1,720,972 research outputs found
Economists' political donations and GDP forecast accuracy
No full textWe examine the association between economists' political donations and the accuracy of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) forecasts. Prior research suggests that individual political donations reflect personal political orientations, leading to a partisan bias. Therefore, economists might not objectively interpret information, with a subsequent reduction in GDP forecast accuracy. Using a sample of one-quarter-ahead US GDP growth forecasts for 2003-2020, we find that economists making political donations are more accurate than their peers. This result suggests that despite the potential partisan bias, individual political donations give economists an information advantage in predicting GDP growth. We also document that the informational benefits associated with donations are stronger when the political party financed by economists controls both the Senate and House of Representatives. However, these benefits are reduced in periods of uncertainty and when the economists' forecasting houses are more politically active
Earnings management and investor protection during a banking crisis: the role of the "spare tire" effect
No full textThis article analyzes the association between earnings management and investor protection during banking crises. Using a sample of firms from 16 European countries for the period 2006-2018, we show that, as banking conditions worsen, firms are more likely to manage earnings upward in countries with a stronger institutional environment, where alternative sources of financing are better available and more accessible. Moreover, we show that this strategy is successful because these firms are able to raise relatively more equity financing. JEL Classification M41, G1
Information asymmetries and debt financing: New evidence from the 2007-2008 financial crisis
No full textPurpose: Focusing on the 2007-2009 financial crisis, this study investigates how firms’ and debtholders’ information sensitivity jointly shape corporate debt financing. According to the pecking order theory, opaque firms prefer bank loans over more information-sensitive sources like bonds and equity. When external conditions worsen, firms face difficulties accessing bank loans and look for alter-natives. Yet, as bondholders are more information-sensitive than banks, the substi-tution effect may not occur especially for firms with lower financial reporting qual-ity (FRQ). Design/methodology/approach: A matching difference-in-differences ap-proach is used to compare the debt financing of firms with and without access to corporate bond markets before and after the onset of the financial crisis. A sample of quarterly data of US-listed firms is analyzed for the 2006Q3-2009Q2 period. Findings: The reduction in debt financing due to the crisis was greater for firms with access to bond markets. The effect is more pronounced for firms with lower FRQ. These firms also looked more for alternatives such as equity and cash re-sources
The dynamic of financial crises and its non-monotonic effects on earnings quality
Full text linkDespite the wealth of research examining earnings quality and earnings management, we still have much to learn about the effects of macroeconomic factors on accounting discretion’s decisions; the recent financial crises may be one of such factors. Nevertheless, the extant literature is inconclusive about the direction of the relationship between earnings quality and economic downturn. In this study, we focus on the extent to which organizational survival may be an objective of earnings management. In this manner, we add to research considering earnings target as an objective of earnings manipulation. Furthermore, our results suggest that these objectives likely change as crisis becomes worse. Consequently, we argue that the relationship between financial crises and earnings management is non-monotonic. Earnings management decreases when the intensity of the crisis is low, while it increases when the crisis is acut
Do tenure-based voting rights help mitigate the family firm control-growth dilemma?
