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The Aesthetic Authority of Law: Experiments with Legal Form
No full textThe legal form dictates the contours of law’s appearance. Texts are neatly divided into (often) numbered paragraphs. Pages must conform to specified layouts. Conventions regulate the use of fonts, punctuation and colours. Legal terms of art replace colloquial expressions. Human experiences enter legal texts only in mediated, sanitized forms. The dictats of legal form are all but incidental. They condition law’s authority. By repeatedly modifying the Case of the S.S. Lotus (Permanent Court of International Justice 1927), this book invites readers to consider how modifications of law’s appearance alter law’s authority.
Valentin Jeutner is an Associate Professor of Law at Lund University, Sweden, and a Senior Retained Lecturer at Pembroke College, Oxford, UK.The legal form dictates the contours of law’s appearance. Texts are neatly divided into (often) numbered paragraphs. Pages must conform to specified layouts. Conventions regulate the use of fonts, punctuation and colours. Legal terms of art replace colloquial expressions. Human experiences enter legal texts only in mediated, sanitized forms. The dictats of legal form are all but incidental. They condition law’s authority. By repeatedly modifying the Case of the S.S. Lotus (Permanent Court of International Justice 1927), this book invites readers to consider how modifications of law’s appearance alter law’s authority.
Valentin Jeutner is an Associate Professor of Law at Lund University, Sweden, and a Senior Retained Lecturer at Pembroke College, Oxford, UK
The Aesthetic Authority of Law: Experiments with Legal Form
No full textThe legal form dictates the contours of law’s appearance. Texts are neatly divided into (often) numbered paragraphs. Pages must conform to specified layouts. Conventions regulate the use of fonts, punctuation and colours. Legal terms of art replace colloquial expressions. Human experiences enter legal texts only in mediated, sanitized forms. The dictats of legal form are all but incidental. They condition law’s authority. By repeatedly modifying the Case of the S.S. Lotus (Permanent Court of International Justice 1927), this book invites readers to consider how modifications of law’s appearance alter law’s authority.
Valentin Jeutner is an Associate Professor of Law at Lund University, Sweden, and a Senior Retained Lecturer at Pembroke College, Oxford, UK.The legal form dictates the contours of law’s appearance. Texts are neatly divided into (often) numbered paragraphs. Pages must conform to specified layouts. Conventions regulate the use of fonts, punctuation and colours. Legal terms of art replace colloquial expressions. Human experiences enter legal texts only in mediated, sanitized forms. The dictats of legal form are all but incidental. They condition law’s authority. By repeatedly modifying the Case of the S.S. Lotus (Permanent Court of International Justice 1927), this book invites readers to consider how modifications of law’s appearance alter law’s authority.
Valentin Jeutner is an Associate Professor of Law at Lund University, Sweden, and a Senior Retained Lecturer at Pembroke College, Oxford, UK
The Aesthetic Authority of Law: Experiments with Legal Form
No full textThe legal form dictates the contours of law’s appearance. Texts are neatly divided into (often) numbered paragraphs. Pages must conform to specified layouts. Conventions regulate the use of fonts, punctuation and colours. Legal terms of art replace colloquial expressions. Human experiences enter legal texts only in mediated, sanitized forms. The dictats of legal form are all but incidental. They condition law’s authority. By repeatedly modifying the Case of the S.S. Lotus (Permanent Court of International Justice 1927), this book invites readers to consider how modifications of law’s appearance alter law’s authority.
Valentin Jeutner is an Associate Professor of Law at Lund University, Sweden, and a Senior Retained Lecturer at Pembroke College, Oxford, UK.The legal form dictates the contours of law’s appearance. Texts are neatly divided into (often) numbered paragraphs. Pages must conform to specified layouts. Conventions regulate the use of fonts, punctuation and colours. Legal terms of art replace colloquial expressions. Human experiences enter legal texts only in mediated, sanitized forms. The dictats of legal form are all but incidental. They condition law’s authority. By repeatedly modifying the Case of the S.S. Lotus (Permanent Court of International Justice 1927), this book invites readers to consider how modifications of law’s appearance alter law’s authority.
