian law. In the second part there are presented separately the patient\u27s right to privacy in the United Kingdom and at the end in the Republic of Slovenia.
The right to privacy has a special position. It cannot be absolute when other interests are more important (for example, the public interest or the rights of others). Each private interest cannot be sufficient grounds for disclosure of certain personal data.
Only if given a legitimate interest the right to privacy may be limited and the recipient allowed the access. The same is valid for the patient’s privacy. The author presents important aspects and especially the most frequent violations of patient’s privacy
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