1,721,228 research outputs found
The distinction between conscious and unconscious cognition in David R. Shanks’s work: A critical assessment
Full text linkAbstract The notion of unconscious finds support in many experimental studies that use the dissociation method. This method allows us to distinguish between conscious and unconscious mental states when participants cannot explain why they performed as they did in an experiment. The paper will discuss the notion of unconscious by considering David R. Shanks’ criticisms of the application of the dissociation method: it will assess three studies Shanks proposes as reexaminations of three other relevant studies in the literature and show how Shanks’ work provides an examination of the methodological pitfalls of such studies. The paper will argue that, although Shanks’s results are relevant regarding theories about the structure of cognition, his theoretical positions are at best confused and at worst diminish the importance of his research outcomes. It will conclude by showing why Shanks’s results that legitimize the role of consciousness in cognition can be problematic for the physicalistic or materialistic framework endorsed by cognitive psychologists.Keywords: Dissociation Method; Dual-process Theories; Cognitive Psychology; Consciousness; UnconsciousLa distinzione tra cognizione conscia e inconscia nell’opera di D.R. Schanks: una valutazione criticaRiassunto: La nozione di inconscio trova supporto in vari studi sperimentali che utilizzano il metodo della dissociazione. Secondo la letteratura cognitivista questo metodo permette di distinguere tra stati mentali consci e inconsci quando i partecipanti non sono in grado di riportare verbalmente il perché si sono comportati in un certo modo durante l’esecuzione di un compito sperimentale. Il presente articolo discute la nozione di inconscio in relazione alle critiche di David R. Shanks all’applicazione del metodo della dissociazione. Più precisamente, esso valuta tre studi che Shanks propone come repliche e rivalutazioni di altrettante ricerche a favore della cognizione inconscia e mostra l’autore riesca con successo a metterne in luce le carenze metodologiche. Inoltre, sostiene anche che, sebbene i risultati sperimentali di Shanks siano importanti per le teorie sulla struttura della cognizione, le sue posizioni teoriche sono quantomeno confuse e rischiano di ridimensionare la portata delle sue conclusioni empiriche e metodologiche. L’articolo conclude mostrando le ragioni per cui i risultati di Shanks, che legittimano il ruolo della coscienza nella cognizione, siano controversi in quanto adottano una posizione filosofica fisicalistica o materialistica comune alla maggioranza degli psicologi cognitivi.Parole chiave: Metodo della dissociazione; Teorie del doppio processo; Psicologia cognitiva; Coscienza; InconscioAbstract The notion of unconscious finds support in many experimental studies that use the dissociation method. This method allows us to distinguish between conscious and unconscious mental states when participants cannot explain why they performed as they did in an experiment. The paper will discuss the notion of unconscious by considering David R. Shanks’ criticisms of the application of the dissociation method: it will assess three studies Shanks proposes as reexaminations of three other relevant studies in the literature and show how Shanks’ work provides an examination of the methodological pitfalls of such studies. The paper will argue that, although Shanks’s results are relevant regarding theories about the structure of cognition, his theoretical positions are at best confused and at worst diminish the importance of his research outcomes. It will conclude by showing why Shanks’s results that legitimize the role of consciousness in cognition can be problematic for the physicalistic or materialistic framework endorsed by cognitive psychologists.Keywords: Dissociation Method; Dual-process Theories; Cognitive Psychology; Consciousness; Unconscious La distinzione tra cognizione conscia e inconscia nell’opera di D.R. Schanks: una valutazione criticaRiassunto: La nozione di inconscio trova supporto in vari studi sperimentali che utilizzano il metodo della dissociazione. Secondo la letteratura cognitivista questo metodo permette di distinguere tra stati mentali consci e inconsci quando i partecipanti non sono in grado di riportare verbalmente il perché si sono comportati in un certo modo durante l’esecuzione di un compito sperimentale. Il presente articolo discute la nozione di inconscio in relazione alle critiche di David R. Shanks all’applicazione del metodo della dissociazione. Più precisamente, esso valuta tre studi che Shanks propone come repliche e rivalutazioni di altrettante ricerche a favore della cognizione inconscia e mostra l’autore riesca con successo a metterne in luce le carenze metodologiche. Inoltre, sostiene anche che, sebbene i risultati sperimentali di Shanks siano importanti per le teorie sulla struttura della cognizione, le sue posizioni teoriche sono quantomeno confuse e rischiano di ridimensionare la portata delle sue conclusioni empiriche e metodologiche. L’articolo conclude mostrando le ragioni per cui i risultati di Shanks, che legittimano il ruolo della coscienza nella cognizione, siano controversi in quanto adottano una posizione filosofica fisicalistica o materialistica comune alla maggioranza degli psicologi cognitivi.Parole chiave: Metodo della dissociazione; Teorie del doppio processo; Psicologia cognitiva; Coscienza; Inconsci
Recensione di C. Lucifora, C.M. Vicario, Il cervello morale. Dalle scienze cognitive all'intelligenza artificiale
Full text linkReview of the book l cervello morale. Dalle scienze cognitive all’intelligenza artificiale by Chiara Lucifora e Carmelo Mario Vicari
Philosophical and Empirical Approaches to Psychology. Mentalism vs. Antimentalism
No full textPhilosophical and Empirical Approaches to Psychology: Mentalism vs. Anti-Mentalism philosophically analyzes four different approaches to psychology: introspectionism, behaviourism, cognitive psychology, and cognitive neuroscience to explore the concept of “the mind,” which developed from the late nineteenth and early twentieth century up through present day psychology. The resulting ideas originating from these approaches are divided into two main groups in this book, mentalism (whose supporters assume that mind is not reducible to something else) and anti-mentalism (whose supporters assume that mind is indeed reducible to something else). This book argues that adopting one idea over another can have a profound influence in a psychologist’s research. Further, the author shows that some controversial psychological notions like “consciousness” pertain to a particular mentalistic approach. Many psychologists do not consider such notions scientific, but he argues that this depends upon their adherence to a certain anti-mentalistic approach or to a specific mentalistic perspective. The book examines these issues by assessing experimental psychology in relation to neurobiology and philosophy, offering an integration of philosophical and theoretical chapters along with empirical and experimental chapters. Theoretically, the arguments draw from philosophy of psychology and experimental psychology.
