119,125 research outputs found
Louis Keefer Collection 1998
No full textThe collection contains correspondence between Mrs. Robert L. Hill and and the Leo Baeck Institute and the Hessische familiengeschichtliche Vereinigung e. V., Darmstadt, regarding genealogical information on her grandfather Louis Keefer. Also included is an obituary for Louis Keefer and a family tree.digitizedLouis Keefer was born in Hahnlein-Hess, Darmstadt, Germany in 1844. He came to the United States in 1863, originally settling in Allegheny, Pennsylvania. He moved to Chicago in 1876, where he worked as a cattle buyer and feeder. He died in Chicago in 1916
When do special interests run rampant ? disentangling the role in banking crises of elections, incomplete information, and checks and balances
Get PDFThe author investigates the political determinants of government decisions that benefit special interest groups - especially government decisions to deal with banking crises. He finds that the better informed the voters, the more proximate elections, and the larger the number of political veto players ( conditional on the costs to voters of relevant policy decision), the smaller the government's fiscal transfer are to the financial sector and the less likely the government is to exercise forbearance in dealing with insolvent financial institutions. The results suggest that policies thatmight be appropriate for mitigating banking crises in the United States might be less effective in settings where voters are less informed, where elections are less competitive, and where there are fewer veto players, because in these settings checks and balances are missing. These policies include: a) Disseminating information about the costs of inefficient government decisions. b) Improving the structure of legislative regulatory oversight. c) Intervening early in insolvent banks. The author concludes that the more veto players there are, the less likely policies are to favor special interest groups (contrary to previous views). Moreover, the closer the elections, the less likely policies are to favor special interest groups.
Democratization and clientelism: why are young democracies badly governed?
Get PDFThis paper identifies systematic performance differences between younger and older democracies: younger democracies are more corrupt; exhibit less rule of law, lower levels of bureaucratic quality, and lower secondary school enrollments; and spend more on public investment and government workers. Only one theory explains the effects of democratic age on the wide range of policy outcomes examined here-the inability of political competitors in younger democracies to make credible promises to citizens. This explanation, first advanced in Keefer and Vlaicu (2004), offers a concrete interpretation of what political institutionalization might mean, and why it is that young democracies frequently fail to become older and well-performing democracies. A variety of tests support this explanation against alternatives. The effect of democratic age remains large even after controlling for the possibilities that voters are less well-informed in young democracies, that young democracies have systematically different political and electoral institutions, or that young democracies exhibit more polarized societies.National Governance,Parliamentary Government,Politics and Government,Environmental Economics&Policies,Economic Theory&Research
A review of the political economy of governance : from property rights to voice
Get PDFKeefer reviews progress made in understanding the effects of different dimensions of governance on economic development, and the sources of good governance. The term governance has been used to embrace concepts that are heterogeneous both with respect to their effects on economic development and their genesis. Future progress in developing policy responses to bad governance will depend on separately examining these heterogeneous elements-the security of property rights, the quality of bureaucratic performance, corruption, voice, and accountability. Future progress will also depend on explicitly linking problems of governance to the overarching political environment and the incentives of governments to correct those problems.Environmental Economics&Policies,Labor Policies,Banks&Banking Reform,Decentralization,Economic Theory&Research,Governance Indicators,NationalGovernance,Environmental Economics&Policies,Economic Theory&Research,Banks&Banking Reform
Boondoogles and expropriation : rent-sseking and policy distortion when property rights are insecure
Get PDFMost analyses of property rights and economic development point to the negative influence of insecure property rights on private investment. The authors focus instead on the largely unexamined effects of insecure property rights on government policy choices. They identify one significant anomaly-dramatically higher public investment in countries with insecure property rights-and use it to make the following broad claims about insecure property rights; 1) They increase rent-seeking. 2) They may reduce the incentives of governments to use tax revenues for productive purposes, such as public investment. 3) They do so whether one regards the principal problem of insecure property rights as the maintenance of law and order, which government spending can potentially remedy, or as the threat of expropriation by government itself, and therefore not remediable by government spending. The authors present substantial empirical evidence to support these claims.Environmental Economics&Policies,International Terrorism&Counterterrorism,Labor Policies,Economic Theory&Research,Payment Systems&Infrastructure,Environmental Economics&Policies,Economic Theory&Research,National Governance,Public Sector Economics&Finance,Land and Real Estate Development
sj-pdf-2-ome-10.1177_00302228221085173 – Supplemental Material for A Distant Ally?: Mortality Salience and Parasocial Attachment
No full textSupplemental Material, sj-pdf-2-ome-10.1177_00302228221085173 for A Distant Ally?: Mortality Salience and Parasocial Attachment by Lucas A. Keefer, Faith L. Brown, Zachary K. Rothschild, and Kaitlyn Allen in OMEGA-Journal of Death and Dying</p
sj-csv-1-ome-10.1177_00302228221085173 – Supplemental Material for A Distant Ally?: Mortality Salience and Parasocial Attachment
No full textSupplemental Material, sj-csv-1-ome-10.1177_00302228221085173 for A Distant Ally?: Mortality Salience and Parasocial Attachment by Lucas A. Keefer, Faith L. Brown, Zachary K. Rothschild, and Kaitlyn Allen in OMEGA-Journal of Death and Dying</p
sj-pdf-1-ome-10.1177_00302228221085173 – Supplemental Material for A Distant Ally?: Mortality Salience and Parasocial Attachment
No full textSupplemental Material, sj-pdf-1-ome-10.1177_00302228221085173 for A Distant Ally?: Mortality Salience and Parasocial Attachment by Lucas A. Keefer, Faith L. Brown, Zachary K. Rothschild, and Kaitlyn Allen in OMEGA-Journal of Death and Dying</p
sj-pdf-3-ome-10.1177_00302228221085173 – Supplemental Material for A Distant Ally?: Mortality Salience and Parasocial Attachment
No full textSupplemental Material, sj-pdf-3-ome-10.1177_00302228221085173 for A Distant Ally?: Mortality Salience and Parasocial Attachment by Lucas A. Keefer, Faith L. Brown, Zachary K. Rothschild, and Kaitlyn Allen in OMEGA-Journal of Death and Dying</p
Going Beyond Counting First Authors in Author Co-citation Analysis
Get PDFThe present study examines one of the fundamental aspects of author co-citation analysis (ACA) - the way co-citation
counts are defined. Co-citation counting provides the data on which all subsequent statistical analyses and mappings
are based, and we compare ACA results based on two different types of co-citation counting - the traditional type that
only counts the first one among a cited work's authors on the one hand and a non-traditional type that takes into
account the first 5 authors of a cited work on the other hand. Results indicate that the picture produced through this non-traditional author co-citation counting contains more coherent author groups and is therefore considerably clearer. However, this picture represents fewer specialties in the research field being studied than that produced through the traditional first-author co-citation counting when the same number of top-ranked authors is selected and analyzed. Reasons for these effects are discussed
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