1,720,987 research outputs found
Going Beyond Counting First Authors in Author Co-citation Analysis
Full text linkThe present study examines one of the fundamental aspects of author co-citation analysis (ACA) - the way co-citation
counts are defined. Co-citation counting provides the data on which all subsequent statistical analyses and mappings
are based, and we compare ACA results based on two different types of co-citation counting - the traditional type that
only counts the first one among a cited work's authors on the one hand and a non-traditional type that takes into
account the first 5 authors of a cited work on the other hand. Results indicate that the picture produced through this non-traditional author co-citation counting contains more coherent author groups and is therefore considerably clearer. However, this picture represents fewer specialties in the research field being studied than that produced through the traditional first-author co-citation counting when the same number of top-ranked authors is selected and analyzed. Reasons for these effects are discussed
The forty thieves: Churchill, the Cairo Conference, and the policy debate over strategies of colonial control in British mandatory Iraq, 1918-1924
Full text linkAfter World War I, Great Britain found itself unexpectedly occupying vast swaths of the Middle East, including the modern-day nation of Iraq. The final disposition of its Middle Eastern possessions was initially unclear, and the British government explored several policy options before finally selecting air policing, a novel colonial control scheme wherein aircraft would be used in lieu of ground forces to provide a British military presence in Iraq. This thesis examines the process by which Britain chose air policing as its best strategy for Iraq. Air policing was intensely controversial from the very beginning. The internal debate it sparked within the government was intense and bitter. That air policing ultimately won out over rival policy options was due to a combination of factors, including Churchill's advocacy, financial cuts, manpower reductions, and policymakers' determining that air policing represented the best possibility for Great Britain to maintain influence in Iraq
Conflict, Cooperation, and Congressional End-Runs: The Defense Budget and Civil-Military Relations in the Carter Administration, 1977-1978
Full text linkPresident Jimmy Carter became commander-in-chief at an important juncture in American civil-military relations. This study adds to the largely neglected historiography of civil-military relations during the Carter years by examining the administration’s first two years, using the civil-military dialogue surrounding the fiscal year 1978 and fiscal year 1979 defense budgets as its primary category of analysis. The study demonstrates that growing cooperation within the Pentagon, increasing conflict between the Pentagon and the White House, and a strengthening military-congressional alliance best characterized civil-military relations in the first two years of the Carter administration. This pattern of civil-military relations prevailed primarily due to early and intense presidential involvement in the defense budgetary process and because of the administration’s attempts to re-prioritize defense spending. The culmination of this pattern of civil-military relations in the administration’s first two years was the presidential veto of the fiscal year 1979 defense appropriations bill
The enemy of my enemy is my friend: Okinawan identity and military government policy in occupied Okinawa, April 1945
Full text linkThis thesis explores the planning considerations of the United States Army in formulating and implementing policy for the occupation of Okinawa in April 1945. American soldiers on Okinawa encountered not only a Japanese enemy but a large local population. The Okinawans were ethnically different from the Japanese yet Okinawa shared politics with Japan as a legal prefecture. When devising occupation policies, the United States Army analyzed practical military considerations such as resources, weapons capability and terrain as well as attempted to ascertain a conclusive definition of Okinawa's relation to Japan through conscious, open, rational analysis of racial and ethnic identity. American planners determined that the Okinawans would act loyally towards Japan and should thus be treated like enemy civilians. As military government soldiers interacted with the civilians during the battle, however, ideas about race, ethnicity, and identity evolved; soldiers began to view the Okinawans as sensitive to the American cause. The modification of Okinawan identity from a Japanese enemy to an American friend displayed both the mutable nature of racial notions as well as their centrality in occupation planning
The SAC mentality: the origins of organizational culture in Strategic Air Command, 1946-1962
Full text linkThis dissertation explores the origins of Strategic Air Command’s organizational culture. Organizational culture—the assumptions, values, and rituals of an organization— has an ideological and a material component. Formed in 1946, SAC inherited part of its organizational culture from the assumptions of Air Force leaders who believed that strategic air power should be organized under one independent commander. This provided the initial values and organizational doctrine for the command. The shared historical experiences of those who fought in World War II provided the formulation for the tactics and cultural rituals that became part of SAC culture. Constructing a ‘force-in-being’ meant preparing SAC to execute its war plan on a moment’s notice. Curtis LeMay put SAC on alert; war was not months or weeks but hours away. As SAC organized, trained, and, in the minds of its leaders and members fought the Cold War, other organizational routines, rituals, and symbols evolved. Many of SAC’s first cultural forms—standardized procedures, lead crews, and the survival school—grew out of the leaders’ shared experiences. Other cultural elements— security, competition, and architectural designs—developed out of the command’s involvement in the Cold War. Security and competition oriented people towards an enemy and to vigilance. Although SAC tried to build a family friendly command, its atmosphere of competition ran counter to the cooperation needed at home to maintain a healthy family life. In 1957, the Soviet Union’s launch of Sputnik I changed the circumstances of the Cold War and added new elements to SAC culture. Alert—the ability to launch bombers and ICBMs within fifteen minutes—became a cultural routine that lasted in SAC until the Cold War ended. The responsiveness required of the alert force meant mistakes, especially with nuclear weapons, were not tolerated. SAC culture dictated perfection as the standard. Missiles, however, stood in stark contrast to the values and assumptions of the organization. These new weapons were ‘pilotless.’ Therefore, SAC took measures to make sure this new SAC subculture espoused the same values and beliefs as the larger organization. SAC’s culture emphasized standardization, perfection, and the physical presentation of power because this was the type of war the organization fought
