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Intelligence and security in the Netherlands and Belgium : a historical comparison
No full textAbstract: This study compares the defence and national security of Belgium and the Netherlands. It shows a remarkable amount of parallel evolutions and events that shaped the securitization of the Netherlands and Belgium. Both countries faced many common security and defence challenges, which they dealt with in their own way but still at times very similar. Such comparison offers insight into how the proximity and similar development of the Low Countries provided a relatively common set of security contingencies and activities, and the differing or similar attitudes and responses both countries adopted towards common security problems. The internationally precarious situation of the two small countries caught in the middle between France and Germany exposed them to a similar threat. Their strategic location in Europe was also responsible for similar challenges in the domestic security environment, such as the threat of socialist agitation and later terrorism. These factors have influenced their international outlook as well as their legal and organizational approaches towards intelligence
Reactions to David Sherman’s ‘William Friedman and Pearl Harbor’
No full textInfused with Shakespeare in tribute to William Friedman’s study of his work, Lasoen's reflection poses some statements to provoke debate about intelligence failure and intelligence studies. The controversial proposition is that the field is dominated by the same subjects while others have not been given the attention they deserve. While some good reasons for this are recognized and it is acknowledged there is always something new to be found even in well-studied cases, a trumpet call is sounded for stimulating innovative research and increasing the usefulness of the field for the practice of intelligence
Going Beyond Counting First Authors in Author Co-citation Analysis
Get PDFThe present study examines one of the fundamental aspects of author co-citation analysis (ACA) - the way co-citation
counts are defined. Co-citation counting provides the data on which all subsequent statistical analyses and mappings
are based, and we compare ACA results based on two different types of co-citation counting - the traditional type that
only counts the first one among a cited work's authors on the one hand and a non-traditional type that takes into
account the first 5 authors of a cited work on the other hand. Results indicate that the picture produced through this non-traditional author co-citation counting contains more coherent author groups and is therefore considerably clearer. However, this picture represents fewer specialties in the research field being studied than that produced through the traditional first-author co-citation counting when the same number of top-ranked authors is selected and analyzed. Reasons for these effects are discussed
Les secrets du département de la Guerre: militaire inlichtingen 1830-1914
No full textOn the centenary of the Belgian military intelligence service ADIV/SGRS, this article considers the antecedents of military intelligence before its foundation. Without having an organized intelligence service, the Belgian army naturally performed intelligence tasks from its earliest days in the campaign against the Netherlands. The Ministry of War had a bureau to study other armed forces, based upon open and diplomatic sources. In line with defending Belgium’s neutrality, special attention would go towards the intentions of neighbouring countries. Yet the same concern for neutrality saw policymakers very apprehensive at engaging in anything resembling foreign espionage. At times of heightened threat, such as an attempted revolution in 1848 and the war between France and Prussia in 1870, the War Ministry would rely on the intelligence capacity of the civil security service. Political wrangling about the army and conscription throughout the nineteenth century left little time for giving much thought to intelligence, while the army staff itself would base defence plans upon general assumptions, being concerned more with the actions of the Belgian Army than those of the potential invaders. At the turn of the twentieth century an organization for the surveillance of the frontiers was active. Most foreign intelligence gathering was done by the diplomatic service. As it was becoming increasingly clear that either France or Germany or both would pass through Belgium in their next war, attempts at improving security were still blocked by political opposition. Finally, a reform of the army saw the birth of an intelligence section of the general staff in 1910. Too embryonic and handicapped by internal bickering, the Agadir crisis still provided a baptism of fire. Increased vigilance came too late even if the German invasion was no surprise. The ease with which Belgium was overtaken and the need for intelligence and security at the front, gave rise to the establishment of the service still in existence today, undergoing a rapid learning process for the duration until the necessity of a military intelligence service was an acknowledged fact. In conclusion, the article considers historical parallels with Belgian complacency regarding security then and today
Escape from mind-set prison : psychological impediments to the intelligence effort and structured analytical techniques
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