Valentin Jeutner is an Associate Professor of Law at Lund University, Sweden, and a Senior Retained Lecturer at Pembroke College, Oxford, UK
სამართლებრივი დილემის კონცეფცია
Get PDFThis article is based on the monograph (Irresolvable Norm Conflicts in International Law: The Concept of A Legal Dilemma) of Valentin Jeutner pioneering the concept of legal dilemma in the doctrine of international law. Briefly, the concept of a legal dilemma is a theory of irresolvable norm conflicts. The concept of legal dilemma serves as a normative exposition of the international legal states of affairs where the conflict between two legal norms is so fundamental that their adequate resolution through norm conflict resolution techniques of contemporary international law is impossible. In this article, the author conceptualizes legal dilemmas as an unavoidable and irresolvable conflict between norms of international law. The intrinsic nature of legal dilemmas resembles a legal state of superposition where a given conduct is both illegal and legal at the same time. That is, if one norm is favored over the other, the other is necessarily unduly impaired. Upon providing the general legal account of the concept of legal dilemma, the author responds affirmatively to their presence in contemporary international law. Subsequently, the author ventures to demonstrate that various legal devices to accommodate legal dilemmas once they have arisen are unsatisfactory. Then he establishes that judicial institutions – for a multiplicity of different legal and non-legal reasons – do not represent an appropriate forum for dealing with the various substantial problems posed by legal dilemmas. Thus, the author proposes that judicial institutions – instead of deciding the legal dilemmas themselves – must issue dilemmatic declarations when confronted with an irresolvable and unavoidable norm conflict. Dilemmatic declarations communicate that a legal dilemma exists but do not resolve a dilemma in favor of one or the other norm. However, the author warns us that the issuance of dilemmatic declarations must occur only after the most rigorous and careful application of norm conflict resolution and accommodation techniques. Importantly, dilemmatic declarations do not themselves decide the legal dilemmas but delegate the decision-making competence to the archetypal subjects of international law and the authors of the legal dilemmas themselves – the States. In the author's view, the final say over the decision of the legal dilemmas falls precisely to the States due to the inherent epistemological and/or metaphysical difficulties associated with deciding the legal dilemmas. A State’s decision of a dilemma possesses no legal precedential value and after a State has decided the legal dilemma, the judicial institutions should then enforce an unduly impaired norm. Finally, the author posits the merits of dilemmatic legal thinking in the international legal thought, one of which is to enhance the conceptual understanding of international law, transcend the binary representations of norms only as legal and illegal and to enable States to engage with and reflect constructively about the problems the existence of legal dilemmas presuppose.ხშირად, ტერმინი „დილემა“ გამოიყენება ისეთი უამრავი განსხვავებული, ეშმაკური საერთაშორისოსამართლებრივი პრობლემის აღსაწერად, რომლის მხოლოდ ერთი კონცეფციის ფარგლებში მოხელთება ძალიან რთულია. თუმცა, ტერმინის ამ სადავო გამოყენებისაგან განსხვავებით, სამართლებრივი დილემის კონცეფცია, წინამდებარე ნაშრომში წარმოდგენილია როგორც ტექნიკურ-იურიდიული ტერმინი. კერძოდ, სამართლებრივი დილემის კონცეფცია, როგორც ეს გაგებული და წარმოჩენილია ამ ნაშრომში, ეხება საერთაშორისო სამართლის ნორმებს შორის წარმოქმნილ გარდაუვალ და გადაუჭრელ კონფლიქტს. ამ ნაშრომის პირველი მიზანია ნათელი მოჰფინოს და ახსნას ამ დეფინიციის უამრავი ელემენტი (1). მეორე მიზანი კი, – წარმოადგინოს და განიხილოს უამრავი სტრატეგია სამართლებრივი დილემების გადასაჭრელად მას შემდეგ, რაც ისინი თავს იჩნენენ (2). იქიდან გამომდინარე, რომ სამართლებრივი დილემის კონცეფცია ახალი განსაკუთრებული მნიშვნელობის მქონე კონცეფციაა, რომელიც მიზნად ისახავს მისთვის ახალი განსაზღვრების მინიჭებას მოცემულ კონტექსტში არსებული დისკუსიის მიზნებისთვის, ამ ნაშრომის საბოლოო მიზანია გაამართლოს კონცეფციის არსებობა და აღმოაჩინოს დილემატური სამართლებრივი აზროვნების ღირსებები (3)
Unlikely encounters of international law and technology : An Interview with Valentin Jeutner
No full textThe Sovereign Human Being : Carl Schmitt, Dietrich Bonhoeffer and Responsible Decision-Making
No full textSovereign is who decides; and who decides is responsible. The book develops these two arguments by comparing Carl Schmitt's and Dietrich Bonhoeffer's theories of sovereignty.Carl Schmitt was an influential jurist of Nazi Germany. Dietrich Bonhoeffer was a Lutheran priest hanged for his involvement in a plot to assassinate Adolf Hitler. In many ways, the two men could not be more different. But they both struggled with the question of how to maintain order and how to prevent violence at times of crisis.In this considered work, Jeutner brings these two thinkers into careful dialogue. They both agreed that order is established not by appealing to existing norms or general principles but by an individual's sovereign decision. Ascribing sovereignty to individuals communicates that they always have a choice and that they are always responsible for these choices. Thus, it is not just powerful individuals who have the choice to bring wars to an end or who can combat climate change.This exploratory work reveals that, by making sovereign decisions, ordinary individuals, too, can work towards the peaceful resolution of conflicts or reduce their carbon footprint. Making such sovereign decisions is not easy for individuals who are taught to follow orders and norms. For this reason, this book supplements the comparative analysis of Schmitt and Bonhoeffer with an action-guiding decision-making framework. While the proposed framework departs from Schmitt's and Bonhoeffer's theses by recognizing the agency, responsibility, and sovereignty of all individuals, Jeutner argues that this acknowledgement of the universal sovereignty of individuals is the only way to bring about the orderly and peaceful world of which Schmitt and Bonhoeffer dream
