178 research outputs found

    Book Review -- Jon Barwise and Lawrence Moss, Vicious Circles: On the Mathematics of Non-Wellfounded Phenomena

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    This is a review of Vicious Circles: On the Mathematics of Non-Wellfounded Phenomena, by Jon Barwise and Lawrence Moss, published by CSLI (Center for the Study of Language and Information) Publications in 1996

    Admissible Sets and Structures

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    Since their inception, the Perspectives in Logic and Lecture Notes in Logic series have published seminal works by leading logicians. Many of the original books in the series have been unavailable for years, but they are now in print once again. Admissible set theory is a major source of interaction between model theory, recursion theory and set theory, and plays an important role in definability theory. In this volume, the seventh publication in the Perspectives in Logic series, Jon Barwise presents the basic facts about admissible sets and admissible ordinals in a way that makes them accessible to logic students and specialists alike. It fills the artificial gap between model theory and recursion theory and covers everything the logician should know about admissible sets.</jats:p

    John Barwise & Lawrence Moss, _Vicious Circles: On the Mathematics of Non-Wellfounded Phenomena_

    No full text
    This is a review of Vicious Circles: On the Mathematics of Non-Wellfounded Phenomena, written by Jon Barwise and Lawrence Moss and published by CSLI Publications in 1996

    John Barwise & Lawrence Moss, _Vicious Circles: On the Mathematics of Non-Wellfounded Phenomena_

    No full text
    This is a review of Vicious Circles: On the Mathematics of Non-Wellfounded Phenomena, written by Jon Barwise and Lawrence Moss and published by CSLI Publications in 1996

    Critical Study: Jon Barwise & John Perry, Situations and Attitudes

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    The present essay is a critical study of Barwise and Perry’s book, emphasizing the logical and model-theoretical aspects of their work. I begin by presenting the authors’ criticism of the classical view of logic and semantics within the tradition of Frege, Russell and Tarski. In this connection, I discuss the so-called Frege argument (“the slingshot”). I try to show that the argument appears inconclusive, not only from a situation-theoretic perspective, but also from such alternative perspectives as orthodox Fregean semantics or Russellian semantics. I then discuss the ontology of situation semantics and the way it is modeled within set theory. In particular, I compare the notion of an abstract situation with that of a possible world. The last two sections concern the model-theoretic aspects of the authors’ theory. In Section 7, I discuss how the “partial” perspective of situation semantics differs from that of classical model theory. Finally, in Section 8, different model-theoretic accounts of attitude reports within situation semantics are discussed, in particular the “relations to situations”-approach presented by the authors in Chapter 9 of S & A. The usual problems of “logical omniscience” that appear in standard Hintikka-style epistemic logic are avoided in situation semantics. I argue, however, that situation semantics is faced with analogous counter-intuitive results, unless the expressive power of the language under study is suitably restricted

    Critical Study: Jon Barwise & John Perry, Situations and Attitudes

    No full text
    The present essay is a critical study of Barwise and Perry’s book, emphasizing the logical and model-theoretical aspects of their work. I begin by presenting the authors’ criticism of the classical view of logic and semantics within the tradition of Frege, Russell and Tarski. In this connection, I discuss the so-called Frege argument (“the slingshot”). I try to show that the argument appears inconclusive, not only from a situation-theoretic perspective, but also from such alternative perspectives as orthodox Fregean semantics or Russellian semantics. I then discuss the ontology of situation semantics and the way it is modeled within set theory. In particular, I compare the notion of an abstract situation with that of a possible world. The last two sections concern the model-theoretic aspects of the authors’ theory. In Section 7, I discuss how the “partial” perspective of situation semantics differs from that of classical model theory. Finally, in Section 8, different model-theoretic accounts of attitude reports within situation semantics are discussed, in particular the “relations to situations”-approach presented by the authors in Chapter 9 of S & A. The usual problems of “logical omniscience” that appear in standard Hintikka-style epistemic logic are avoided in situation semantics. I argue, however, that situation semantics is faced with analogous counter-intuitive results, unless the expressive power of the language under study is suitably restricted

    Probing the Iroquoian Perspective

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    Interpolation, Preservation, and Pebble Games

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    Preservation and interpolation results are obtained for L1! and sublogics L ` L1! such that equivalence in L can be characterized by suitable back-and-forth conditions on sets of partial isomorphisms. 1 Introduction In the heyday of infinitary logic in the 1960&apos;s and 70&apos;s, most attention was focused on L!1! and its fragments (see e.g. Keisler [19]), since countable formulas seemed best behaved. The past decade has seen a renewed interest in L1! and its finite variable fragments L (k) 1! (for 2 k ! !) and the modal fragment L \Pi 1! (see e.g. Ebbinghaus and Flum [17] on the former and Barwise and Moss [9] on the latter), due to various connections with topics in computer science. These logics form a hierarchy of increasingly powerful logics L \Pi 1! ae L (2) 1! ae L (3) 1! ae : : : ae L (k) 1! ae : : : ae L1! ; with each of these inclusions being proper. Moreover, there is a useful and elegant algebraic characterization of equivalence in L in each of these logics L, fro..

    PRIJEVODI

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    Barry Hartley Slater "Out of the Liar Tangle" Jon Barwise i John Etchemendy "Completeness of Propositional Logic" Willard Van Orman Quine "Reference and Modality
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