292 research outputs found
Ethiopia, Africa 1972
No full textRelief shown by shading and spot heights.;
"500824 9-72.";
Maps in margin: Population and ethnic groups.--Economic activity.--Vegetation.;Includes inset maps showing Population and Ethnic Groups, Economic Activity and Vegetation.;Color;1:4,070,000 (E 36°--E 48°/N 16°--N 4°).
Union Jacks and Red Stars on Them : UK Intelligence, the Soviet Nuclear Threat and British Nuclear Weapons Policy, 1945-1970.
No full textPhDThis thesis is a study of the British intelligence assessments produced by the UK's Joint
Intelligence Committee regarding the Soviet Union's nuclear capabilities and intentions.
It examines the origins of such intelligence, the various organisations that collected,
collated and analysed it and how it fed into the Joint Intelligence structure. The thesis
seeks both to synthesise existing historical analysis and add new evidence on
intelligence organisation, collection, analysis and dissemination by examining the
development of such assessments over a twenty-five year period and considering how
well they reflected and informed British governments about the status and progress of
the Soviet nuclear threat. Lastly, it analyses how this intelligence fed into and may have
affected wider British military and ministerial decision-making regarding the course of
the UK's nuclear weapons policy between 1945 and 1970
Truth-seeking and the principles of discrimination, necessity, proportionality and reciprocity in national security intelligence activity
No full textNational security intelligence is information or other data collected, analyzed and disseminated by intelligence agencies (in particular) and done so in the service of these agencies’ primary institutional purpose (Miller 2010), at least in liberal democracies. Here it is understood that this institutional purpose and these actions are to be understood normatively, that is in terms of what ought to be done, as opposed to what is in fact being done. Here, the term “normative” has a moral or ethical loading, for example what ought to be done is typically what morally ought to be done all things considered (including consideration of the empirical facts). 1 Moreover, these essentially epistemic (from the Greek word, “episteme”, meaning knowledge) or evidence-based truth-seeking activities of collection, analysis and dissemination are the main ones performed by national security agencies. That said, many of these agencies also perform kinetic tasks, for example the covert operations conducted by the United States CIA (Central Intelligence Agency), and on occasion tasks that might be referred to as quasi-epistemic, for example psychological “warfare”.Ethics & Philosophy of Technolog
Report on the President's Surveillance Program
No full textDeclassified report released in response to a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit by The New York Times about the Stellarwind program, the group of N.S.A. warrantless wiretapping and bulk phone and e-mail records collection activities initiated by President George W. Bush after the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001. In 2009, the government released a 43-page unclassified version which omitted discussion of many key facts that then remained secret. After the 2013 leaks by the former intelligence contractor Edward J. Snowden, which included a draft version of the N.S.A. inspector general¿s contribution to this larger joint I.G. report, the government declassified many facts about surveillance, leading to The Times¿ lawsuit seeking release of the full and final report
A democratic licence to operate
Get PDFPreface
Britain is an open, democratic and increasingly digital society. Technological innovation and the growth in global communication networks have enabled commerce, trade and the transfer of knowledge. British citizens, companies and the government have embraced the benefits of these ever-expanding national and international networks.
The availability of digital technology is having a profound effect on society. Computers guide our everyday activities and regulate our communications. Big data is reshaping the way we live, work and think. Digital information is helping us to identify social trends, tackle crime and prevent disease.
More information and data is being shared: between citizens themselves; between citizens and government; consumers and companies; and exchanged by the public and private sectors. Often this information is shared across national borders. Protecting privacy and ensuring data security is necessary but is thus becoming more difficult as information volumes increase and are moved and stored around the world.
The strain of technological evolution on society is particularly acute in the realms of crime, national security and public safety. Technological developments have enhanced the capacity of governments, companies and citizens to know more about individuals and to undertake surveillance, interception and data collection. The Internet has become the front line in contemporary debates about privacy and security.
Privacy is an essential prerequisite to the exercise of individual freedom, and its erosion weakens the constitutional foundations on which democracy and good governance have traditionally been based in this country.
Successive governments have faced a perpetual dilemma: democratic societies demand openness about what is being done in their name but key aspects of the way that police, security and intelligence agencies operate must remain secret in order for their work to be effective. These agencies are dependent on the public’s consent, and in an open society there is therefore an important understanding between citizens and the state that the agencies must operate within a strict legal framework, that their intrusions into private life must be necessary and proportionate, and that they must be overseen and scrutinised by independent bodies.
