1,720,976 research outputs found
Going Beyond Counting First Authors in Author Co-citation Analysis
Get PDFThe present study examines one of the fundamental aspects of author co-citation analysis (ACA) - the way co-citation
counts are defined. Co-citation counting provides the data on which all subsequent statistical analyses and mappings
are based, and we compare ACA results based on two different types of co-citation counting - the traditional type that
only counts the first one among a cited work's authors on the one hand and a non-traditional type that takes into
account the first 5 authors of a cited work on the other hand. Results indicate that the picture produced through this non-traditional author co-citation counting contains more coherent author groups and is therefore considerably clearer. However, this picture represents fewer specialties in the research field being studied than that produced through the traditional first-author co-citation counting when the same number of top-ranked authors is selected and analyzed. Reasons for these effects are discussed
Variations on the Author
Get PDF“Variations on the Author” discusses two of Eduardo Coutinho’s recent films (Um Dia na Vida, from 2010, and Últimas Conversas, posthumously released in 2015) and their contribution to the general question of documentary authorship. The director’s filmography is characterized by a consistent yet self-effacing form of authorial self-inscription: Coutinho often features as an interviewer that rather than express opinions propels discourses; an interviewer that is good at listening. This mode of self-inscription characterizes him as an author who is not expressive but who is nonetheless markedly present on the screen. In Um Dia na Vida, however, Coutinho is completely absent form the image, while Últimas Conversas, on the contrary, includes a confessional prologue that moves the director from the margins to the center of his films. This article examines the ways in which these works stand out in the filmography of a director who offers new insights into the notion of cinematic authorship
Appropriate Similarity Measures for Author Cocitation Analysis
Get PDFWe provide a number of new insights into the methodological discussion about author cocitation analysis. We first argue that the use of the Pearson correlation for measuring the similarity between authors’ cocitation profiles is not very satisfactory. We then discuss what kind of similarity measures may be used as an alternative to the Pearson correlation. We consider three similarity measures in particular. One is the well-known cosine. The other two similarity measures have not been used before in the bibliometric literature. Finally, we show by means of an example that our findings have a high practical relevance.information science;Pearson correlation;cosine;similarity measure;author cocitation analysis
Dispelling the Myths Behind First-author Citation Counts
Get PDFWe conducted a full-scale evaluative citation analysis study of scholars in the XML research field to explore just how different from each other author rankings resulting from different citation counting methods actually are, and to demonstrate the capability of emerging data and tools on the Web in supporting more realistic citation counting methods. Our results contest some common arguments for the continued
use of first-author citation counts in the evaluation of scholars, such as high correlations between author rankings by first-author citation counts and other citation
counting methods, and high costs of using more realistic citation counting methods that are not well-supported by the ISI databases. It is argued that increasingly available digital full text research papers make it possible for citation analysis studies to go beyond what the ISI databases have directly supported and to employ more
sophisticated methods
Drug Dealing and the Internal Morality of Medicine
No full textWhich practices qualify as “medical” in nature? This question has important legal implications. Every state has laws prohibiting the “unauthorized practice of medicine.” Health insurance policies generally limit coverage to procedures that are “medically necessary.” And physicians can be prosecuted as drug traffickers if they prescribe controlled substances without a “legitimate medical purpose.” Each of these questions—and many others—hinge on how medicine is defined.
As with many common terms, we all have a general understanding of what medicine is and this heuristic suffices to carry us through our daily lives without complication. Yet when called on to produce a precise definition that captures all practices we think of as “medical,” while excluding those we do not, that task proves exceptionally challenging. This problem is further complicated by the fact that what qualifies as “medical” may vary across different contexts. Prescribing Botox to mitigate frown lines may qualify as a “medical” intervention for purposes of laws regulating doctors but may not qualify as “medically necessary” for purposes of insurance reimbursement.
Yet despite the difficulty of defining medicine and the weighty legal consequences that can hinge on these definitions, courts, regulators, and legal scholars have given little consideration to these challenges in the context of regulating physician prescribing. Instead, they have often relied on “commonsense” definitions that fail to grapple with the complexity of the issue. As a result, legal standards that govern prescribing are often unclear and inconsistently applied, leaving physicians without a clear understanding of which conduct they must avoid. Given multiple opportunities to resolve this issue definitively, the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly demurred, including most recently in its 2022 opinion in Ruan v. United States
Regulating Identity: Medical Regulation as Social Control
Get PDFNew biomedical technologies offer growing opportunities not only to prevent and treat illnesses, but also to change how healthy people think, feel, behave, and appear to others. Controversies over these nontherapeutic practices are a pervasive feature of contemporary American culture, from students on study drugs and cops on steroids to skin-lightening by black celebrities and the over-prescription of antidepressants. Yet the diversity of these controversies often masks their common root-namely, disputes about the propriety of using medical technologies as tools for shaping one\u27s identity.
Some observers believe these so-called enhancement practices threaten important values, offering unfair advantages to users and undermining their ability to lead authentic lives. But existing systems of medical regulation, which were desined to promote the safety of therapeutic treatments and to deter drug abuse, are largely blind to concerns beyond protecting human health. As identity-modifying practices continue to proliferate, calls are growing to restrict access to these technologies on moral grounds.
These proposals overlook the United States\u27 extensive and unfortunate experiences regulating nontherapeutic medical practices to enforce contested conceptions of morality. From Prohibition and the war on drugs to laws restricting contraceptives and abortion procedures, these efforts have been costly, ineffective, and intrusive. They have also interfered with fundamental liberties involving bodily integrity and identity-a fact that is widely recognized in the context of reproduction technologies, but largely overlooked with respect to other medical interventions. Rather than expanding our reliance on contested moral concerns in policing access to medical interventions, the U.S. should purge its existing regulation of morality-based intrusions and recommit itself to protecting human health
Drug Dealing and the Internal Morality of Medicine
Get PDFWhich practices qualify as “medical” in nature? This question has important legal implications. Every state has laws prohibiting the “unauthorized practice of medicine.” Health insurance policies generally limit coverage to procedures that are “medically necessary.” And physicians can be prosecuted as drug traffickers if they prescribe controlled substances without a “legitimate medical purpose.” Each of these questions—and many others—hinge on how medicine is defined.
As with many common terms, we all have a general understanding of what medicine is and this heuristic suffices to carry us through our daily lives without complication. Yet when called on to produce a precise definition that captures all practices we think of as “medical,” while excluding those we do not, that task proves exceptionally challenging. This problem is further complicated by the fact that what qualifies as “medical” may vary across different contexts. Prescribing Botox to mitigate frown lines may qualify as a “medical” intervention for purposes of laws regulating doctors but may not qualify as “medically necessary” for purposes of insurance reimbursement.
Yet despite the difficulty of defining medicine and the weighty legal consequences that can hinge on these definitions, courts, regulators, and legal scholars have given little consideration to these challenges in the context of regulating physician prescribing. Instead, they have often relied on “commonsense” definitions that fail to grapple with the complexity of the issue. As a result, legal standards that govern prescribing are often unclear and inconsistently applied, leaving physicians without a clear understanding of which conduct they must avoid. Given multiple opportunities to resolve this issue definitively, the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly demurred, including most recently in its 2022 opinion in Ruan v. United States
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