1,720,968 research outputs found
Allocating Indivisible Goods to Strategic Agents: Pure Nash Equilibria and Fairness
Full text linkWe consider the problem of fairly allocating a set of indivisible goods to a set of strategic agents with additive valuation functions. We assume no monetary transfers and, therefore, a mechanism in our setting is an algorithm that takes as input the reported—rather than the true—values of the agents. Our main goal is to explore whether there exist mechanisms that have pure Nash equilibria for every instance and, at the same time, provide fairness guarantees for the allocations that correspond to these equilibria. We focus on two relaxations of envy-freeness, namely envy-freeness up to one good (EF 1 ), and envy-freeness up to any good (EFX ), and we positively answer the above question. In particular, we study two algorithms that are known to produce such allocations in the non-strategic setting: Round-Robin (EF 1 allocations for any number of agents) and a cut and choose algorithm of Plaut and Roughgarden [35] (EFX allocations for two agents). For Round-Robin we show that all of its pure Nash equilibria induce allocations that are EF 1 with respect to the underlying true values, while for the algorithm of Plaut and Roughgarden we show that the corresponding allocations not only are EFX but also satisfy maximin share fairness, something that is not true for this algorithm in the non-strategic setting! Further, we show that a weaker version of the latter result holds for any mechanism for two agents that always has pure Nash equilibria which all induce EFX allocations
Allocating Indivisible Goods to Strategic Agents: Pure Nash Equilibria and Fairness
No full textWe consider the problem of fairly allocating a set of indivisible goods to a set of strategic agents with additive valuation functions. We assume no monetary transfers, and therefore, a mechanism in our setting is an algorithm that takes as input the reported- rather than the true-values of the agents. Our main goal is to explore whether there exist mechanisms that have pure Nash equilibria for every instance and, at the same time, provide fairness guarantees for the allocations that correspond to these equilibria. We focus on two relaxations of envy-freeness, namely, envy-freeness up to one good (EF1) and envy freeness up to any good (EFX), and we positively answer the preceding question. In particular, we study two algorithms that are known to produce such allocations in the nonstrategic setting: round-robin (EF1 allocations for any number of agents) and a cut-and-choose algorithm of Plaut and Roughgarden (EFX allocations for two agents). For round-robin, we show that all of its pure Nash equilibria induce allocations that are EF1 with respect to the underlying true values, whereas for the algorithm of Plaut and Roughgarden, we show that the corresponding allocations not only are EFX, but also satisfy maximin share fairness, something that is not true for this algorithm in the nonstrategic setting! Further, we show that a weaker version of the latter result holds for any mechanism for two agents that always has pure Nash equilibria, which all induce EFX allocations
The infinite server problem
Full text linkWe study a variant of the k-server problem, the infinite server problem, in which infinitely many servers reside initially at a particular point of the metric space and serve a sequence of requests. In the framework of competitive analysis, we show a surprisingly tight connection between this problem and the resource augmentation version of the k-server problem, also known as the (h,k)-server problem, in which an online algorithm with k servers competes against an offline algorithm with h servers. Specifically, we show that the infinite server problem has bounded competitive ratio if and only if the (h,k)-server problem has bounded competitive ratio for some k=O(h). We give a lower bound of 3.146 for the competitive ratio of the infinite server problem, which holds even for the line and some simple weighted stars. It implies the same lower bound for the (h,k)-server problem on the line, even when k/h → ∞, improving on the previous known bounds of 2 for the line and 2.4 for general metrics. For weighted trees and layered graphs, we obtain upper bounds, although they depend on the depth. Of particular interest is the infinite server problem on the line, which we show to be equivalent to the seemingly easier case in which all requests are in a fixed bounded interval. This is a special case of a more general reduction from arbitrary metric spaces to bounded subspaces. Unfortunately, classical approaches (double coverage and generalizations, work function algorithm, balancing algorithms) fail even for this special case
Going Beyond Counting First Authors in Author Co-citation Analysis
Full text linkThe present study examines one of the fundamental aspects of author co-citation analysis (ACA) - the way co-citation
counts are defined. Co-citation counting provides the data on which all subsequent statistical analyses and mappings
are based, and we compare ACA results based on two different types of co-citation counting - the traditional type that
only counts the first one among a cited work's authors on the one hand and a non-traditional type that takes into