In Britain how these principles apply in practice in the digital age has been the subject of considerable controversy, with recent reviews concluding that the state of the law has not matched the pace of technological change
Organizational culture\u27s contributions to security failures within the United States intelligence community
Get PDFThe institutions that comprise the United States intelligence community have organizational cultures that are unique from other government agencies. These cultures encourage the development and retention of traits that are necessary to mission accomplishment, yet these exclusivities also hamstring organizations and may contribute to significant security failures. This thesis isolates elements of organizational culture that are specific to the United States intelligence community and explores the extent to which the culture is responsible for security and/or counterintelligence shortcomings. The author selected three governmental organizations with intelligence collection and analysis functions; they include the Naval Investigative Service (NIS), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). These agencies demonstrate the intelligence community includes military (NIS), intelligence (CIA) and law enforcement (FBI) components with shared organizational traits. The author subsequently identified a significant security failure case encountered by each agency and employed a case study approach to determine the extent to which the agencies’ organizational cultures contributed to the security failures. Internal agency investigations and external assessments of espionage activities reveal cultural factors impede the early detection of security compromises and thwart law enforcement efforts to investigate suspicious behavior. Despite the deleterious effects of national security collapses, the intelligence community’s personnel increasingly recognize the complicity of organizational culture in such security failures. The intelligence community increasingly analyzes the negative aspects of its organizational traits, and there have been substantive strides within the intelligence establishment to minimize the security obstacles that organizational culture imposes on its constituent adherents. The intelligence apparatus must maintain an organizational culture that distinguishes it from other government agencies. Unfortunately, the community’s cultural characteristics also convey increased risks of security compromises. It is possible, however, for the United States intelligence community to maintain its unique organizational culture and simultaneously minimize the possibility of operational or security failure
Incentives For Workers As Intervening Variables On The National and Political Unity Agency (KESBANGPOL) Simalungun Regency
Get PDFThis study aims to determine the effect of emotional intelligence and work motivation on employee performance with incentives as intervening variables (Case Study on National and Political Unity Agency Employees, Simalungun Regency, Pematang Siantar City). The research method used is the quantitative data method. Data collection in this study was carried out by distributing questionnaires (questionnaires) to respondents. The results of this study are 1) The emotional intelligence (X1) variable has a positive and statistically significant effect on incentives (Z).2) The Variable Work Motivation (X2) has no positive or significant effect on Incentives (Z).3) Emotional intelligence (X1) has a significant effect on employee performance (Y). 4) Work Motivation (X2) has a significant effect on Employee Performance (Y). 5) Incentives (Z) have a significant effect on employee performance (Y). 6) The incentive (Z) is an intervening variable that mediates the effect of emotional intelligence (X1) on employee performance (Y).7 Incentive (Z) is an intervening variable that mediates the effect of work motivation (X2) on employee performance (Y). This shows that emotional intelligence (X1) and work motivation (X2) can explain the incentive (Z) of 88.9%. This shows that the Incentive (Z) Emotional Intelligence (X1) and Work Motivation (X2) can explain Employee Performance (Y) by 65.2%. The author suggests that human resources or employees should prioritize the quality of emotional intelligence in addition to their intellectual intelligence so that there is a balance in terms of achieving good performance. In order for employees' work motivation to increase, the National Unity and Political Agency of Simalungun Regency Pematang Siantar City should increase the level of persistence of employees by paying attention and developing skills in order to advance the agency and improve employee performance. The incentive compensation system that is implemented should generate benefits for both parties, namely the National Unity and Political Agency of Simalungun Regency, Pematang Siantar City, as the provider of incentive compensation, and employees
Veiled intentions: Hamas’s strategic deception and intelligence success on 7 October 2023
No full textOn 7 October 2023, Hamas dealt a severe blow to Israel’s deterrence by launching a multi-front incursion that killed more than a thousand Israelis and captured hundreds. Prevailing commentary frames the attack as an Israeli intelligence debacle; this study instead interrogates Hamas’s intelligence success. Drawing on strategic deception, the intelligence-cycle model and asymmetric warfare scholarship, it analyses how a resource-starved non-state actor concealed intentions. Process-traced evidence from investigative reporting, declassified Israeli documents, and interviewsFootnote1 the author conducted with Hamas’s leadership, members and analysts reveals four enabling pillars: meticulous operational security, systematic open-source and cyber intelligence collection (OSINT), insider human intelligence (HUMINT) and a professionalised intelligence apparatus shaped by decades of counter-espionage practice and external tutoring. The findings underscore adversary agency and expose the fragility of technological superiority for advanced militaries.</p