Full text linkInvestment growth in family firms is constrained by family preferences to retain corporate control, which limits outside equity issuance and increases the expropriation risk perceived by external minority shareholders. Tenure-based voting rights (TVRs) weaken the link between voting rights and cash flow rights, facilitating new equity capital issuance without loss of control. We find that publicly listed family firms in Italy adopt TVRs to facilitate the continuation of investment growth while retaining family control. We also find that in family firms with fragile control, investment increases after TVR adoption. Our results indicate that control-enhancing mechanisms such as TVRs can help resolve the control–growth dilemma in family firms
Enhancing environmental reporting: A study on the role of narrative disclosure, firm‐ and country‐level incentives
No full textMoving from the ongoing debate on the benefits of mandating environmental reporting, this paper provides an analysis of the role of narrative information quality in enhancing environmental reporting, considering the moderating effect of firm-level and country-level incentives. We examine an international sample of listed firms belonging to an environmental-sensitive industry and construct disclosure indices based on a content analysis of the company's reporting. Results reveal that mandatory narrative information quality is positively associated with the quality of environmental reporting displaying a credibility effect beyond earnings quality. Country-level factors that increase the demand for environmental information weaken this relation by reducing the marginal benefit of disclosing environmental information. Our approach advances existing literature on the link between CSR and financial reporting and highlights the unintended consequences of mandating environmental reporting
Family ownership and impression management: an integrated approach
No full textAccording to agency theory, impression management is lower in family-owned firms because of reduced agency I conflicts. However, when family owners are present, agency I conflicts are superseded by agency II conflicts between controlling and minority shareholders, leading to a positive association between impression management and family ownership. Moreover, family owners have distinct goals related to the preservation of socioemotional wealth (SEW) that may influence agency conflicts. We formalize these countervailing forces by developing an integrated theoretical framework that considers both agency I and agency II conflicts and how they interact with SEW-related motives. We hypothesize that the coexistence of agency I and agency II conflicts in family-owned firms leads to a U-shaped association between family ownership and impression management. We also expect that this U-shaped association is flatter when family influence on the board is stronger and SEW motives shape more corporate choices. We test our predictions by analyzing the letters to shareholders of 77 Italian-listed firms from 2008 to 2015. The results confirm our expectations and hold when we use instrumental variable estimation, alternative proxies to capture SEW motives, and impression management measures
Financial reporting and the protection of socioemotional wealth in family-controlled firms
No full textWe develop an integrated framework to financial reporting decisions in family-controlling firms. Our model contends that in these firms, financial reporting decisions (i.e. earnings management and voluntary disclosure) are driven by a diverse set of family owners’ motives that can be synthesised in the preservation of the different aspects of the family socioemotional wealth (SEW). The proposed model suggests the criticality of recognising the existence of different family owners’ reference points, given the gambling nature of accounting choices. By focusing on two dimensions of SEW (‘Family Control and Influence’ and ‘Family Identification’), we explore how the prioritisation of one dimension or the other will imply a different family owners' evaluation of benefits and costs of accounting strategies and, hence, a diverse resolution of the accounting gamble
Environmental awareness and shareholder proposals: the case of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill disaster
Full text linkPurpose
The authors study the effect of increasing environmental awareness on shareholders' activism. Specificallly, this study aims to examine whether growing environmental awareness is reflected in more aggressive environmental shareholder proposals.
Design/methodology/approach
This study uses the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill disaster as an exogenous event that increased shareholders' environmental awareness. This study analyzes the spill’s effect on the tone of proposals about environmental issues and nonenvironmental topics.
Findings
After the disaster, the tone of environmental proposals (i.e. the treatment group) is significantly more negative. In contrast, the tone of nonenvironmental proposals (i.e. the control group) is unaffected. This study interprets this finding as direct evidence that the oil spill led to increased shareholder environmental activism through proposals that targeted the environmental risks surrounding the business more aggressively. By contrast, this study finds no effect of the oil spill on the tone of managers' responses to the proposals, consistent with managers refraining from emphasizing environmental threats.
Originality/value
Anecdotal evidence and recent studies suggest a link between environmental disasters and shareholder pressure for corporate change. However, no prior research has investigated the channel through which shareholders could have exerted such pressure or has looked for direct evidence of it in the negotiations between shareholders and managers. By finding such evidence in shareholder proposals, this study fills in this gap
Big baths around turnovers: what happens if the former CEO stays on board?
Full text linkWe examine whether retaining the former CEO as a board member has an impact on big bath accounting around CEO turnovers. Early evidence shows that when a CEO turnover occurs, the new CEO uses big bath to shift the responsibility for low earnings toward the previous management. However, the former CEO is often retained. This event may restrict the new CEO's ability to take a big bath. Using a hand-collected sample of CEO turnover events in US firms, we find that CEO turnover increases the probability of a big bath. However, retaining the CEO acts as a monitoring mechanism by reducing the probability of big baths, especially opportunistic ones. Our findings indicate that CEO retention could be a useful corporate governance mechanism that restricts new CEO's opportunistic practices
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