Using empirical research, Philosophical and Empirical Approaches to Psychology examines the role of the various mentalistic and anti-mentalistic approaches to psychology by integrating epistemological analysis and empirical research
Self-Perception Theory, Radical Behaviourism, and the Publicity/Privacy Issue.
No full textAccording to Bem’s self-perception theory, people know their own minds in the same way that they know those of others: they infer their own minds by observing their own behavior and the circumstances in which this behavior takes place. Although Bem’s theory seems anti-introspectionistic, it claims that people infer their minds by observing their own behavior only when internal cues are weak, ambiguous, or un- interpretable. This has led some to argue that Bem does not rule out a priori introspec- tive access to the mind and thus introspection as a research method. This paper will discuss self-perception theory and its influence over recent research and will argue that introspection is not an autonomous research method. This is so because of its radical behavioristic outlook, according to which all methods and data of psychology must be public and not private. Then, the paper will discuss the epistemological implications of this behavioristic attitude on psychology. Finally, it will argue in favor of introspection as an autonomous research method and an independent source of data for psychology
Freud’s psychoanalysis, contemporary cognitive/ social psychology, and the case against introspection
No full textAlthough Freud and contemporary cognitive/social psychologists differ with regards to various traditions, vocabularies, methods, and areas of application, they agree in their criticism of the use of introspection as a means of inquiring about the mind. They share not only a strong outlook against introspection but both go so far as to make some outright arguments against introspection. Very briefly, it seems that both of these approaches conceive of introspection and the data stemming from it as hindrances to the construction of a science of mind. After presenting the theoretical assumptions and methodological underpinnings of contemporary cognitive/social psychology and Freud’s psychoanalysis, this article will compare them so as to highlight their differences and commonalities. The paper will conclude by arguing that both approaches appear to reject introspection as a method of inquiry because each understands psychology to be a natural science that is free from subjectivity
Neuralizing decision-making: A critical account.
No full textIt is discussed the status of neuroeconomics as a scientifici discipline
Neuroeconomics, Identity Theory, and the Issue of Correlation
No full textThe paper deals with the issue of the scientific status of neuroeconomics and of its ontological foundations
Reasons versus Causes in Arocha’s Scientific Realism
Full text linkArocha’s scientific realism (2021) puts at the center of psychology the individual and their variability in behavior: the individual appears to be irreducible to what emerges from the analysis of aggregate data. According to this position, psychology’s aim is to uncover the mechanisms underlying the observable world. This entails adopting the cause-based approach of the natural sciences. Arocha’s article also refers to final causes and intentions and thus to the reason-based approach of the human sciences in contrast to that of the natural sciences. Thus, it is not clear whether the article aims to reduce the final causes to mechanical causes or supports the irreducibility of the former. Starting from these remarks, this comment will argue that the reason-based approach is preferable to the cause-based approach in order to have a scientific psychology. Adopting the reason-based approach also avoids the appeal to aggregate data by focusing upon the single case
The Relationship between Introspection and Folk Psychology: An Overview
Full text linkThe epistemic status of introspection remains a controversial topic. due to its subjective char- acter, introspection is not an easy fit with natural sciences or a physicalistic picture of the mind. In literature, introspection is conceived as dealing only with macro-cognition and not with micro-cognition, the supposed object of study of scientific psychology. This essay dis- cusses the epistemic status of introspection in light of its relationship with folk psychology and spells it out through an analysis of the positions of Wilkes, Alston, Schwitzgebel, and Churchland. Specifically, the essay makes a distinction between folk and scientific psychol- ogy and addresses the issue of the incorrigibility/infallibility of introspective judgments. The essay endorses a view according to which introspection should be conceived as a cognitive process the contents of which are provided by folk knowledge. It shows how this view can be appreciated as scientific, provided that a physicalistic image of the mind is rejected
The inside and the outside. Psychoanalysis and architecture
No full textThis book explores how psychoanalysis and architecture can enhance and increase the chances of mental 'containment', while also fostering exchange between inside and outside.
The way in which psychoanalysts take care of mental suffering, and the way in which architects and city planners assess the environment, are grounded in a shared concern with the notion of 'dwelling'. It is a matter of fact that dwelling exists in a complex context comprised of both biological need and symbolic function. Psychoanalysis and architecture can work together in both thinking about and designing not only our homes but also the analyst’s consulting rooms and, more generally, our therapy places. However, this is possible only if they renounce the current limited and restrictive model of this interaction, and propose one more that is more in harmony with the questions and situations that clients themselves pose.
Creating sustainable and integrative relationships with the buildings in which we inhabit everyday - whether they are our houses, public buildings (such as schools and prisons), or therapeutic spaces (hospitals, clinics, and consulting rooms) - can be a measure both of the degree of the advancement of a society and of the quality of its institutions
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