1,720,999 research outputs found
The evidence of evil
Full text linkDoes evil constitute any evidence against the existence of God? Stephen Wykstra argues that it does not, claiming that “if we have realized the magnitude of the theistic proposal, cognizance of suffering ... should not in the least reduce our confidence that it is true”. I argue that he is mistaken. I outline a framework for modelling the confidence we lend to propositions and assessing the rational propriety of such confidences both at a given time and over time, and apply this framework to the issue at hand by imagining a scenario in which a subject observes for the first time a terrible evil. I argue that no matter which one of us this subject is, he ought to undergo a reduction in confidence in the existence of God as a result of this observation. The bulk of this thesis is taken up with a defence of two central premises of this argument, the most controversial of which is, roughly speaking, that our subject ought to be more confident of the occurrence of the evil on the supposition that God does not exist than on the supposition that He does. In the course of a defence of this premise I seek to counter the challenge to evidential arguments from evil made by the 'Sceptical Theists' and the challenge, based on the claim that in deciding which evils to permit God may have to draw an arbitrary line, that van Inwagen issues
Reformed epistemology and naturalistic explanations of religious belief: an inquiry into the epistemological implications of the cognitive science of religion
Full text linkReformed Epistemology is an influential view in contemporary philosophy of religion, according to which theistic beliefs that are the product of our native, non-inferential cognitive faculties often constitute knowledge if God exists. My aim in this thesis is to ascertain whether Reformed Epistemology is viable in light of contemporary scientific explanations of the mechanisms of religious belief- formation, especially the Cognitive Science of Religion (CSR). I argue for a qualified “yes.” To begin with, I attempt to carefully reconstruct and scrutinise some currently popular “debunking arguments” from CSR’s findings, which aim to show that non-inferential religious beliefs are not knowledge, even if true, given the causal origins that CSR ascribes to them. I try to show that in various ways these arguments fail. Subsequently, I attempt to find a better such argument. The strongest debunking argument, I contend, is one that focuses upon the diverse and mutually inconsistent outputs of the religious belief-producing mechanisms described by CSR. However, I go on to argue that even supposing that this argument succeeds in showing that religious beliefs that are partly the product of contingent cultural influences are not knowledge even if true, there remains a body of what I term “core propositions”—propositions concerning the existence of some kind of personal, supernatural creator and moral lawgiver, in which humans are naturally disposed to believe regardless of their particular cultural setting— that can be known if God exists. Finally, I try to show that merely having this core supernaturalistic knowledge would provide someone with the cognitive contact with God that is sufficient for having a personal relationship with God (if God exists), even if only de re relationship. I argue, moreover, that God would have positively good reasons for creating a world in which human beliefs about life’s most important matters, including religious matters, are significantly dependent upon testimony and hence subject to the ebbs and flows of cultural tides
The principle of grace according to Thomas Aquinas
Full text linkMy thesis investigates Thomas Aquinasâ doctrine of Grace. There are several aspects to
this doctrine, and I am primarily interested in Aquinasâ claim that God bestows a
supernatural quality on some human beingsâa quality called âgraceâ. In the thesis I am
concerned with two research questions: is the quality of grace necessary for justification
and/or sanctification? And if it is, how does a person get it?
Discussion of Aquinasâ doctrine of grace has been widespread in certain schools of
Thomism, notably the Strict-Observance School (see Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange),
Augustinian Thomism (see the work of Henri de Lubac, particularly his Mystere du
Surnaturel), and Transcendental Thomism (see Karl Rahner). One school of Thomism
where discussion of grace is lacking is that of âanalytical Thomismâ (Haldane, 2004). One
could argue that analytical Thomism might come under another recent movement within
theology: namely, analytic theology (Crisp and Rea, 2009). I adopt a methodology roughly
characteristic of either analytical Thomism or analytic theology.
For Aquinas, the quality of grace is needed for the processes of both justification and
sanctification. In my first chapter I get clear on the nature of this quality, engaging in a
debate over whether it is created or uncreated. In the second chapter I look to the
thought of Duns Scotus and William of Ockham to begin to address the question of
whether created grace is necessary for justification and acceptance to eternal life. I then
look to the reformers, particularly Calvin, in whom we find a wholesale rejection of the
need for created grace for justification. Noting the agreement of Aquinas and Calvin on
the need for new dispositions for sanctification (what Aquinas simply calls âgraceâ), I move
on to the question of how a person gets created grace. I compare Aquinas and Calvin on
the necessary and sufficient conditions for a bestowal of grace in the Eucharist. Finally, I
seek to address the question of the plausibility of the claim that created grace is bestowed
through material rites like the sacraments.</p
The "greater goods" response to the argument from divine hiddenness
Full text linkArguments from divine hiddenness attempt to demonstrate that the apparent hiddenness of God is a reason for thinking God does not exist. One of the most prominent arguments from divine hiddenness maintains that if God existed He would do what He could to ensure that all persons have access to conscious personal relationship with Him. But since such relationship is impossible for those who do not believe God exists, God would ensure that everyone has evidence sufficient to believe that He exists. That there are people who do not believe God exists due only to a lack of evidence is therefore a reason for thinking that God does not exist. One of the most prominent ways to respond to this kind of argument from divine hiddenness is to maintain that God withholds evidence of Himself in order to bring about some greater good or another.
