1,721,115 research outputs found
The Uzbek Growth Puzzle
Get PDFAfter the breakup of the Soviet Union, Uzbekistan's output fell less than in any other former Soviet republic, and growth turned positive in 1996/97. Given the country's hesitant and idiosyncratic approach to reforms, this record has surprised many observers. This paper first shows that a standard panel model of growth in transition systematically underpredicts Uzbek growth from 1992-1996, confirming the view that Uzbekistan's performance constitutes a puzzle. It then attempts to resolve the puzzle by extending the model in a way that encompasses competing hypotheses of what makes Uzbekistan's output path unusual. The main result is that Uzbekistan's performance can be accounted for by a combination of low initial industrialization, its cotton production, and its self-sufficiency in energy. Copyright 1999, International Monetary Fund
The Mussa Theorem (and Other Results on IMF-Induced Moral Hazard)
Get PDFUsing a simple model of international lending, we show that as long as the IMF lends at an actuarially fair interest rate and debtor governments maximize the welfare of their taxpayers, any changes in policy effort, capital flows, or borrowing costs in response to IMF crisis lending are efficient. Thus, under these assumptions, the IMF cannot cause moral hazard, as argued by Michael Mussa (1999 and 2004). It follows that examining the effects of IMF lending on capital flows or borrowing costs is not a useful strategy to test for IMF-induced moral hazard. Instead, empirical research on moral hazard should focus on the assumptions of the Mussa theorem. Copyright 2005, International Monetary Fund
What’s Germany really thinking? Vince Cable, Simon Hix and Jeromin Zettelmeyer discuss Brexit
No full textGerman economic policy advisor Jeromin Zettelmeyer (far left) joined the LSE’s Simon Hix (near left) and former UK business secretary Vince Cable on 7 September to discuss how Germany plans to negotiate Brexit. How much will Angela Merkel – herself under domestic pressure – be prepared to concede to keep the UK in the Single Market (assuming Britain wants to do so)? What does Germany want out of the final agreement? Robert van Geffen reports on the discussion
Sovereign Debt in the Americas: New Data and Stylized Facts
Get PDFIn this paper, we introduce the first comprehensive database on sovereign debt systematically compiled to ensure comparability, for all countries in the Americas, and use this new data to highlight the main stylized facts regarding sovereign debt for developing America in the last two decades. We find that debt ratios in developing America are comparable to those in developed countries and have remained stable since the late nineties. By contrast, the composition of debt in the region has changed significantly, shifting from foreign currency external to local currency domestic debt. This “onshoring” and “ dedollarization” of sovereign debt, contrary to conventional wisdom, has not come at the expense of a shortening of maturities. Furthermore, we find that “onshoring” is correlated with the level economic development and country size, and with the presence of institutional investors.
The Eurozone Debt Crisis: From its origins to a way forward. CEPS Policy Brief No. 251, August 2011
Get PDFAs the Eurozone debt crisis reaches a turning point, this Policy Brief argues for a more organised intervention by the ECB to stop contagion through the creation of a quantitative easing programme, coupled with a political agreement among member states on a more federalist budget for the Eurozone.
The roots of this crisis and how institutions have repeated some of the mistakes of the Argentine crisis, both in 1998 and 2010, are considered in this paper. The author analyses the reasons why the ECB should start a quantitative easing programme to contain government bond yields, and shows that it can be done with limited impact on inflation targeting policies. The importance of reinforcing the new policy announced by the ECB, which has lain rather dormant during the Eurozone crisis, is also highlighted as a pre-condition for a broader political agreement on more harmonised fiscal policies and to stabilise market conditions. Valiante finds that responses should be organised on three levels: institutional competences, monetary policy support, and fiscal policy coordination
Sovereign debt structure for crisis prevention /
No full text"Eduardo Borensztein, Marcos Chamon, Olivier Jeanne, Paolo Mauro, and Jeromin Zettelmeyer."Includes bibliographical references (p. 56-60)
The impact of the crisis on budget policy in Central and Eastern Europe. Bruegel Working Paper 2009/05, 31 July 2009
Get PDFThis paper describes the particular impacts of the financial and economic crisis on central and eastern European (CEE) countries, studies pro-cyclicality of fiscal policies, discusses the impact of the crisis on fiscal policy, and the policy response of various governments. After drawing some lessons for fiscal policy from previous emerging market crises, the paper concludes with some thoughts on the appropriate policy response from a more normative perspective. The key message of the paper is that the crisis should be used as an opportunity to introduce reforms to avoid future pro-cyclical fiscal policies, to increase the quality of budgeting and to increase credibility. These reforms should include fiscal responsibility laws comprising medium-term fiscal frameworks, fiscal rules, and independent fiscal councils. When fiscal consolidation is accompanied by fiscal reforms that increase credibility, non- Keynesian effects may offset to some extent the contraction caused by the consolidation
Debt Maturity: Is Long-Term Debt Optimal?
Get PDFWe model and calibrate the arguments in favor and against short-term and long-term debt. These arguments broadly include: maturity premium, sustainability, and service smoothing. We use a dynamic equilibrium model with tax distortions and government outlays uncertainty, and model maturity as the fraction of debt that needs to be rolled over every period. In the model, the benefits of defaulting are tempered by higher future interest rates. We then calibrate our artificial economy and solve for the optimal debt maturity for Brazil as an example of a developing country and the U.S. as an example of a mature economy. We obtain that the calibrated costs from defaulting on long-term debt more than offset costs associated with short-term debt. Therefore, short-term debt implies higher welfare levels.
What Moves Capital to Transition Economies?
Get PDFThe transition economies in Europe and the former Soviet Union between 1991 and 1999 differed widely in terms of total capital flows and the share and composition of private flows. With some exceptions (notably Russia), the main source of private inflows was foreign direct investment. Portfolio investment was volatile, and concentrated in a handful of countries. Regressions show that direct investment can be well explained in terms of economic fundamentals, whereas the presence of a financial market infrastructure and a property rights indicator are the only explanatory variables that seem to have a robust effect on portfolio invest-ment. Copyright 2002, International Monetary Fund
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