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L'université George Washington
Lorenzen Ernest G. L'université George Washington. In: Revue internationale de l'enseignement, tome 52, Juillet-Décembre 1906. pp. 177-191
Renvoi Doctrine in the Conflict of Laws -- Meaning of The Law of a Country
Some years ago in writing on the present subject the author made the statement that the renvoi doctrine was no part of the conflict of laws of the United States. In the light of certain more recent decisions or judicial utterances the question may properly be asked again: Should the courts of the United States adopt the renvoi theory in the conflict of laws? Although no discussion of the problem is yet to be found in any American decision, there are cases in which the renvoi doctrine has been sanctioned either expressly or by necessary implication. The case of Guernsey v. The Imperial Bank of Canada and the case of Lando v. Lando may serve as illustrations. In the former case an action was brought in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Wyoming against the indorser of a promissory note. The note was made and indorsed in Illinois, but it was payable in Canada. Presentment, demand and protest were made, and notice of dishonor was given in compliance with the law of Canada; but the indorser claimed that the notice would have been insufficient to charge the indorser if the note had been payable in Illinois. The court below held that the notice was good and rendered judgment against the indorser. The latter\u27s counsel insisted that the ruling was error on the ground that the sufficiency of the notice was governed by the law of the place of indorsement and not by the law of the place of payment. On appeal, the learned court made the following remarks concerning the above contention:
To this contention there is a short and conclusive answer. The place of the indorsement was the state of Illinois. The law of that state was, when the indorsement was made, and it still is, that when commercial paper is indorsed in one jurisdiction and is payable in another the law of the place where it is payable governs the time and mode of presentment for payment, the manner of protest, and the time and manner of giving notice of dishonor, and the law of the place of indorsement is inapplicable to them. Wooley v. Lyon, II7 Ill. 248, 250,.6 N. E. 885, 886, 57 Am. Rep. 867. If, therefore, as counsel contend, the law of the place where the indorsement was made,- the law of Illinois, governs the sufficiency of the notice of dishonor in this case that notice was good, for it was sufficient under the law of Ca1zad~ where the note was payable, and the law of Illinois was that in a case of this character the law of the place where ,the note was payable governed the time and manner of giving the notice of dishonor
The Conflict of Laws of Germany
In Germany the rules of the conflict of laws «have generally been regarded as a part of the municipal law. It was natural, therefore, that with the unification of the German law through the Civil Code, in effect since January 1, 1900, the rules relating to the conflict of laws prevailing in the different states and territories constituting the German Empire should have been codified. Dr. Gebhard, the author of the General Part of the first draft of the German Civil Code, submitted to the First Commission general rules relating to the conflict of laws. The Second Commission decided to incorporate them into the code as the Sixth Book. The Federal Council eliminated some of the rules submitted, completely revamped the rest, so as to limit their operation to German subjects or to German territory, and transferred them to the Introductory Law of the German Civil Code,. where they now appear as Articles 7 to 31
Going Beyond Counting First Authors in Author Co-citation Analysis
The present study examines one of the fundamental aspects of author co-citation analysis (ACA) - the way co-citation
counts are defined. Co-citation counting provides the data on which all subsequent statistical analyses and mappings
are based, and we compare ACA results based on two different types of co-citation counting - the traditional type that
only counts the first one among a cited work's authors on the one hand and a non-traditional type that takes into
account the first 5 authors of a cited work on the other hand. Results indicate that the picture produced through this non-traditional author co-citation counting contains more coherent author groups and is therefore considerably clearer. However, this picture represents fewer specialties in the research field being studied than that produced through the traditional first-author co-citation counting when the same number of top-ranked authors is selected and analyzed. Reasons for these effects are discussed
Haddock v. Haddock Overruled
SUBJECT to diversified state legislation, divorce presents a particularly difficult conflict of laws problem in this country. The foundation fur this problem was laid when divorces were granted fur causes recognized by local legislation (lex fori) without reference to the laws of the matrimonial domicile. And the question was further complicated when married women were allowed to acquire domiciles separate from those of their husbands. Since divorce strikes deep into our social life and is basically a religious or moral issue, state laws reflecting widely divergent views on the subject extend from extreme strictness to the greatest liberality. Causes for divorce range all the way from adultery as the sole ground to extreme mental cruelty. Consequently, persons living in states under whose laws they cannot obtain a divorce seek to take advantage of the laws of more liberal jurisdictions. The migratory divorce problem has become even more intensified in recent times, for several states have changed their divorce legislation with the ex-press purpose of attracting non-residents. Nevada, the first to enter the divorce business, reduced its residence requirement, in 1927, to three months and in 1931, to six weeks. Some of the Mexican states have gone even further, granting divorces without reference to domicile or residence, and in some cases by mail. All efforts to remedy the situation have failed. Even the most conspicuous, the Uniform Marriage Annulment and Divorce Act, has received the approval of only three states. An amendment to the Federal Constitution giving Congress power, similar to that of the Canadian and Australian legislatures, to deal with the subject of marriage and divorce is perhaps the only real solution to the problem
