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Dynamic factor demands under rational expectations
Bibliography: p. 19.by Robert S. Pindyck and Julio J. Rotemberg
Dynamic Factor Demands Under Rational Expectations
This paper presents a dynamic model of the industrial demands for structures, equipment, and blue- and white-collar labor. Our approach is consistent with producers holding rational expectations and optimizing dynamically in the presence of adjustment costs, yet it permits generality of functional form regarding the technology. We represent the technology by atranslog input requirement function that specifies the amount of blue-collar labor (a flexible factor) the firm must hire to produce a level of output given its quantities of three quasi-fixed factors that are subject to adjustment costs: non-production (white-collar) workers, equipment, and structures.A complete description of the production structure is obtained by simultaneously estimating the input requirement function and three stochastic Euler equations.We apply an instrumental variable technique to estimate these equations using aggregate data for U.S. manufacturing. We find that as a fraction of total expenditures, adjustment costs are small in total hut large on the margin,and that they differ considerably across quasi-fixed factors. We also present short- and long-run elasticities of factor demands.
Imperfect Competition and the Effects of Energy Price Increases on Economic Activity
We show that modifying the standard neoclassical growth model by assuming that competition is imperfect makes it easier to explain the size of the declines in output and real wages that follow increases in the price of oil. Plausibly parameterized models of this type are able to mimic the response of output and real wages in the United States. The responses are particularly consistent with a model of implicit collusion where markups depend positively on the ratio of the expected present value of future profits to the current level of output.
The Discounted Economic Stock of Money with VAR Forecasting
We measure the United States capital stock of money implied by the Divisia monetary aggregate service flow, in a manner consistent with the present-value model of economic capital stock. We permit non-martingale expectations and time varying discount rates. Based on Barnett’s (1991) definition of the economic stock of money, we compute the U.S. economic stock of money by discounting to present value the flow of expected expenditure on the services of monetary assets, where expenditure on monetary services is evaluated at the user costs of the monetary components. As a theoretically consistent measure of money stock, our economic stock of money nests Rotemberg, Driscoll, and Poterba’s (1995) currency equivalent index as a special case, under the assumption of martingale expectations. To compute the economic stock of money without imposing martingale expectations, we use forecasts based on the asymmetric vector autoregressive model and the Bayesian vector autoregressive model. We find the resulting capital-stock growth-rate index to be surprisingly robust to the modeling of expectations.monetary aggregation, econommic stock of money, aggregation theory, index number theory, VAR forecasting, wealth effect, Pigou effect, real balance effect, measurement
Going Beyond Counting First Authors in Author Co-citation Analysis
The present study examines one of the fundamental aspects of author co-citation analysis (ACA) - the way co-citation
counts are defined. Co-citation counting provides the data on which all subsequent statistical analyses and mappings
are based, and we compare ACA results based on two different types of co-citation counting - the traditional type that
only counts the first one among a cited work's authors on the one hand and a non-traditional type that takes into
account the first 5 authors of a cited work on the other hand. Results indicate that the picture produced through this non-traditional author co-citation counting contains more coherent author groups and is therefore considerably clearer. However, this picture represents fewer specialties in the research field being studied than that produced through the traditional first-author co-citation counting when the same number of top-ranked authors is selected and analyzed. Reasons for these effects are discussed
Variations on the Author
“Variations on the Author” discusses two of Eduardo Coutinho’s recent films (Um Dia na Vida, from 2010, and Últimas Conversas, posthumously released in 2015) and their contribution to the general question of documentary authorship. The director’s filmography is characterized by a consistent yet self-effacing form of authorial self-inscription: Coutinho often features as an interviewer that rather than express opinions propels discourses; an interviewer that is good at listening. This mode of self-inscription characterizes him as an author who is not expressive but who is nonetheless markedly present on the screen. In Um Dia na Vida, however, Coutinho is completely absent form the image, while Últimas Conversas, on the contrary, includes a confessional prologue that moves the director from the margins to the center of his films. This article examines the ways in which these works stand out in the filmography of a director who offers new insights into the notion of cinematic authorship
Leadership Style and Incentives
We study the relationship between a firm's environment and its optimal leadership style. We use a model in which contracts between the firm and managers are incomplete so that providing incentives to subordinates is not straightforward. Leadership style, whether based on organizational culture or on the personality of the leader, then affects the incentive contracts that can be offered to subordinates. We show that leaders who empathize with their employees adopt a participatory style and that shareholders gain from appointing such leaders when the firm has the potential for exploiting numerous innovative ideas. By contrast, when the environment is poor in new ideas, shareholders benefit from hiring a more selfish (i.e., more profit maximizing) leader whose style is more autocratic.leadership style, employee participation, incomplete contracts, incentives for innovation
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