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Philosophical and Empirical Approaches to Psychology. Mentalism vs. Antimentalism
No full textPhilosophical and Empirical Approaches to Psychology: Mentalism vs. Anti-Mentalism philosophically analyzes four different approaches to psychology: introspectionism, behaviourism, cognitive psychology, and cognitive neuroscience to explore the concept of “the mind,” which developed from the late nineteenth and early twentieth century up through present day psychology. The resulting ideas originating from these approaches are divided into two main groups in this book, mentalism (whose supporters assume that mind is not reducible to something else) and anti-mentalism (whose supporters assume that mind is indeed reducible to something else). This book argues that adopting one idea over another can have a profound influence in a psychologist’s research. Further, the author shows that some controversial psychological notions like “consciousness” pertain to a particular mentalistic approach. Many psychologists do not consider such notions scientific, but he argues that this depends upon their adherence to a certain anti-mentalistic approach or to a specific mentalistic perspective. The book examines these issues by assessing experimental psychology in relation to neurobiology and philosophy, offering an integration of philosophical and theoretical chapters along with empirical and experimental chapters. Theoretically, the arguments draw from philosophy of psychology and experimental psychology.
Using empirical research, Philosophical and Empirical Approaches to Psychology examines the role of the various mentalistic and anti-mentalistic approaches to psychology by integrating epistemological analysis and empirical research
Neuroeconomics, Identity Theory, and the Issue of Correlation
No full textThe paper deals with the issue of the scientific status of neuroeconomics and of its ontological foundations
Reasons versus Causes in Arocha’s Scientific Realism
Full text linkArocha’s scientific realism (2021) puts at the center of psychology the individual and their variability in behavior: the individual appears to be irreducible to what emerges from the analysis of aggregate data. According to this position, psychology’s aim is to uncover the mechanisms underlying the observable world. This entails adopting the cause-based approach of the natural sciences. Arocha’s article also refers to final causes and intentions and thus to the reason-based approach of the human sciences in contrast to that of the natural sciences. Thus, it is not clear whether the article aims to reduce the final causes to mechanical causes or supports the irreducibility of the former. Starting from these remarks, this comment will argue that the reason-based approach is preferable to the cause-based approach in order to have a scientific psychology. Adopting the reason-based approach also avoids the appeal to aggregate data by focusing upon the single case
The inside and the outside. Psychoanalysis and architecture
No full textThis book explores how psychoanalysis and architecture can enhance and increase the chances of mental 'containment', while also fostering exchange between inside and outside.
The way in which psychoanalysts take care of mental suffering, and the way in which architects and city planners assess the environment, are grounded in a shared concern with the notion of 'dwelling'. It is a matter of fact that dwelling exists in a complex context comprised of both biological need and symbolic function. Psychoanalysis and architecture can work together in both thinking about and designing not only our homes but also the analyst’s consulting rooms and, more generally, our therapy places. However, this is possible only if they renounce the current limited and restrictive model of this interaction, and propose one more that is more in harmony with the questions and situations that clients themselves pose.
Creating sustainable and integrative relationships with the buildings in which we inhabit everyday - whether they are our houses, public buildings (such as schools and prisons), or therapeutic spaces (hospitals, clinics, and consulting rooms) - can be a measure both of the degree of the advancement of a society and of the quality of its institutions
Introspection Illusion and the Methodological Denial of the First Person Perspective
No full textThe papers deals with the issue of the first person perspective in psychological research
The distinction between conscious and unconscious cognition in David R. Shanks’s work: A critical assessment
Full text linkAbstract The notion of unconscious finds support in many experimental studies that use the dissociation method. This method allows us to distinguish between conscious and unconscious mental states when participants cannot explain why they performed as they did in an experiment. The paper will discuss the notion of unconscious by considering David R. Shanks’ criticisms of the application of the dissociation method: it will assess three studies Shanks proposes as reexaminations of three other relevant studies in the literature and show how Shanks’ work provides an examination of the methodological pitfalls of such studies. The paper will argue that, although Shanks’s results are relevant regarding theories about the structure of cognition, his theoretical positions are at best confused and at worst diminish the