2,695 research outputs found
Agency conflicts, ownership concentration, and legal shareholder protection
No full textThe paper analyzes the interaction between legal shareholder protection, managerial incentives, monitoring and ownership concentration. Legal shareholder protection affects the expropriation of shareholders and the blockholder's incentives to monitor. Because monitoring weakens managerial incentives, both effects jointly determine the relationship between legal protection and ownership concentration. When legal protection and monitoring are substitutes better laws weaken the monitoring incentives and the relationship between legal protection and ownership concentration is non-monotone
MissSupplementalMaterial – Supplemental material for Corepresentation During Joint Action in Marmoset Monkeys (<i>Callithrix jacchus</i>)
No full textSupplemental material, MissSupplementalMaterial for Corepresentation During Joint
Action in Marmoset Monkeys (Callithrix jacchus) by Fabia M.
Miss and Judith M. Burkart in Psychological Science</p
Mimosa tenuipendula Burkart
No full text<p> 48. * <i>Mimosa tenuipendula</i> Burkart</p> <p> Known to Barneby (1991) only from limestone outcrops from the valley of the Rio Paraguay in the vicinity of Puerto Cascadas in Dept. Boquerón, Paraguay. A single collection from the dry valleys of Cochabamba (<i>C. Antezana C</i> 1257, BOLV) is apparently attributable to this species, but it remains very poorly known and very sparsely represented in collections.</p>Published as part of <i>Margoth Atahuachi, M. Leontien Van Der Bent, John R. I. Wood, Gwilym P. Lewis & Colin E. Hughes, 2016, Bolivian Mimosa (Leguminosae, Mimosoideae): three new species and a species checklist, pp. 201-222 in Phytotaxa 260 (3)</i> on page 219, DOI: 10.11646/phytotaxa.260.3.1, <a href="http://zenodo.org/record/192175">http://zenodo.org/record/192175</a>
Agency conflicts in public and negotiated transfers of corporate control
No full textWe analyze control transfers in firms with a dominant minority blockholder and
otherwise dispersed owners, and show that the transaction mode is important.
Negotiated block trades preserve a low level of ownership concentration, inducing
more inefficient extraction of private benefits. In contrast, public acquisitions increase
ownership concentration, resulting in fewer private benefits and higher firm
value. Within our model, the incumbent and new controlling party prefer to trade
the block because of the dispersed shareholders’ free-riding behavior. We also explore
the regulatory implications of this agency problem and its impact on the terms of block trade
Text-fig. 5. Eomys schluneggeri n. sp. from Rigi 2. a) P4 – M3; P4 sin.: Rgi 31, M1/2 sin.: DKRgi1, M1/2 dext. (reversed): DKRgi2, M3 dext. (reversed): DKRgi3. b) P – M sin.; P sin.: DKRgi4, M sin.: DKRgi5, M sin. Rgi 23, M sin.: DKRgi6. All figures at 4 3 4 1 2 3 magnification 35×. in Eomys Helveticus N. Sp. And Eomys Schluneggeri N. Sp., Two New Small Eomyids Of The Chattian (Mp 25/Mp 26) Subalpine Lower Freshwater Molasse Of Switzerland
No full textText-fig. 5. Eomys schluneggeri n. sp. from Rigi 2. a) P4 – M3; P4 sin.: Rgi 31, M1/2 sin.: DKRgi1, M1/2 dext. (reversed): DKRgi2, M3 dext. (reversed): DKRgi3. b) P – M sin.; P sin.: DKRgi4, M sin.: DKRgi5, M sin. Rgi 23, M sin.: DKRgi6. All figures at 4 3 4 1 2 3 magnification 35×.Published as part of Engesser, Burkart & Kälin, Daniel, 2017, Eomys Helveticus N. Sp. And Eomys Schluneggeri N. Sp., Two New Small Eomyids Of The Chattian (Mp 25/Mp 26) Subalpine Lower Freshwater Molasse Of Switzerland, pp. 213-224 in Fossil Imprint 73 (1-2) on page 217, DOI: 10.2478/if-2017-0012, http://zenodo.org/record/538399
Large Shareholders, Monitoring, and the Value of the Firm
No full textWe propose that dispersed outside ownership and the resulting managerial discretion come with costs but also with benefits. Even when tight control by shareholders is ex post efficient, it constitutes ex ante an expropriation threat that reduces managerial initiative and noncontractible investments. In addition, we show that equity implements state contingent control, a feature usually associated with debt. Finally, we demonstrate that monitoring, and hence ownership concentration, may conflict with performance-based incentive schemes
Trade Credit and Credit Rationing in Canadian Firms
No full textBurkart and Ellingsen's (2004) model of trade credit and bank credit rationing predicts that trade credit will be used by medium-wealth and low-wealth firms to help ease bank credit rationing. The author tests these and other predictions of Burkart and Ellingsen's model using a large sample of more than 28,000 Canadian firms. She uses an endogenous method to divide the firms into the appropriate wealth categories, rather than arbitrarily selecting firms likely to be credit rationed. The data support the main predictions of Burkart and Ellingsen's model quite well. The author finds that medium-wealth firms substitute trade credit for bank credit consistent with using it to alleviate bank credit rationing. The low-wealth firms use trade credit, but it is positively linked to their bank credit, which suggests that those firms are constrained in both bank credit and trade credit markets, and so cannot use trade credit to adjust as much to negative shocks. The findings also suggest that there are very few unconstrained, high-wealth Canadian firms. The author also finds that low-wealth, declining, and distressed firms supply proportionally more trade credit than firms that have healthier balance sheets. This is surprising, but has been found in earlier studies as well. It may reflect some exploitation of market power by the customers of such firms.Financial markets; Credit and credit aggregates
Minority Blocks and Takeover Premia
No full textThis paper analyses takeovers of companies owned by atomistic shareholders and by one minority blockholder, all of whom can only decide to tender or retain their shares. As private benefit extraction is inefficient, the posttakeover share value increases with the bidder's shareholdings. In a successful takeover, the blockholder tenders all his shares and the small shareholders tender the amount needed so that the posttakeover share value matches the bid price. Compared to a fully dispersed target company, the bidder may have to offer a higher price either to win the blockholder's support or to attract enough shares from small shareholders
Why Higher Takeover Premia Protect Minority Shareholders
No full textPosttakeover moral hazard by the acquirer and free-riding by the target shareholders lead the former to buy as few shares as necessary to gain control. As moral hazard is most severe under low ownership concentration, inefficiencies arise in successful takeovers. Moreover, share supply is shown to be upward-sloping. Rules promoting ownership concentration limit both agency costs and the occurrence of takeovers. One share-one vote and simple majority are generally not optimal, and socially optimal rules need not emerge through private contracting
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