1,842 research outputs found
Shapiro, Karl : Elliston lecture number 9 : the greatest living author; April 9th, 1959
No full textDescription on Reel Box: Reel #1 Speed: 3 3/4
Elliston Poet 1959 - Karl Shapiro
Lecture #9 - April 9, 1959
"The Greatest Living Author"Contents:
Track 01 The Greatest Living Author [complete]Digital Projects SAN: Folder and disc location for wav file: 20120222/Box2/Disc 5. Folder and disc location for mp3 file: 20120222/Box2/Disc
The Role of Procedural Controls in OSHA's Ergonomics Rulemaking
No full textFew, if any, regulations over the past decade have received the publicity or engendered the controversy of OSHA’s ergonomics regulation. Some may see the ergonomics rule as the paradigmatic instance of procedural hurdles holding up and eventually destroying a regulation. The purpose of this article is to examine the role that procedure played in the ergonomics rulemaking. To draw lessons from the ergonomics rulemaking I have conducted analyses of the four publicly available versions and conducted interviews with seven high ranking officials at OSHA and the Small Business Administration. I find that of the procedural hurdles faced by OSHA, the notice and comment requirement had the largest impact on the final rule. OMB review and requirements to conduct a cost benefit analysis served largely as a fire alarm to political overseers and the required small business panel had largely symbolic effects. The more traditional control of Congressional budgetary oversight had the greatest effect by delaying the rule for three years which eventually doomed OSHA’s attempts to regulate.Peer reviewe
Defragmenting the Regulatory Process
No full textThe regulatory process is often criticized for being cumbersome and slow, much like a computer whose hard drive is fragmented by files no longer used or useful. Like such a computer, the regulatory process contains many requirement of dubious utility. These include the Paperwork Reduction Act, the Regulatory Flexibility Act, the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act, and numerous executive orders. While other parts of the regulatory process such as notice and comment and cost-benefit analysis have received much more academic attention, these other parts of the process deserve examination as well. This paper argues that such an examination will reveal that these statutes and executive orders add little of value to the regulatory process while consuming agency resources. An improved requirement for cost-benefit analysis with distributional analysis could easily replace virtually all of these requirements and improve regulations while reducing the time needed to promulgate regulations.Peer reviewe
An Evaluation of the Bush Administration Reforms to the Regulatory Process
No full textThe Bush Administration has implemented more reforms to the regulatory process than any of its predecessors. These reforms are often stereotyped as anti-regulatory. This article examines the reforms as a whole and asks which interests have been empowered by the Bush Administration regulatory reforms. I believe this method is a more effective way of assessing the impact of the reforms. I find that in addition to adding potential costs to the regulatory process, the reforms are likely to empower powerful interest groups and the presidency. Whether the impact of these reforms is pro-regulation or anti-regulation will depend on how a future administration more dedicated to regulatory protections uses them. I also lay out a research agenda to better empirically assess the impact of these regulatory reforms.Peer reviewed"Issue published online: 11 APR 2007. Article first published online: 11 APR 2007"--Publisher website
Does the amount of participation matter? Public comments, agency responses and the time to finalize a regulation
No full textThe notice and comment rulemaking process is a fundamental part of how agencies write regulations. While this process is starting to receive more empirical attention, the question of how the number of comments that an agency receives affects its decision-making process has received little examination. This paper uses Boolean analysis to examine nine rules from two agencies at the Department of Health and Human Services and evaluates the impact of a high volume of comments on agency changes to proposed rules and the time an agency takes to finalize a proposed rule. These nine cases suggest that agencies are most likely to change their proposals when they receive a high volume of comments on highly complex rules that are not very politically salient. Highly complex rules are also likely to take a long time to finalize when there are many public comments however it is often other factors that cause a long delay between proposed and final rules.Peer reviewedThe final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11077-007-9051-
Antitrust Policy: A Century of Economic and Legal Thinking
No full textPassage of the Sherman Act in the United States in 1890 set the stage for a century of jurisprudence regarding monopoly, cartels, and oligopoly. Among American statutes that regulate commerce, the Sherman Act is unequaled in its generality. The Act outlawed "every contract, combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade" and "monopolization" and treated violations as crimes. By these open-ended commands, Congress gave federal judges extraordinary power to draw lines between acceptable cooperation and illegal collusion, between vigorous competition and unlawful monopolization. By enlisting the courts to elaborate the Sherman Act' s broad commands, Congress gave economists a singular opportunity to shape competition policy. Because the statute' s vital terms directly implicated economic concepts, their interpretation inevitably would invite contributions from economists. What emerged is a convergence of economics and law without parallel in public oversight of business. As economic learning changed, the contours of antitrust doctrine and enforcement policy eventually would shift, as well. This article follows the evolution of thinking about competition since 1890 as reflected by major antitrust decisions and research in industrial organization. We divide the U.S. antitrust experience into five periods and discuss each period' s legal trends and economic thinking in three core areas of antitrust: cartels, cooperation, or other interactions among independent firms; abusive conduct by dominant firms; and mergers.
Park West Gallery sets the record straight
No full textMorris Shapiro, gallery director of Park West Galleries, writes this article asa rebuttal to the claims author David Phillips made about Park West Galleries in the November 2008 issue of Artist's Magazine. The allegations Phillips made about Park West are about the Dali Biblia Sacra prints
Transforming Power Relationships: Leadership, Risk, and Hope. IHS Political Science Series No. 135, May 2013
No full textChronic communal conflicts resemble the prisoner’s dilemma. Both communities prefer peace to war. But neither trusts the other, viewing the other’s gain as its own loss, so
potentially shared interests often go unrealized.
Achieving positive-sum outcomes from apparently zero-sum struggles requires a kind of riskembracing leadership. To succeed leaders must: a) see power relations as potentially
positive-sum; b) strengthen negotiating adversaries instead of weakening them; and c) demonstrate hope for a positive future and take great personal risks to achieve it.
Such leadership is exemplified by Nelson Mandela and F.W. de Klerk in the South African democratic transition. To illuminate the strategic dilemmas Mandela and de Klerk faced, we examine the work of Robert Axelrod, Thomas Schelling, and Josep Colomer, who highlight important dimensions of the problem but underplay the role of risk-embracing leadership. Finally we discuss leadership successes and failures in the Northern Ireland settlement and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
Media Bias and Reputation
No full textA Bayesian consumer who is uncertain about the quality of an information source will infer that the source is of higher quality when its reports conform to the consumer's prior expectations. We use this fact to build a model of media bias in which firms slant their reports toward the prior beliefs of their customers in order to build a reputation for quality. Bias emerges in our model even though it can make all market participants worse off. The model predicts that bias will be less severe when consumers receive independent evidence on the true state of the world, and that competition between independently owned news outlets can reduce bias. We present a variety of empirical evidence consistent with these predictions.
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