importance of his research outcomes. It will conclude by showing why Shanks’s results that legitimize the role of consciousness in cognition can be problematic for the physicalistic or materialistic framework endorsed by cognitive psychologists.Keywords: Dissociation Method; Dual-process Theories; Cognitive Psychology; Consciousness; UnconsciousLa distinzione tra cognizione conscia e inconscia nell’opera di D.R. Schanks: una valutazione criticaRiassunto: La nozione di inconscio trova supporto in vari studi sperimentali che utilizzano il metodo della dissociazione. Secondo la letteratura cognitivista questo metodo permette di distinguere tra stati mentali consci e inconsci quando i partecipanti non sono in grado di riportare verbalmente il perché si sono comportati in un certo modo durante l’esecuzione di un compito sperimentale. Il presente articolo discute la nozione di inconscio in relazione alle critiche di David R. Shanks all’applicazione del metodo della dissociazione. Più precisamente, esso valuta tre studi che Shanks propone come repliche e rivalutazioni di altrettante ricerche a favore della cognizione inconscia e mostra l’autore riesca con successo a metterne in luce le carenze metodologiche. Inoltre, sostiene anche che, sebbene i risultati sperimentali di Shanks siano importanti per le teorie sulla struttura della cognizione, le sue posizioni teoriche sono quantomeno confuse e rischiano di ridimensionare la portata delle sue conclusioni empiriche e metodologiche. L’articolo conclude mostrando le ragioni per cui i risultati di Shanks, che legittimano il ruolo della coscienza nella cognizione, siano controversi in quanto adottano una posizione filosofica fisicalistica o materialistica comune alla maggioranza degli psicologi cognitivi.Parole chiave: Metodo della dissociazione; Teorie del doppio processo; Psicologia cognitiva; Coscienza; InconscioAbstract The notion of unconscious finds support in many experimental studies that use the dissociation method. This method allows us to distinguish between conscious and unconscious mental states when participants cannot explain why they performed as they did in an experiment. The paper will discuss the notion of unconscious by considering David R. Shanks’ criticisms of the application of the dissociation method: it will assess three studies Shanks proposes as reexaminations of three other relevant studies in the literature and show how Shanks’ work provides an examination of the methodological pitfalls of such studies. The paper will argue that, although Shanks’s results are relevant regarding theories about the structure of cognition, his theoretical positions are at best confused and at worst diminish the importance of his research outcomes. It will conclude by showing why Shanks’s results that legitimize the role of consciousness in cognition can be problematic for the physicalistic or materialistic framework endorsed by cognitive psychologists.Keywords: Dissociation Method; Dual-process Theories; Cognitive Psychology; Consciousness; Unconscious La distinzione tra cognizione conscia e inconscia nell’opera di D.R. Schanks: una valutazione criticaRiassunto: La nozione di inconscio trova supporto in vari studi sperimentali che utilizzano il metodo della dissociazione. Secondo la letteratura cognitivista questo metodo permette di distinguere tra stati mentali consci e inconsci quando i partecipanti non sono in grado di riportare verbalmente il perché si sono comportati in un certo modo durante l’esecuzione di un compito sperimentale. Il presente articolo discute la nozione di inconscio in relazione alle critiche di David R. Shanks all’applicazione del metodo della dissociazione. Più precisamente, esso valuta tre studi che Shanks propone come repliche e rivalutazioni di altrettante ricerche a favore della cognizione inconscia e mostra l’autore riesca con successo a metterne in luce le carenze metodologiche. Inoltre, sostiene anche che, sebbene i risultati sperimentali di Shanks siano importanti per le teorie sulla struttura della cognizione, le sue posizioni teoriche sono quantomeno confuse e rischiano di ridimensionare la portata delle sue conclusioni empiriche e metodologiche. L’articolo conclude mostrando le ragioni per cui i risultati di Shanks, che legittimano il ruolo della coscienza nella cognizione, siano controversi in quanto adottano una posizione filosofica fisicalistica o materialistica comune alla maggioranza degli psicologi cognitivi.Parole chiave: Metodo della dissociazione; Teorie del doppio processo; Psicologia cognitiva; Coscienza; Inconsci
MENTALISM VS. ANTI-MENTALISM AN EPISTEMOLOGICAL ANALYSIS AND AN EMPIRICAL RESEARCH
No full textPer spiegare i loro risultati gli psicologi sperimentali fanno uso di termini riferentisi al mentale. Tuttavia, nel corso della storia, essi hanno definito in modi differenti il concetto di mente e quindi il significato dei termini usati nelle sue teorie. Nella prima parte della tesi sono discusse quattro opzioni epistemologiche in base alle quali tali termini sono stati interpretati nella storia della psicologia scientifica (il ‘mentalismo’ dell’introspezionismo, l’‘anti-mentalismo’ del comportamentismo, il ‘mentalismo’ del cognitivismo, l’ ‘antimentalismo’ delle neuroscienze cognitive). Assumere una di queste posizioni piuttosto che un’altra implica il porre l’attenzione su tipi diversi di dati e dunque la scelta di differenti metodologie di raccolta e analisi degli stessi.
