1,374,905 research outputs found
Stan Luck
No full text"Stan Luck VX21737 2nd/14th Fd.Regt 1941 to 1943 [Signature] SELuck".Stan Luck VX21737. 2nd/14th Field Regiment, 1941 to 1943. [Signature] SELuck
The problem of moral luck: An argument against its epistemic reduction
No full textWhom I call 'epistemic reductionists' in this article are critics of the notion of 'moral luck' that maintain that all supposed cases of moral luck are illusory; they are in fact cases of what I describe as a special form of epistemic luck, the only difference lying in what we get to know about someone, rather than in what (s)he deserves in terms of praise or blame. I argue that epistemic reductionists are mistaken. They implausibly separate judgements of character from judgements concerning acts, and they assume a conception of character that is untenable both from a common sense perspective and with a view to findings from social psychology. I use especially the example of Scobie, the protagonist of Graham Greene's novel The Heart of the Matter, to show that moral luck is real-that there are cases of moral luck that cannot be reduced to epistemic luck. The reality of moral luck, in this example at least, lies in its impact on character and personal and moral identity. © 2009 Springer Science Media B.V
Free will and luck
No full textThe problem of free will is a problem about control and luck. If causal determinism is true, then everything we do is ultimately a matter of luck, as it is if causal determinism is false. Either way we seem to lack free will of the kind needed for moral responsibility. In this thesis a case is built for a certain type of modest incompatibilist view on free will. It is argued that it makes no difference in terms of control whether determinism or indeterminism obtains. What matters is that we have a certain kind of ownership over what we do. Causal determinism rules this out, but indeterminism does not. This has the upshot that not only does free will turn out to be compatible with luck, exposure to a certain kind of luck is actually required, for unless we are exposed to this kind of luck our actions will not be truly ours. By providing luck with a positive role this thesis invites a re-evaluation of the reasons causal determinism destroys free will, and a re-evaluation of our attitudes towards luck. In short this thesis challenges the anti-luckism that lies behind the problem of free will
Unifying Agent Systems
No full textWhilst there has been an explosion of interest in multi-agent systems, there are still many problems that may have a potentially deleterious impact on the progress of the area. These prob- lems have arisen primarily through the lack of a common structure and language for understanding multi-agent systems, and with which to organise and pursue research in this area. In response to this, previous work has been concerned with developing a computational formal framework for agency and autonomy which, we argue, provides an environment in which to develop, evaluate, and compare systems and theories of multi-agent systems. In this paper we go some way towards justifying these claims by reviewing the framework and showing what we can achieve within it by developing models of agent dimensions, categorising key inter-agent relationships and by ap- plying it to evaluate existing multi-agent systems in a coherent computational model. We outline the benefits of specifying each of the systems within the framework and consider how it allows us to unify different systems and approaches in general
Epistemic luck
No full textIn almost any domain of endeavour, successes can be attained through skill, but also by dumb luck.
An archer’s wildest shots occasionally hit the target. Against enormous odds, some fair lottery tickets
happen to win. The same goes in the case of purely cognitive or intellectual endeavours. As
inquirers, we characteristically aim to believe truly rather than falsely, and to attain such standings as
knowledge and understanding. Sometimes such aims are attained with commendable competence,
but of course, not always. Epistemic luck is a species of luck which features in circumstances where
a given cognitive success—in the broadest sense, some form of cognitive contact with reality—is
attained in a manner that is (in some to-be-specified sense) interestingly lucky—viz., chancy,
accidental or beyond our control. In the paradigmatic case, this involves the formation of a belief
that is luckily true, and where the subject plausibly deserves little credit for having gotten things
right. Although the literature on epistemic luck has focused predominantly on the relationship
between luck and propositional knowledge—which is widely taken to (in some sense) exclude
luck—epistemologists are increasingly exploring the compatibility of epistemic luck with other kinds
of epistemic standings, such as knowledge-how and understanding
Psi may look like luck: Perceived luckiness and beliefs about luck in relation to precognition.
