1,721,050 research outputs found
Voting over Redistribution and the Size of the Welfare State: the Role of Turnout
Theories of redistribution inspired by the Downsian model receive little support from empirical investigation. In this article I argue that one of the possible explanations is that the standard Downsian theory, and the empirical specifications derived from it, ignore electoral turnout. Empirical evidence consistently shows that higher-income citizens are more likely to vote; office-seeking candidates should therefore include this probability in their objective function. As a consequence, the pivotal voter is not the median in the income distribution, but is generally richer. Moreover, an increase in income inequality does not unambiguously increase the political demand for redistribution, as most literature takes for granted. Including turnout in the model restores the compatibility of the Downsian theory with current empirical evidence. A regression analysis on panel data for 41 countries in the period 1972–98 confirms the importance of turnout as an explanatory variable for social spending
Does Political Knowledge Increase Turnout? Evidence from the 1997 British General Election
A number of recent formal models predict a positive effect of political knowledge on turnout. Both information acquisition and turnout, however, are likely to be determined by a similar set of variables, rendering hard the identification of a causal link in empirical investigations. Available empirical regularities should therefore be interpreted as mere correlations. I address this problem by using an intrumental variables approach, where the instruments are represented by various proxies of information supply on mass media. Using survey data from the 1997 British General Election Study, I show that political knowledge has a sizeable influence on the probability of voting and that mass media play an important role in influencing political participation
Replication Data for "Enfranchisement and Representation: Evidence from the Introduction of Quasi-Universal Suffrage in Italy"
The material in this folder replicates the data analysis presented in the paper and in the Appendix. It contains various datasets covering electoral results, MPs characteristics and socio-economic conditions of Italian electoral districts between 1900 and 1919. It also contains a Codebook and Stata do-files for replicating tables and graphs
Electoral Competition and Redistribution with Rationally Informed Voters
In spite of the negligible probability that everyone has to cast a decisive vote, political information
can be relevant for a number of private decisions. Under quite mild assumptions, the
demand for information is increasing in income. Being informed affects responsiveness to electoral
platforms and vote-seeking political parties should take this into account in their optimization
process. As a consequence, redistribution is generally lower than what the median voter theorem
predicts. Moreover, in contrast with what most literature takes for granted, an increase in inequality
does not unambiguously increase redistribution. This is consistent with most empirical research
in this field. Finally, an increase in the cost of information induces a reduction in redistribution
Replication Data for: "Testing Model of Distributive Politics Using Exit Polls to Measure Voters' Preferences and Partisanship", by Valentino Larcinese, James M. Snyder and Cecilia Testa, British Journal of Political Science, 43 (4), 845-875
Stata datasets and do-file
Replication Data for: "Testing Model of Distributive Politics Using Exit Polls to Measure Voters' Preferences and Partisanship", by Valentino Larcinese, James M. Snyder and Cecilia Testa, British Journal of Political Science, 43 (4), 845-875
Stata datasets and do-file
Personal and Household income taxation in a progressive tax system
I compare personal and household income taxation and study the effects of tax progression
under the two systems. Potential reforms of the Italian tax system are simulated,
endogenizing labor supply reactions. Results show that, with respect to a number of
indicators, the choice of the tax unit is more relevant than the degree of progression of the tax
schedule. A personal and progressive tax system provides incentives to female labor supply
and turns out to be the most effective in redistributing income and raising revenue, with little
productive costs compared with a flat tax rate. Household taxation has instead a number of
drawbacks when coupled with a progressive tax schedule
Enfranchisement and Representation: Evidence from the Introduction of Quasi-Universal Suffrage in Italy
This paper presents evidence on the consequences of the 1912 introduction of "quasi-universal" male suffrage in Italy. The reform increased the electorate from slightly less than three million to 8,650,000 and left the electoral rules and the district boundaries unchanged. This allows us to exploit the heterogeneity in enfranchisement rates across electoral districts to identify the causal effects of franchise extension on a number of political outcomes. The reform caused an increase in the vote share of social reformers (Socialists, Republicans and Radicals), together referred to as the Estrema. One standard deviation in the share of newly enfranchised voters over the total number of registered 1913 voters caused an increase of around 2% in votes for Estrema candidates but had no impact on their parliamentary net seat gains. Enfranchisement had also no impact on the parliamentary representation of aristocracy and traditional elites. Other outcomes (the chances of having candidates from the Estrema and the Herfindel-Hirshman index of electoral competition) were also unaffected, with the exception of turnout, which decreased. These findings show that de jure political equalization did not cause major changes to political representation, although the voting choices of the formerly and newly enfranchised citizens differed on average. This apparent puzzle is the consequence of the heterogeneity of the effect across a number of both social and political dimensions. The paper documents elite's effort to minimize the political impact of the reform
Crime and Punishment in the UK: Accountability Channels Following the MPs' Expenses Scandal
Does democracy make politicians accountable? The UK expenses scandal of May 2009
constitutes an ideal setting to answer this question, since it allows credible ceteris paribus
comparisons. We show that scandal-related press coverage significantly increased the
probability of an MP to retire, reduced vote shares of standing MPs, but did not decrease their
re-election probability. We also show that punishment was directed to individual MPs involved
in the scandal rather than their parties. An objective monetary measure of malfeasance from an
official report explains press coverage but has no independent effect on MPs’ retirement or vote
shares. We show that voters perceive co-partisan MPs to be less involved than other MPs.
Finally we analyse coverage of the scandal by seven national newspapers and conclude that the
press worked as a watchdog by focussing on the government and on frontbenchers of the main
opposition party, with little role for ideological leanings. Our study also uncovers a substantial
gender bias: ceteris paribus, female MPs received more media attention and, for the same level
of media attention, were more likely to stand down
Singing from the Same Hymn Sheet? – Examining Newspaper Coverage Bias during the 2009 MPs Expenses Scandal
We study media coverage of the 2009 MPs' expenses scandal by using a difference-in-differences methodology which is closely related to previous research on the US press of Larcinese et al. (2011) and Puglisi and Snyder (2011a). Our conclusion is that personal characteristics explain press coverage, ceteris paribus, better than partisan affiliation. In particular, we uncover a systematic unfavourable treatment of female MPs
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