Nella seconda parte vengono replicati gli esperimenti del neurologo Damasio per testare la sua “ipotesi del marcatore somatico”. Tali esperimenti sono interessanti perchè utilizzano dati e metodologie che fanno riferimento a tutte e quattro le opzioni epistemologiche descritte nella prima parte. I risultati qui presentati non replicano quelli di Damasio e dunque sembrano falsificare la sua ipotesi.
L’analisi empirica e quella epistemologica mostrano come l’opzione mentalistico-introspezionistica (rifiutatata da Damasio in favore di quella neuroscientifica) meriti di essere considerata e perseguita come linea metodologica che può dare origine a risultati scientificamente fecondi.Experimental psychologists use terms referring to mind for explaining their results. However, in the course of history, they have defined the concept of mind in many ways and so the meaning of the terms used in its theories. In the first part of this work four epistemological options according to which these terms have been interpreted all along the history of experimental psychology are discussed (the ‘mentalism’ of introspectionism, the ‘anti-mentalism’ of behaviourism, the ‘mentalism’ of cognitivism, the ‘anti-mentalism’ of cognitive neuroscience). Assuming one of these options implies to consider different kinds of data and so to choose different data collecting and analyzing methodologies.
In the second part the experiments proposed by neurologist Damasio for testing his ‘somatic marker hypothesis’ are replicated. Such experiments are interesting because they appeal to data and methodologies referring to all the four epistemological options above considered. The results presented do not replicate the Damasio’s ones and so they seem to falsify his hypothesis.
The epistemological analysis and the empirical research show how the introspectionistic-mentalistic option (refused by Damasio in favour of the neuroscientific option) deserve to be considered as a reliable methodological that can lead to important scientific results
Recensione di C. Lucifora, C.M. Vicario, Il cervello morale. Dalle scienze cognitive all'intelligenza artificiale
Full text linkReview of the book l cervello morale. Dalle scienze cognitive all’intelligenza artificiale by Chiara Lucifora e Carmelo Mario Vicari
Clinical and experimental practices in psychology: kinds of inferences
No full textRecently, psychologists’ attention has been drawn to the procedures of theory construction, that is to say, to the processes involved in the quest for sound explanations of psychological phenomena. It is a matter of fact that the various areas of psychology have their own peculiarities but nonetheless they also show some commonalities regarding the study of the phenomena they deal with. In particular, clinical and experimental practices have different methods, objects of inquiry and areas of application but they seem to share some inferential procedures in order to improve their results. In this contribution, we’ll focus upon two specific kinds of inference, abduction and the hypothetical-deductive (H-D) method
Sull’utilizzo delle tecnologie informatiche in psicologia. Alcune considerazioni critiche
No full textIn questo capitolo prenderemo in considerazione alcune questioni etiche relative all’utilizzo di internet e delle tecnologie informatiche, sia nella pratica professionale sia nella ricerca. Il contributo non pretende di essere esaustivo, data la vastità del tema, ma si propone di fornire occasioni di riflessione su aspetti professionali e di ricerca strettamente legati alla grande diffusione dei mezzi informatici. A nostro avviso, infatti, molte delle questioni che si affronteranno nel prossimo futuro, non solo di natura etica ma anche metodologica e professionale, non potranno ignorare o sottostimare il sempre più rilevante ruolo di internet e delle tecnologie informatiche nell’ambito della pratica e della ricerca. Tuttavia, non sempre l’utilizzo massivo dell’informatica comporta necessariamente l’emergere di nuovi dilemmi etici: valutare in quali casi l’utilizzo di tali tecnologie porti alla riproposizione di questioni già esistenti in un nuovo ambito e in quali invece porti autentici elementi di novità è di fatto una questione aperta che merita attenzion
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