2,441 research outputs found
Personal Papers (MS 80-0002)
No full textLetter from A. H. Blackshear, Jr. to H. B. Stenzel sending two tickets to A&M football
Personal Papers (MS 80-0002)
No full textLetter from D. W. Kempner to Henry B. Stenzel, asking him for help in securing tickets for the November Texas - A. & M. game
Inversenbildung und Komplettierung bei topologischen Ringen und Körpern
No full textStenzel M. Inversenbildung und Komplettierung bei topologischen Ringen und Körpern. Bielefeld; 1978
An inversion formula for the Segal–Bargmann transform on a symmetric space of non-compact type
No full textAbstractWe prove analogs of the heat kernel transform inversion formulae of Golse, Leichtnam and the author [E. Leichtnam, F. Golse, M. Stenzel, Intrinsic microlocal analysis and inversion formulae for the heat equation on compact real-analytic Riemannian manifolds, Ann. Sci. École Norm. Sup. (4) 29 (6) (1996) 669–736. MR1422988 (97h:58153), Theorems 0.3, 0.4] in the setting of a Riemannian symmetric space of Helgason's non-compact type
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Letter to M. Meijer from H.B. Stenzel on 1962-10-09
No full textJackson School of Geoscience
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Letter to M. Meijer from H.B. Stenzel on 1965-10-27
No full textJackson School of Geoscience
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Letter to M. Meijer from H.B. Stenzel on 1964-11-12
No full textJackson School of Geoscience
Anomalies in Auction Choice Behavior
No full textIvanova-Stenzel and Salmon (2004a) established some interesting yet puzzling results regarding bidders’ preferences between auction formats. The finding is that bidders strongly prefer the ascending to the first price sealed bid auction on a ceteris paribus basis but they are not willing to pay up to an entry price for entering into an ascending auction instead of a first price that would equalize the profits between the two. While it was found that risk aversion on the part of the bidders could resolve this anomaly the claim that risk aversion drives overbidding in first price auctions is somewhat controversial. In this study we examine two competing explanations for the observed behavior; loss aversion and “clock aversion”, i.e. a dislike for some aspect of the clock based bidding mechanism. We find that neither alternative explanation can account for bidders’ auction choice behavior leaving risk aversion as the only un-falsified hypothesis
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Letter to Edmund M. Spieker from H.B. Stenzel on 1948-01-26
No full textJackson School of Geoscience
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Letter to M. J. Meijer from H.B. Stenzel on 1963-05-23
No full textJackson School of Geoscience
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