1,721,154 research outputs found
The Volitive and the Executive Function of Intentions
Full text linkMany philosophers of action conceive intentions functionally, as executive states: intentions are mental states that represent an action and tend to cause this action. In the philosophical tradition another function of intentions, which may be called "volitive", played a much more prominent role: intentions are mental states that represent what kind of actions we want and prefer to be realized and thus synthesize in a possibly rational way our motivational, desiderative and perhaps affective as well as cognitive attitudes towards this action. In the paper it is argued that intentions must fulfil both functions. Then a concept of ‘intention’ is developed that integrates both functions
Priorità per chi sta peggio. Valori e norme morali nel prioritarismo etico
No full textIl prioritarismo è un'etica normativa, che dà priorità al miglioramento della situazione di chi sta peggio, rispetto al miglioramento per chi sta meglio. Peggio uno sta più grande è la priorità. Tuttavia questa priorità non è mai infinita, ma consiste in un peso (limitatamente) più alto assegnato a modificazioni della situazione di chi sta peggio. Il contributo si propone di sviluppare e giustificare un'etica prioritarista, sia la parte assiologica di quest'etica, cioè il criterio di valutazione morale, sia la parte normativa in senso stretto, cioè gli obblighi morali secondo una tale etica. Più precisamente, il saggio comincia con una riflessione metodologica, nella quale vengono stabilite condizioni d'adeguatezza per la giustificazione di una morale, che implicano un certo tipo di internalismo morale. Poi l'applicazione di queste condizioni sulla parte assiologica dell'etica, basandosi su una ricerca psicologica dei motivi per l'agire morale che identifica come motivo moralmente più significativo la compassione, porta ad una funzione prioritarista della desiderabilità morale. L'applicazione delle condizioni d'adeguatezza alla parte normativa dell'etica, porta invece ad una concezione degli obblighi morali che in gran parte si appoggia su norme socialmente in vigore, che cerca però di migliorare, in un processo storico, con interventi politici
Analytische Philosophie und Logik
No full textThe article examines the relation between analytic philosophy and logics. While 'logic' is easily definable as: theory of formally valid inferences, for 'analytic philosophy' only several ideal characteristics can be provided, in particular: clearness, argumentativity, use of a wide spectrum of good epistemic instruments (logic, probability theory, decision theory, linguistic analysis...), use of empirical information, practical utility. Hard versus soft analytical philosophy can be distinguished in how far it shows these characteristics. After such clarifications, finally, the relation between analytical philosophy and logics is analysed: analytical philosophy has to respect logics but logic is only one of its many subjects etc
Diskurs- und Argumentationstheorie der Wahrheit?
No full textThe paper is a critique of discourse theory and argumentation theory of truth, in particular in the version of Wolfgang Becker. One of the main criticism is that the structure of arguments is designed in such a way as to guide a process of cognising that the truth criteria of the claim are fulfilled. This implies that argumentation (and argumentation theory) presupposes independent truth criteria. Hence an argumentation theory of truth is viciously circular
Quellen der Moral. Plädoyer für einen prudentiellen Altruismus
No full textMoralbegründungen schöpfen die zu begründenden Moralitätskriterien typischerweise aus einer Quelle wie z. B. Rationalität oder moralische Intuition. Ziel des Aufsatzes ist, zu klären, welche derartige Quelle zur triftigen Moralbegründung geeignet ist. (1) Formale Adäquatheitsbedingungen für triftige Moralbegründungen werden vorgestellt. (2) Nur ein rationalistischer Ansatz ist zur triftigen Moralbegründung im Sinne dieser Bedingungen geeignet. (3) Die Adäquatheitsbedingungen werden um Überlegungen zum Sinn einer sozial verbindlichen Moral erweitert, die ein prudentiell konsensualistisches Verständnis solch einer Moral nahelegen. (4) Unter den rationalistischen Konzeptionen führt nur eine prudentielle Verstärkung entscheidungstheoretischer Rationalitätskriterien zusammen mit einem Ansetzen an moralnahen Motiven (= prudentieller Altruismus), insbesondere am Mitgefühl, zu der konsensualistischen Moral. (5) Problem dieses Ansatzes ist jedoch, daß das zugrunde gelegte Motiv ziemlich schwach ist. Die Lösung dieses Problems (6) führt zu einer Historisierung der Moral
Integrative Wirtschaftsethik besser ohne Diskursethik
No full textThe paper is a critique of Peter Ulrich's Integrative Economic Ethics. While Ulrich's political and moral view of the economic system - in contrast to a view of economics as a quasi-natural system - as well as is sustained, the philosophical foundation of Integrative Economic Ethics on Discourse Ethics is criticised: Discourse Ethics uses a confused criterion of validity of moral norms
Kantischer Externalismus und Motive zu moralischem Handeln
No full text(1) Kantianer möchten Moral begründen ohne Rekurs auf Motive, die diese Moral inhaltlich bestimmen (= fundativer Externalismus); gleichwohl soll diese Begründung Menschen zur Moralbefolgung bewegen (= praktische Forderung). Dies setzt voraus, 1. daß es motivationsverleihende Mechanismen gibt, die selbst inhaltlich einigermaßen neutral sind, aber moralischen Urteilen folgen, und 2. daß diese motivationsverleihenden Mechanismen auch einer externalistisch begründeten Moral motivationale Kraft verleihen. Thema des Artikels ist, ob diese beiden Bedingungen erfüllt sind. (2-7) Diverse logisch mögliche motivationsverleihende Mechanismen werden moralpsychologisch untersucht, u.a. ein Handeln aus reiner Vernunft und ein apriorisches Motiv der Achtung vor dem Sittengesetz, und bis auf einen, den Wunsch nach Selbstwertsteigerung, als empirisch inexistent oder zu eng verworfen. (8) Eine Skizze einer Psychologie des moralischen Urteils zeigt aber, daß dieser Mechanismus die zweite Bedingung nicht erfüllt. Ein praktischer fundativer Externalismus ist also aus empirischen Gründen nicht möglich
Ein Maximinprinzip der Güterverteilung - Zu Kollers Theorie der sozialen Gerechtigkeit
No full textThe paper criticizes maximin principles of distributive justice in general and in particular Peter Koller's respective approach. A better alternative which takes up several ideas behind the maximin principle but does not have the disadvantages of this principle is prioritarianism
Epistemic norms for public political arguments
Full text linkThe aim of the article is to develop precise epistemic rules for good public political arguments, by which political measures in the broad sense are justified. By means of a theory of deliberative democracy, it is substantiated that the justification of a political measure consists in showing argumentatively that this measure most promotes the common good or is morally optimal. It is then discussed which argumentation-theoretical approaches are suitable for providing epistemically sound rules for arguments for such theses and for the associated premises, rules whose compliance implies the truth or acceptability of the thesis. Finally, on the basis of the most suitable approach, namely the epistemological one, such systems of rules for the required types of arguments are presented that fulfil the conditions mentioned
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