1,721,446 research outputs found
Jan Cornelis Sylvius
Medium: etchingsigned and dated."Jan Cornelis Sylvius" [1959.3530.000.000], Novelli, Francesco, Rembrandt van RijnArtist and Role: Rembrandt van Rijn,Extent: imageExtent: plateExtent: sheetExtent: sheet (adhered
Jan Cornelis Sylvius, Preacher
Medium: etching and burin"Jan Cornelis Sylvius, Preacher" [1982.2043.000.000], Rembrandt van RijnArtist and Role: Rembrandt van Rijn, EtcherExtent: comp. 16.4 x 13.
Economia dei mercati del lavoro imperfetti
traduzione (con adattamento al constesto italiano) del volume pubblicato da princeton university pres
The Economics of Imperfect Labor Markets Second Edition
The novelty of our book is that from the start the focus is on labor market institutions operating in imperfect labor markets, that is, markets that depart from perfect competition. Unlike competitive markets, imperfect labor markets allow employers and employees to enjoy rents, and hence a job is a big deal. Losing a job for a worker or having to replace an employee leaving the firm is costly in such markets, while employees and employers involved in this type of events would not suffer any loss in competitive labor markets. Imperfect markets are also characterized by the presence of many labor market institutions, that is, systems of laws and programs that shape the behavior of individual workers and employers. Institutions result from a political process aimed at (1) increasing economic efficiency and (2) achieving some redistributive goal. Efficiency is achieved by remedying market imperfections, such as excessive monopsonistic power, informational asymmetries that give rise to moral hazard and adverse selection problems, and externalities associated with social customs or the job-matching process, as well as transaction costs and frictions that restrict the size of markets. Redistribution provides a rationale for these institutions even when there are no market imperfections. In imperfect markets redistribution sometimes can be achieved while pursuing efficiency, as in the case of institutions, such as minimum wages or employment subsidies, that counteract excessive monopsonistic power. In most cases, however, the traditional trade-off between efficiency and equity arises. Actually, the redistribution operated by these institutions may well not promote a more egalitarian society or represent the interests of the median voter. There are frequent policy failures in the design of labor market institutions that give disproportionate representation to some pressure group pursuing very specific interests.
This book also takes into account that institutions rarely operate in isolation. Hence, from a positive standpoint, the effects of each institution on the labor market are investigated by considering not only its direct effects on employment, unemployment, and wages, but also its indirect effects, mediated by the presence of other institutions. For example, a change in the generosity of the unemployment benefit system affects unemployment directly by reducing search intensity and increasing the reservation wage of job seekers and indirectly by increasing the bargaining power of unions and the level of the efficiency wage. This, incidentally, provides a third rationale for the presence of some institutions: they are created to counteract or complement the effects of other institutions. Policy failures may arise also in this context because the institutions that are responsible for the distortions are rarely reformed. Often the political process creates chains of distortions and clusters of institutions whereby institutions are used to compensate for undesirable effects of other institutions
The Economics of Imperfect Labor Markets
The novelty of this book is that from the start the focus is on labor market institutions operating
in imperfect labor markets, that is, markets departing from perfect competition. Imperfect markets
are characterised by the presence of many labor market institutions, that is, systems of laws, pro-
grams shaping the behavior of individual workers and employers. Institutions result from a political
process aimed at: i) increasing economic e¢ ciency, and ii) achieving some redistributive goal. E¢ -
ciency is achieved by remedying to market imperfections, such as excessive monopsonistic power,
informational aymmetries giving rise to moral hazard and adverse selection problems, externalities
associated with social customs or the job matching process as well as transaction costs and frictions
restricting the size of markets. Redistribution provides a rationale for these institutions even when
there are no market imperfections. In imperfect markets redistribution sometimes can be achieved
while pursuing e¢ ciency, as in the case of institutions, such as minimum wages or employment
subsidies, counteracting excessive monopsonistic power. In most of the cases, however, the tradi-
tional trade-o¤ between e¢ ciency and equity arises. Actually the redistribution operated by these
institutions may well not be towards having a more egalitarian society or represting the interests
of the median voter. There are frequent policy failures in the design of labor market institutions,
giving disproportionate representation to some pressure group pursuing very specific interests
Going Beyond Counting First Authors in Author Co-citation Analysis
The present study examines one of the fundamental aspects of author co-citation analysis (ACA) - the way co-citation
counts are defined. Co-citation counting provides the data on which all subsequent statistical analyses and mappings
are based, and we compare ACA results based on two different types of co-citation counting - the traditional type that
only counts the first one among a cited work's authors on the one hand and a non-traditional type that takes into
account the first 5 authors of a cited work on the other hand. Results indicate that the picture produced through this non-traditional author co-citation counting contains more coherent author groups and is therefore considerably clearer. However, this picture represents fewer specialties in the research field being studied than that produced through the traditional first-author co-citation counting when the same number of top-ranked authors is selected and analyzed. Reasons for these effects are discussed
Variations on the Author
“Variations on the Author” discusses two of Eduardo Coutinho’s recent films (Um Dia na Vida, from 2010, and Últimas Conversas, posthumously released in 2015) and their contribution to the general question of documentary authorship. The director’s filmography is characterized by a consistent yet self-effacing form of authorial self-inscription: Coutinho often features as an interviewer that rather than express opinions propels discourses; an interviewer that is good at listening. This mode of self-inscription characterizes him as an author who is not expressive but who is nonetheless markedly present on the screen. In Um Dia na Vida, however, Coutinho is completely absent form the image, while Últimas Conversas, on the contrary, includes a confessional prologue that moves the director from the margins to the center of his films. This article examines the ways in which these works stand out in the filmography of a director who offers new insights into the notion of cinematic authorship
Appropriate Similarity Measures for Author Cocitation Analysis
We provide a number of new insights into the methodological discussion about author cocitation analysis. We first argue that the use of the Pearson correlation for measuring the similarity between authors’ cocitation profiles is not very satisfactory. We then discuss what kind of similarity measures may be used as an alternative to the Pearson correlation. We consider three similarity measures in particular. One is the well-known cosine. The other two similarity measures have not been used before in the bibliometric literature. Finally, we show by means of an example that our findings have a high practical relevance.information science;Pearson correlation;cosine;similarity measure;author cocitation analysis
- …