No sure victory: measuring U.S. Army effectiveness and progress in the Vietnam War
Full text linkThis study analyzes how the United States Army component of the Military Assistance Command-Vietnam (MACV) attempted to measure its progress and effectiveness while conducting counterinsurgency operations during the Vietnam War. It illustrates the difficulties staff officers and commanders confronted in identifying useful metrics for gauging success in an unconventional environment. Political, economic, and cultural factors all impinged on the course and conduct of the army's counterinsurgency operations. These factors also influenced how commanders attempted to assess their effectiveness and progress. From a historiographical standpoint, most secondary literature on the Vietnam War maintains that the U.S. Army simply used body counts to measure its military effectiveness in a counterinsurgency environment. These sources contend that since army officers could not depend on traditional measures such as geography to determine if they were winning or losing, they reverted to the organizationally comfortable procedure of counting enemy dead. The purpose of this study is to correct this inaccurate simplification and, more importantly, to discover how the U.S. Army, confronted by an unfamiliar enemy and form of warfare, attempted to measure its successes and failures. It will do so by examining the army's doctrine for counterinsurgency, its formulation of measurements to assess progress in the Vietnam War, and the army's use and modification of these measurements during a long and complex war. In the process, this study investigates the army's efforts to measure its progress and effectiveness in a number of key areas throughout the conflict: counterinsurgency operations, search and destroy missions, pacification efforts, and the training of South Vietnamese forces
Conflict and Compromise: American Military Chaplains and the Vietnam War
Full text linkMilitary chaplains, serving alongside American servicemen and women, have lived and worked at the cultural and institutional intersections of religion and war. Understanding how chaplains experienced the Vietnam War—as military officers and as clergy—illuminates both the sympathies and tensions between faith and war. This dissertation examines chaplains’ experiences and reflections of the Vietnam War in order to track that war’s effects on chaplains personally and on the institutional chaplaincy. Chaplains acted as “cultural mediators or links between religious and military cultures in situations that demanded explanation and reconciliation. Chaplains’ experiences highlighted the stress fracturing the nation as Vietnam came to represent a failure of both American foreign policy and a certain vision of American identity. This dissertation examines the impact of the Vietnam War on chaplains as individuals and on the institutional chaplaincy. The dissertation uses four types of primary sources: Chaplain Corps official records; first person accounts of Vietnam-era chaplains; oral interviews with chaplains; and publications of the mainstream media, the popular religious press, and denominational organizations. These materials uncover not only the structural and organizational workings of the chaplaincy, but also the cultural patterns and ideas that influenced chaplains and those around them. The dissertation is organized into three parts. The first part examines the religious, cultural, and international contexts of the early Cold War in order to contextualize the Vietnam War. The second part deals with the combat period of the Vietnam War, roughly 1962-1973; its three chapters examine chaplains’ official functions, chaplains’ experiences, and chaplains’ relationship to homefront communities. The third part of the dissertation deals with post-Vietnam responses and changes among chaplains and within the institutional chaplaincy. Chaplains remain at the forefront of discussions about the relationship between religion and war, and the reverberations from Vietnam are intense. Several contemporary situations reveal uncertainty about the chaplain’s role in the modern United States military. Many of these questions are rooted in the tensions of chaplains’ experiences in the Vietnam War. Understanding the chaplaincy during this period provides important insights into the history of both religion and the military in late twentieth century America
Super-Rangers: the early years of Army Special Forces 1944-1953
Full text linkThe United States Army Special Forces is an unconventional warfare organization of the United States Army with roots in World War II. Soldiers and civilian policymakers who participated in guerilla warfare during that war saw unconventional warfare as a way to further American interests in situations where a conventional army could not operate effectively. In the postwar national security policy battles, these soldiers and government officials fought for a permanent unconventional warfare unit in the US Army. By 1951 They had successfully argued for the establishment of Army Special Forces Groups utilizing guerilla warfare to fight Soviet Communism in the event of a general war. The problems of understanding and defining unconventional warfare, however, crippled the ability of Army Special Forces to instigate guerilla warfare against the Soviet Union wherever and whenever needed
Prelude to a Revolution: African-American World War II Veterans, Double Consciousness, and Civil Rights 1940-1955
Full text linkThis dissertation examines and analyzes the experiences of African-American servicemen in World War II through the lens of double consciousness. I argue that the black experience in the U.S. military at home and overseas, as troops encountered different cultures and places, changed and raised consciousness for black troops. In turn, this altered consciousness contributed to racial progress and new attitudes on the homefront upon their return. In the postwar period, veterans employed increasingly militant forms of protest, spearheaded a variety of desegregation efforts, and improved organizational efforts in the black community. Using an interdisciplinary approach to this topic, I incorporate oral testimonies from black veterans, the theory of double consciousness, and elements of contemporary black literature to articulate the prevailing consciousness within the black community in general and veterans in particular. The study makes a critical connection between the Second World War and the civil rights movement.Doctor of Philosoph
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