Modern Private Data Collection and National Security Agency Surveillance: A Comprehensive Package of Solutions Addressing Domestic Surveillance Concerns
Get PDFEach day as we add cell phone apps, adopt trending tweets, or ask Siri for assistance, our information is being captured, stored, and even analyzed for repackaging in a profile. Private companies are working very hard to find the best ways to read consumers in the digital world to target them for advertisement. Meanwhile, the National Security Agency (NSA) is working very hard to stay connected to these big data collection methods to find the best way to target individuals for surveillance. This Comment provides insight into modern methods of NSA surveillance through examining section 215 USA Patriot Act and section 702 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) surveillance practices. Part I uncovers data collection and surveillance controversies that emerged in the media in 2013, sparking global privacy concerns about section 702 warrantless surveillance and section 215 mass domestic and foreign business communication records collection. In Part II, this Comment delves into the history of NSA surveillance, developing case law, and proposed legislation. Part III explores how big data surveillance works and reveals the connections between NSA surveillance and private companies. Part IV discusses the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and emerging policy on big data collection in the private realm. Part V forms a comprehensive package of solutions by merging NSA and FTC proposals to remedy past and future surveillance issues. Finally, Part VI concludes with the author\u27s top suggestions for the legislature, judiciary, and executive to preserve domestic privacy in an era of big data collection
"A Rat Hole to be Watched"? CIA Analyses of the Tito-Stalin Split, 1948-1950
No full textThis thesis studies Central Intelligence Agency analyses of the June 28, 1948, Tito-Stalin split. It discusses the many issues that the CIA confronted after the first public breach of a heretofore united Communist monolith. This thesis also places these analyses in context, examining the problems faced by the newly created CIA as it struggled to find a place in the national security bureaucracy.
After the Agency was established in 1947, its very existence was consistently challenged by the Departments of State and Defense, organizations which were unwilling to cede any bureaucratic control away from their own intelligence operations. The Secretaries of State and Defense used their superior status on the National Security Council to bolster their positions, while the Agency's ad hoc organizational structure and uncertain mandate provided a weak case for more authority. Along with its administrative struggles, the early CIA was also marked by a series of high-profile intelligence failures, among them the Tito-Stalin split.
Despite its ongoing bureaucratic struggles, the CIA quickly recovered from the shock of the split. It provided remarkably prescient analyses of the rift's consequences. Using a collection of newly declassified CIA files, as well as a series of interviews with the CIA Station Chief in Belgrade from 1948 until 1951, this thesis analyzes those reports. It follows a year-by-year progression between 1948 and 1950. The first chapter, covering 1948, discusses the CIA's initial post-split analyses, in which the possibility was broached of provoking more "Tito" defections throughout Eastern Europe. It also discusses the initial likelihood of a Soviet or Sattelite invasion of Yugoslavia in order to depose Tito, Stalin's initiation of "Titoist" purges in the Sattelite states, and the initial repercussions of Yugoslavia's aid to Greek Communist rebels and disputed claim to Trieste. Concomitant with the deteriorating relations of the United States and Yugoslavia before the split, the CIA during 1948 considered Yugoslavia "a rat hole to be watched." By 1949, that perception was beginning to change. The second chapter discusses CIA analyses of Tito's staying power, as well as the harm this entrenchment caused to the Soviet-led international Communist Movement. CIA analyses of Stalin's options for interference in Yugoslavia are again considered, with the addition of reports discussing possible Soviet-led insurrection in Yugoslav Macedonia. American economic and military aid, needed to offset a Soviet-Satellite blockade of Yugoslav trade, also receives consideration. In 1950, the outbreak of the Korean War caused a reassessment within the CIA of Stalin's willingness to go to war in the Balkans. Chapter Three discusses these analyses, as well as the process by which the United States used a severe drought in Yugoslavia to offer military assistance. The beginning of each chapter offers context, noting major Cold War events and significant occurrences within the CIA. The thesis ends in early 1951, with the establishment of a joint Yugoslav-American intelligence sharing agreement
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