Validity and Effects of Contracts in the Conflict of Laws (Part 1)
There is no..topic in the conflict of laws in regard to which there is greater uncertainty than that of contracts. In this country there is no agreement even regarding the fundamental principles that should govern. Elsewhere there is less dispute concerning the general principles, but much difference of view in their application to concrete situations. Under these circumstances a discussion of the question in broad outline may not be amiss. Since an inquiry into the law governing capacity to contract and ,the formalities with which a contract must be executed raises a number of special problems, it has been deemed best to omit the discussion of this phase of the subject in the present article, except in so far as it may bear upon the intention theory in general, and to restrict its scope to the intrinsic validity of contracts, and to \u27their effects. The purpose of this article will have been attained if it has pointed out the difficulties in the way of finding a simple solution of the conflicts arising from the diversity of laws relating to contracts (apart from capacity and form), and if it has succeeded in suggesting, in the light of the best juristic thought of the world, some guiding principles by means of which the solution of the particular problems may be found. In this problem, as in most others arising in the conflict of laws, some light may be derived from the juristic discussions of foreign writers and from the experience of foreign nations. So far as it may serve the purpose of this article the foreign law and literature will therefore be considered
Application of Full Faith and Credit Clause to Equitable Decrees for the Conveyance of Foreign Land
The Constitution of the United States provides: Full faith and credit shall be given in such state to the public acts, records and judicial proceedings of every other state. And the Congress may by general laws prescribe the manner in which such acts, records and proceedings shall be approved, and the effect thereof. In pursuance of the power vested in it, Congress has prescribed the mode of authentication and the effects of such acts, records and proceedings as follows : and the said records and judicial proceedings so authenticated shall have such faith and credit given to them in· every court within the United States as they have by law or usage in the courts of the state from which they are taken. It is a settled rule that the full faith and credit clause applies only to substantive rights and that it has· no application to matters of procedure. Hence, if \u27it can be shown that equitable decrees do not establish obligations, that is, right-duty relations, but are merely methods for the enforcement of existing legal relations,· it follows of course that they are not within the purview of the full-faith and credit clause. The first issue relates therefore to the nature and effect of equitable decrees in general
Commercial Arbitration -- International and Interstate Aspects
England. The development of commercial arbitration in England was particularly affected by a dictum of Lord Coke in Vynior\u27 s Case, decided in 1609, where plaintiff was permitted to recover on a bond given for the faithful performance of an arbitration agreement. Lord Coke explained that where there is an agreement to submit to arbitration, a party might countermand it, for a man cannot by his act make such authority, power, or warrant not countermandable which is by the law and of its nature countermandable ; but the bond is thus forfeited because the condition of the bond is broken by such revocation. With the enactment of the Statute of Fines and Penalties, in 1697, the use of a bond in submission was no longer effective, but the fact that the method of making the agreement effective had been abrogated did not induce the courts to abandon the revocability rule. There resulted the irrational situation that a valid agreement was utterly ineffective, for the courts would give only nominal damages for breach of the agreement on the theory that there could be no actual injury in forcing people to litigate in the King\u27s own courts of justice. The view that courts cannot approve irrevocability of arbitration agreements because it ousts the jurisdiction of the court did not appear in the early cases, and is not to be found until the case of Kill v. Hollister, decided in 1746. It was created perhaps to justify the maintenance of the revocability rule which could no longer be mitigated by the use of bonds after the passage of the Statute of Fines and Penalties. The doctrine has also been credited to the judicial jealousy of the English courts, whose judges and court officers in early times were paid by fees on the volume of business which came to them
Extraterritorial Divorce -- Williams v. North Carolina II
Williams v. North Carolina I simplified the law on interstate divorce by compelling the recognition of foreign divorces it the petitioner was domiciled in the state granting the divorce, and without reference to which of the spouses was at fault.· In doing so, it overruled the doctrine of the Haddock case, according to which the domiciliary state of the respondent, who was not personally before the divorce court, need not recognize the foreign divorce. It also did away with the special doctrine laid down in Atherton v. Atherton, which made the recognition of the foreign decree upon substituted service compulsory if it was rendered by the courts of the last matrimonial domicil, that is, of the state in which the parties last lived together as husband and wife.
Williams v. North Carolina I was tried on the assumption that North Carolina had the power under the Haddock doctrine to attack the Nevada decree because the Nevada court had no personal jurisdiction over the respondent. For that reason it did not challenge the finding of the Nevada court that the petitioners had acquired a domicil in Nevada. The Supreme Court of the United States did not find it necessary, therefore, to discuss the subject of domicil as a prerequisite for divorce jurisdiction. The existence of domicil in Nevada became the decisive issue upon review by certiorari, in Williams v North Carolina II, of the judgment of the Supreme Court of North Carolina which convicted the Nevada divorcees of bigamous cohabitation
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