But there are a few challenges facing these âgreater goodsâ responses. First, some proposed greater goods benefit only someone other than the nonbeliever; one might argue that God would not withhold evidence sufficient for belief from one person entirely for the benefit of another person. Second, some proposed greater goods presuppose libertarian free will; but it has been argued that God would not allow such free will due to the great evil it brings about. Third, if a conscious personal relationship with God is greater than all other goods we might wonder how there could be goods for the sake of which God would be willing to withhold such relationship from some people. Finally, if God is infinitely resourceful and if all goods come from God, it is somewhat puzzling how there could be goods which preclude conscious personal relationship with God. In this thesis I aim to address these challenges to greater goods responses to the hiddenness argument.</p
Towards a Catholic epistemology
Full text linkIn this thesis, I develop a Catholic analysis of faith and reason, drawing on insights from a movement in contemporary analytic philosophy: Reformed Epistemology. In my first chapter, I explain that despite criticism from Catholic philosophers, Reformed Epistemology provides a broadly salutary model of faith. Inspired by Reformed Epistemology, I develop a further model (âCounter-Reformed Epistemologyâ) which is philosophically defensible, and which accords well with a set of theological desiderata for such a model drawn from the Churchâs dogmatic teaching about faith. These desiderata include divine faith consisting of propositional assent to divine revelation which is (at least, in paradigm instances) perfectly certain, rationally tenacious and freely chosen. I argue that CRE accounts for these properties of faith better than competing analyses of faith advanced by Catholic philosophers. In the second chapter, I expand my sketch of CRE, to show how it can account for the possibility of âimplicitâ Catholic faith in those who non-culpably fail to believe in the gospel. In doing so, I also compare CRE to the insights of Rahner and von Balthasar, who are important representatives of modern approaches to âfundamental theologyâ. In the remainder of my thesis, I aim to show that CRE has considerable precedent in Catholic theological tradition. In successive chapters, I argue that Augustine, Aquinas and Newman all advanced religious epistemologies which to different degrees bear considerable similarities to CRE, engaging with various modern interpretations of their work. The support of authors in the tradition should lend plausibility to my model from a Catholic perspective, meaning that Catholics with âbasicâ belief in divine revelation can be fairly confident that their belief is epistemically fitting. In all, I argue that Reformed Epistemology provides the resources to develop a model of faith that accords well with a traditional Catholic understanding of faith and reason.</p
Going Beyond Counting First Authors in Author Co-citation Analysis
Full text linkThe present study examines one of the fundamental aspects of author co-citation analysis (ACA) - the way co-citation
counts are defined. Co-citation counting provides the data on which all subsequent statistical analyses and mappings
are based, and we compare ACA results based on two different types of co-citation counting - the traditional type that
only counts the first one among a cited work's authors on the one hand and a non-traditional type that takes into
account the first 5 authors of a cited work on the other hand. Results indicate that the picture produced through this non-traditional author co-citation counting contains more coherent author groups and is therefore considerably clearer. However, this picture represents fewer specialties in the research field being studied than that produced through the traditional first-author co-citation counting when the same number of top-ranked authors is selected and analyzed. Reasons for these effects are discussed
Variations on the Author
Full text link“Variations on the Author” discusses two of Eduardo Coutinho’s recent films (Um Dia na Vida, from 2010, and Últimas Conversas, posthumously released in 2015) and their contribution to the general question of documentary authorship. The director’s filmography is characterized by a consistent yet self-effacing form of authorial self-inscription: Coutinho often features as an interviewer that rather than express opinions propels discourses; an interviewer that is good at listening. This mode of self-inscription characterizes him as an author who is not expressive but who is nonetheless markedly present on the screen. In Um Dia na Vida, however, Coutinho is completely absent form the image, while Últimas Conversas, on the contrary, includes a confessional prologue that moves the director from the margins to the center of his films. This article examines the ways in which these works stand out in the filmography of a director who offers new insights into the notion of cinematic authorship
Appropriate Similarity Measures for Author Cocitation Analysis
Full text linkWe provide a number of new insights into the methodological discussion about author cocitation analysis. We first argue that the use of the Pearson correlation for measuring the similarity between authors’ cocitation profiles is not very satisfactory. We then discuss what kind of similarity measures may be used as an alternative to the Pearson correlation. We consider three similarity measures in particular. One is the well-known cosine. The other two similarity measures have not been used before in the bibliometric literature. Finally, we show by means of an example that our findings have a high practical relevance.information science;Pearson correlation;cosine;similarity measure;author cocitation analysis
Dispelling the Myths Behind First-author Citation Counts
Full text linkWe conducted a full-scale evaluative citation analysis study of scholars in the XML research field to explore just how different from each other author rankings resulting from different citation counting methods actually are, and to demonstrate the capability of emerging data and tools on the Web in supporting more realistic citation counting methods. Our results contest some common arguments for the continued
use of first-author citation counts in the evaluation of scholars, such as high correlations between author rankings by first-author citation counts and other citation
counting methods, and high costs of using more realistic citation counting methods that are not well-supported by the ISI databases. It is argued that increasingly available digital full text research papers make it possible for citation analysis studies to go beyond what the ISI databases have directly supported and to employ more
sophisticated methods
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