The Reasonable Person : A Legal Biography
No full textJeutner argues that the reasonable person is, at heart, an empathetic perspective-taking device, by tracing the standard of the reasonable person across time, legal fields and countries. Beginning with a review of imaginary legal figures in the legal systems of ancient Egypt, Greece, and Rome, the book explains why the common law's reasonable person emerged amidst the British industrialisation under the influence of Scottish Enlightenment thinking. Following the figure into colonial courts, onto battlefields and into self-driving cars, the book contends that the reasonable person invites judges, jury-members, and lawyers to take another person's perspective when assessing their own or another person's conduct. The perspective of another is taken by means of empathy, by feeling what others might feel in a particular situation. Thus construed, the figure of the reasonable person can help us make more accurate judgments in a diverse world
The Sovereign Human Being Carl Schmitt, Dietrich Bonhoeffer and Responsible Decision-Making
No full textSovereign is who decides; and who decides is responsible. The book develops these two arguments by comparing Carl Schmitt's and Dietrich Bonhoeffer's theories of sovereignty. Carl Schmitt was an influential jurist of Nazi Germany. Dietrich Bonhoeffer was a Lutheran priest hanged for his involvement in a plot to assassinate Adolf Hitler. In many ways, the two men could not be more different. But they both struggled with the question of how to maintain order and how to prevent violence at times of crisis. In this considered work, Jeutner brings these two thinkers into careful dialogue. They both agreed that order is established not by appealing to existing norms or general principles but by an individual's sovereign decision. Ascribing sovereignty to individuals communicates that they always have a choice and that they are always responsible for these choices. Thus, it is not just powerful individuals who have the choice to bring wars to an end or who can combat climate change. This exploratory work reveals that, by making sovereign decisions, ordinary individuals, too, can work towards the peaceful resolution of conflicts or reduce their carbon footprint. Making such sovereign decisions is not easy for individuals who are taught to follow orders and norms. For this reason, this book supplements the comparative analysis of Schmitt and Bonhoeffer with an action-guiding decision-making framework. While the proposed framework departs from Schmitt's and Bonhoeffer's theses by recognizing the agency, responsibility, and sovereignty of all individuals, Jeutner argues that this acknowledgement of the universal sovereignty of individuals is the only way to bring about the orderly and peaceful world of which Schmitt and Bonhoeffer dream
Irresolvable Norm Conflicts in International Law : The Concept of a Legal Dilemma
No full textConventionally, international legal scholarship concerned with norm conflicts focusses on identifying how international law can or should resolve them. This book adopts a different approach. It focusses on identifying those norm conflicts that law cannot and should not resolve. The book offers an unprecedented, controversial, yet sophisticated, argument in favour of construing such irresolvable conflicts as legal dilemmas. Legal dilemmas exist when a legal actor confronts a conflict between at least two legal norms that cannot be avoided or resolved. Addressing both academics and practitioners, the book aims to identify the character and consequences of legal dilemmas, to distil their legal function within the sphere of international law, and to engender and contribute to serious theoretical and practical investigations into the conditions that lead to a legal dilemma. The argument unfolds in three parts. The first part proposes a definition of legal dilemmas and distinguishes the term from numerous related concepts. Based on this definition, the second part scrutinises international law’s contemporary norm conflict resolution and accommodation devices in order to identify their limited ability to resolve certain kinds of norm conflicts satisfactorily. Against the background of the limits identified in the second part, the third part outlines and evaluates the book’s proposed method of dealing with legal dilemmas. In contrast to conventional approaches that recommend dealing with irresolvable norm conflicts by means of non liquet declarations, judicial law-making or balancing test, the book’s proposal envisions that irresolvable norm conflicts are dealt with by judicial and sovereign actors in a complementary fashion. According to the proposal, judicial actors should openly acknowledge irresolvable conflicts and sovereign actors should decide with which norm they will comply. Subsequently, judicial actors should hold the sovereign actor responsible for the violation of any prescriptive norm the sovereign chose to impair. The book concludes with the argument that analysing various aspects of international law through the lenses of the concept of a legal dilemma enhances international law’s conceptual accuracy, facilitates more legitimate decision-making processes and maintains international law’s dynamic responsiveness.</p
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