1,720,980 research outputs found
Replication Data for: Policy over party: Comparing the effects of candidate ideology and party on affective polarization
No full textAt least two theories have been offered that explain the rise of affective polarization. Some scholars, relying on social identity theory, argue that as the relevance of party identification increased, Americans became more likely to see their in-party in positive terms and the out-party in negative terms. Other scholars argue that affective polarization is a reaction to increasingly extreme political actors. This study seeks to arbitrate between these two theories of affective polarization through a survey experiment which asks respondents to rate candidates whose party (or lack thereof) and ideology (or lack thereof) is randomly assigned. In line with the policy-oriented view of affective polarization, respondents reacted far more strongly to ideology than party, especially if it was the ideology of the member of the out-party
Replication Data for: Policy over party: Comparing the effects of candidate ideology and party on affective polarization
No full textAt least two theories have been offered that explain the rise of affective polarization. Some scholars, relying on social identity theory, argue that as the relevance of party identification increased, Americans became more likely to see their in-party in positive terms and the out-party in negative terms. Other scholars argue that affective polarization is a reaction to increasingly extreme political actors. This study seeks to arbitrate between these two theories of affective polarization through a survey experiment which asks respondents to rate candidates whose party (or lack thereof) and ideology (or lack thereof) is randomly assigned. In line with the policy-oriented view of affective polarization, respondents reacted far more strongly to ideology than party, especially if it was the ideology of the member of the out-party
Replication Data for: Much ado about acquiescence .
No full textAcquiescence response bias, or the tendency to agree with questions regardless of content, is a prominent concern in survey design. An often proposed solution, and one that was recently implemented in the American National Election Study, is to rewrite response options so that they tap directly into the dimensions of the construct of interest. However, there is little evidence that this solution improves data quality. We present a study in which we employ two waves of the 2012 American National Election Study in order to compare the reliability and concurrent validity of political efficacy questions in both the agree-disagree and construct-specific formats. Construct-specific questions were not only as reliable and valid as agree-disagree questions generally, they were also as valid among respondents that were most likely to acquiesce. This suggests two possible outcomes: Either agree-disagree questions do not negatively impact data quality or that construct-specific questions are not a panacea for acquiescence response bias
Replication Data for: Much ado about acquiescence .
No full textAcquiescence response bias, or the tendency to agree with questions regardless of content, is a prominent concern in survey design. An often proposed solution, and one that was recently implemented in the American National Election Study, is to rewrite response options so that they tap directly into the dimensions of the construct of interest. However, there is little evidence that this solution improves data quality. We present a study in which we employ two waves of the 2012 American National Election Study in order to compare the reliability and concurrent validity of political efficacy questions in both the agree-disagree and construct-specific formats. Construct-specific questions were not only as reliable and valid as agree-disagree questions generally, they were also as valid among respondents that were most likely to acquiesce. This suggests two possible outcomes: Either agree-disagree questions do not negatively impact data quality or that construct-specific questions are not a panacea for acquiescence response bias
Replication Data for: The Hostile Audience: The Effect of Access to Broadband Internet on Partisan Affect
No full textOver the last two decades, as the number of media choices available to consumers has exploded, so too have worries over self-selection into media audiences. Some fear greater apathy, others heightened polarization. In this paper, we shed light on the latter possibility. We identify the impact of access to broadband Internet on affective polarization by exploiting differences in broadband availability brought about by variation in state right-of-way regulations (ROW). We merge state-level regulation data with county-level broadband penetration data and a large-N sample of survey data from 2004 to 2008 and find that access to broadband Internet increases partisan hostility. The effect occurs in both years and is stable across levels of political interest. We also find that access to broadband Internet boosts partisans' consumption of partisan media, a likely cause of increased polarization
Replication Data for: The Hostile Audience: The Effect of Access to Broadband Internet on Partisan Affect
No full textOver the last two decades, as the number of media choices available to consumers has exploded, so too have worries over self-selection into media audiences. Some fear greater apathy, others heightened polarization. In this paper, we shed light on the latter possibility. We identify the impact of access to broadband Internet on affective polarization by exploiting differences in broadband availability brought about by variation in state right-of-way regulations (ROW). We merge state-level regulation data with county-level broadband penetration data and a large-N sample of survey data from 2004 to 2008 and find that access to broadband Internet increases partisan hostility. The effect occurs in both years and is stable across levels of political interest. We also find that access to broadband Internet boosts partisans' consumption of partisan media, a likely cause of increased polarization
Replication Data for: Ancestral Kinship and the Origins of Ideology
No full textReplication data for: Ancestral Kinship and the Origins of Ideology. Include files to replicate both main results and supplemental materials
Replication Data for: The Nature of Affective Polarization: Disentangling Policy Disagreement from Partisan Identity
No full textDemocrats and Republicans clearly dislike one another. Yet, scholars debate whether policy disagreement or partisan identity, per se, drives inter-party animus. Past studies suggest the relationship between partisanship and interpersonal affect is spurious, driven by inferred policy preferences. We argue, instead, that policy preferences signal partisan identity when the parties' stances on an issue are well-known. Using a nationally representative survey and four preregistered experiments, we disentangle the effects of policy disagreement and partisan identity on interpersonal affect. Our findings suggest that partisan identity is the principal mechanism of affective polarization, and that policy preferences factor into affective polarization largely by signaling partisan identity. However, our results also affirm that policy disagreement in itself drives interpersonal affect. This provides evidence that partisanship reflects an emotional attachment to a political party, not merely a running tally of rational considerations
Replication Data for: Selling ourselves short? How abbreviated measures of personality change the way we think about personality and politics
No full textPolitical scientists who study the interplay between personality and politics overwhelmingly rely on short personality scales. We explore whether the length of the employed personality scales affects the criterion validity of the scales. We show that Need for Cognition (NfC) increases reliance on party cues, but only when a longer measure is employed. Additionally, while NfC increases reliance on policy information, the effect is more than twice as large when a longer measure is used. Finally, Big Five personality traits that have been dismissed as irrelevant to political ideology yield stronger and more consistent associations when larger batteries are employed. We also show that using high Cronbach's alpha and factor loadings as indicators of scale quality does not improve the criterion validity of brief measures. Hence, the measurement of personality conditions the conclusions we draw about the role of personality in politic
The Limits of Partisan Prejudice
Full text linkPartisanship increasingly factors into the behavior of Americans in both political and non-political situations, yet the bounds of partisan prejudice are largely unknown. In this paper we systematically evaluate the limits of partisan prejudice using a series of five studies situated within a typology of prejudice. We find that partisan prejudice predicts promotion of hostile rhetoric, avoidance of members of the opposition, and a desire for preferential treatment for one\u27s own party. While these behaviors may cause incidental or indirect harm to the opposition, we find that even the most affectively polarized-those with the strongest disdain for the opposition-are no more likely to intentionally harm the opposition than those with minimal levels of affective polarization
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