No full textSmith (1998) has shown that different people use the term 'luck' to mean different things, some of which might be used euphemistically to account for psi experiences. However, previous luck-psi experiments have only measured luck via the Perceived Personal Luckiness (PPL) scale without investigating what participants actually mean by the term, so in this study luck beliefs were measured using the Questionnaire of Beliefs about Luck (QBL). Previous literature indicates that luck might best be understood in terms of Stanford's model of 'psi-mediated instrumental response' (PMIR), so 100 participants completed a PMIR-inspired non-intentional precognition experiment with static fractal images as targets, and depending on success experienced either a task involving erotic images (psi incentive) or a boring vigilance task (psi disincentive). The mean psi score over ten forced-choice trials was 2.85 (MCE = 2.5), which gives a significant overall precognition effect (t[99] = 2.508, p = 0.014, r = 0.244). Furthermore, scores on the PPL and the Luck subscale of the QBL were found to correlate significantly with precognition performance (r = 0.263, p = 0.008 for both). However, only the Luck subscale was found to be a significant predictor variable of psi score (adjusted R² = 0.06, t[99] = 2.7, p = 0.008), indicating that beliefs about luck are more relevant to psi performance than PPL alone. Psi task performance was also related to belief in psi (rs[98] = 0.236, p = 0.02) and suggestively with belief in the paranormal (rs[98] = 0.194, p = 0.10), offering tentative support for the notion that psi ability drives belief initially. Precognition performance was also found to be suggestively higher amongst the erotically reactive than the erotically unreactive (t[99] = 1.65, p = 0.10), offering indirect support for the experiment's validity and the need-serving aspect of PMIR. A number of other exploratory hypotheses are discussed. The findings support the suggested relationship between luck and psi but further investigations should consider beliefs about luck and not just perceived luckiness
Understanding, luck, and communicative value
No full textDoes utterance understanding require reliable (i.e. non-lucky) recovery of the speaker's intended proposition? There are good reasons to answer in the affirmative: the role of understanding in supporting testimonial knowledge seemingly requires such reliability. Moreover, there seem to be communicative analogues of Gettier cases in which luck precludes the audience's understanding an utterance despite recovering the intended proposition. Yet, there are some major problems for the view that understanding requires such reliability. First, there are a number of cases in which understanding seems to occur in a lucky way. In light of these cases I argue that we need to narrow down the precise sense in which understanding precludes luck—the anti-luck condition attached to linguistic understanding is importantly different to anti-luck conditions typically applied to knowledge. Secondly, Megan Hyska has recently argued that, assuming understanding precludes luck, we get a communicative analogue of the value problem for knowledge: i.e. why is it better to meet the other conditions for understanding in a reliable way than in a lucky way? It is natural to assume that we can simply port over our favoured responses to the epistemic value problem in response to Hyska's challenge. I argue that, due to the difference between epistemic and communicative luck (discussed in response to the first problem), this cannot be done. The epistemic and communicative value problems will require different solutions. I close by sketching the beginnings of an alternative answer to the value problem for communication.</p
A Conceptual Framework for Agent Definition and Development
No full textThe use of agents of many different kinds in a variety of fields of computer science and
artificial intelligence is increasing rapidly and is due, in part, to their wide applicability. The
richness of the agent metaphor that leads to many different uses of the term is, however, both a
strength and a weakness: its strength lies in the fact that it can be applied in very many different
ways in many situations for different purposes; the weakness is that the term agent is now used so
frequently that there is no commonly accepted notion of what it is that constitutes an agent. This
paper addresses this issue by applying formal methods to provide a defining framework for agent
systems. The Z specification language is used to provide an accessible and unified formal account
of agent systems, allowing us to escape from the terminological chaos that surrounds agents. In
particular, the framework precisely and unambiguously provides meanings for common concepts
and terms, enables alternative models of particular classes of system to be described within it, and
provides a foundation for subsequent development of increasingly more refined concepts
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Gambling, luck and superstition: a brief psychological overview
No full textFor what is generally accepted as almost endemic to many a gamblers' disposition - the ideas, practices and responses that combine gambling, luck and superstition - there has been surprisingly little scientific research in this field. As an indication of what can be undertaken subsequently, an intriguing picture emerges of how this affects players' character and motivations as gamblers according to the type of gambling engaged, including its relationship to chance and skill
Beliefs around luck : confirming the empirical conceptualization of beliefs around luck and the development of the Darke and Freedman beliefs around luck scale
No full textThe current study developed a multi-dimensional measure of beliefs around luck. Two studies introduced the Darke and Freedman beliefs around luck scale where the scale showed a consistent 4 component model (beliefs in luck, rejection of luck, being lucky, and being unlucky) across two samples (n = 250; n = 145). The scales also show adequate reliability statistics and validity by ways of comparison with other measures of beliefs around luck, peer and family ratings and expected associations with measures of personality, individual difference and well-being variables
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