account the first 5 authors of a cited work on the other hand. Results indicate that the picture produced through this non-traditional author co-citation counting contains more coherent author groups and is therefore considerably clearer. However, this picture represents fewer specialties in the research field being studied than that produced through the traditional first-author co-citation counting when the same number of top-ranked authors is selected and analyzed. Reasons for these effects are discussed
Variations on the Author
Full text link“Variations on the Author” discusses two of Eduardo Coutinho’s recent films (Um Dia na Vida, from 2010, and Últimas Conversas, posthumously released in 2015) and their contribution to the general question of documentary authorship. The director’s filmography is characterized by a consistent yet self-effacing form of authorial self-inscription: Coutinho often features as an interviewer that rather than express opinions propels discourses; an interviewer that is good at listening. This mode of self-inscription characterizes him as an author who is not expressive but who is nonetheless markedly present on the screen. In Um Dia na Vida, however, Coutinho is completely absent form the image, while Últimas Conversas, on the contrary, includes a confessional prologue that moves the director from the margins to the center of his films. This article examines the ways in which these works stand out in the filmography of a director who offers new insights into the notion of cinematic authorship
Online algorithms for markets
Full text linkThe thesis consists of two parts, both dealing with issues of uncertainty and incentives in markets. In the first part we examine the online properties of markets. In most of the Mechanism Design literature, markets are studied under the assumption that all participants are present at the same time and can seamlessly interact with each other. This may not always be the case in practice. We consider markets where buyers and sellers appear in sequence, one after another, without overlapping and it is the duty of an intermediary to coordinate with them. We take the role of that intermediary and our goal is redistribute items among them to maximise certain objectives, namely the profit, social welfare or gain from trade. We focus on posted price mechanisms, which are robust and truthful. There are two natural, complementary variants of the order of arrival of the agents. In the first case, an adversary dictates their order, but the intermediary has prior, distributional information about their valuations, similar to the prophet inequality setting. In the second, the adversary selects their valuations but their order is a uniformly random permutation. We obtain asymptotically tight worst-case guarantees for both cases, under a competitive analysis benchmark.
In the second part, we study the strategic implications that arise from adding one extra option to the miners participating in the bitcoin proto- col. We propose that when adding a block, miners also have the ability to pay forward an amount to be collected by the first miner who successfully extends their branch, giving them the power to influence the incentives for mining. We formulate a stochastic game for the study of such incentives and show that with this added option, smaller miners can guarantee that the best response of even substantially more powerful miners is to follow the expected behavior intended by the protocol designer. Moreover, pay-forward can be used to alleviate the predicted instability when block rewards are small compared with respect to transaction fees, by smoothing out the variability of the rewards collected from transaction fees.</p
Appropriate Similarity Measures for Author Cocitation Analysis
Full text linkWe provide a number of new insights into the methodological discussion about author cocitation analysis. We first argue that the use of the Pearson correlation for measuring the similarity between authors’ cocitation profiles is not very satisfactory. We then discuss what kind of similarity measures may be used as an alternative to the Pearson correlation. We consider three similarity measures in particular. One is the well-known cosine. The other two similarity measures have not been used before in the bibliometric literature. Finally, we show by means of an example that our findings have a high practical relevance.information science;Pearson correlation;cosine;similarity measure;author cocitation analysis
Dispelling the Myths Behind First-author Citation Counts
Full text linkWe conducted a full-scale evaluative citation analysis study of scholars in the XML research field to explore just how different from each other author rankings resulting from different citation counting methods actually are, and to demonstrate the capability of emerging data and tools on the Web in supporting more realistic citation counting methods. Our results contest some common arguments for the continued
use of first-author citation counts in the evaluation of scholars, such as high correlations between author rankings by first-author citation counts and other citation
counting methods, and high costs of using more realistic citation counting methods that are not well-supported by the ISI databases. It is argued that increasingly available digital full text research papers make it possible for citation analysis studies to go beyond what the ISI databases have directly supported and to employ more
sophisticated methods
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