3,090 research outputs found
Los Elementos Esenciales delDerecho Corporativo ¿Qué es el Derecho Corporativo?
No full textThis article is the first chapter of the second edition of “The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A Comparative and Functional Approach”, by Reinier Kraakman, John Armour, Paul Davies, Luca Enriques, Henry Hansmann, Gerard Hertig, Klaus Hopt, HidekiKanda and Edward Rock (Oxford University Press, 2009). The book as a whole provides a functional analysis of Corporate (or Company) Law in Europe, the U.S., and Japan. Its organization reflects the structure of Corporate Law throughout all jurisdictions, while individual capitals explore the diversity of jurisdictionalapproaches to the common issues of Corporate Law. In its second edition, the book has been significantly revised and expanded.Este artículo es el primer capítulo de la segunda edición de The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A Comparative and Functional Approach, por Reinier Kraakman, John Armour, Paul Davies, Luca Enriques, Henry Hansmann, Gerard Hertig, Klaus Hopt, Hideki Kanda y Edward Rock (Oxford University Press, 2009). El libro como un todo provee un análisis funcional del Derecho Corporativo (o Societario) en Europa, Estados Unidos y Japón. Su organización refleja la estructura del Derecho Corporativo a lo largo de todas las jurisdicciones, mientras que los capítulos individuales exploran la diversidad de los enfoques de distintas jurisdicciones a los problemas comunes del Derecho Corporativo. En su segunda edición, el libro ha sido significativamente revisado y expandido
Los Elementos Esenciales delDerecho Corporativo ¿Qué es el Derecho Corporativo?
No full textThis article is the first chapter of the second edition of “The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A Comparative and Functional Approach”, by Reinier Kraakman, John Armour, Paul Davies, Luca Enriques, Henry Hansmann, Gerard Hertig, Klaus Hopt, HidekiKanda and Edward Rock (Oxford University Press, 2009). The book as a whole provides a functional analysis of Corporate (or Company) Law in Europe, the U.S., and Japan. Its organization reflects the structure of Corporate Law throughout all jurisdictions, while individual capitals explore the diversity of jurisdictionalapproaches to the common issues of Corporate Law. In its second edition, the book has been significantly revised and expanded.Este artículo es el primer capítulo de la segunda edición de The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A Comparative and Functional Approach, por Reinier Kraakman, John Armour, Paul Davies, Luca Enriques, Henry Hansmann, Gerard Hertig, Klaus Hopt, Hideki Kanda y Edward Rock (Oxford University Press, 2009). El libro como un todo provee un análisis funcional del Derecho Corporativo (o Societario) en Europa, Estados Unidos y Japón. Su organización refleja la estructura del Derecho Corporativo a lo largo de todas las jurisdicciones, mientras que los capítulos individuales exploran la diversidad de los enfoques de distintas jurisdicciones a los problemas comunes del Derecho Corporativo. En su segunda edición, el libro ha sido significativamente revisado y expandido
A anatomia do direito societário: uma abordagem comparada e funcional
No full text- Divulgação dos SUMÁRIOS das obras recentemente incorporadas ao acervo da Biblioteca Ministro Oscar Saraiva do STJ. Em respeito à Lei de Direitos Autorais, não disponibilizamos a obra na íntegra.- Localização na estante: 347.725 A535d- Com contribuições de: Reinier Kraakman, John Armour, Paul Davies, Luca Enriques, Henry Hansmann, Gerard Hertig, Klaus Hopt, Hideki Kanda, Mariana Pargendler, Wolf-Georg Ringe e Edward Rock.O que é o direito societário? / John Armour, Henry Hansmann, Reineir Kraakman, Mariana Pargendler -- Problemas de agência e estratégias jurídicas / John Armour, Henry Hansmann, Reineir Kraakman -- A estrutura de governança básica : os interesses dos acionistas como classe / John Armour, Luca Enriques, Henry Hansmann, Reinier Kraakman -- A estrutura de governança básica : acionistas minositários e grupos não acionistas / Luca Enriques, Henry Hansmann, Reinier Kraakman, Marina Pargendler -- Operações com credores / John Armour, Gerard Hertig, Hideki Kanda -- Transações entre partes relacionadas / Luca Enriques, Gerard Hertig, Hideki Kanda, Mariana Pargendler -- Mudanças fundamentais / Edward Rock, Paul Davies, Hideki Kanda, Reinier Kraakman, Wolf-Georg Ringe -- Transferências de controle / Paul Davies, Klaus Hopt, Wolf-Georg Ringe -- Direito societário e mercado de capitais / Luca Enriques, Gerard Hertig, Reinier Kraakman, Edward Rock -- Para além da anatonomia / John Armour, Luca Enriques, Mariana Pargendler, Wolf-Georg Ringe
Ownership Form and Trapped Capital in the Hospital Industry
No full textOver the past 20 years, demand for acute care hospital services has declined more rapidly than has hospital capacity. This paper investigates the extent to which the preponderance of the nonprofit form in this industry might account for this phenomenon. We test whether rates of exit from the hospital industry differ significantly across the different forms of ownership, and especially whether secular nonprofit hospitals reduce capacity more slowly than do other types of hospitals. We estimate the effect of population changes (a proxy for changes in demand) at the zip-code level between 1985 and 1994 on changes in the capacity of for-profit, secular nonprofit, religious nonprofit, and public hospitals over the same period, holding constant metropolitan statistical area (MSA) fixed effects and other 1985 baseline characteristics of residential zip codes. We find that for-profit hospitals are the most responsive to reductions in demand, followed in turn by public and religiously affiliated nonprofit hospitals, while secular nonprofits are distinctly the least responsive of the four ownership types.
The Functions of Trust Law: A Comparative Legal and Economic Analysis
No full textIn this Article, Professors Henry Hansmann and Ugo Mattei analyze the functions served by the law of trusts and ask, first, whether the basic tools of contract and agency law could fulfill the same functions and, second, whether trust law provides benefits that are not provided by the law of corporations. The authors' analysis is motivated in part by the inreasing interest in the trust, a familiar feature of common- law jurisdictions, in a number of civil law countries, and in part by the important role that trusts, for example pension and mutual finds, have come to play in capital markets. The authors conclude that the important contribution of trust law lies not in its well-recognized role of ordering, via default rules of contract, the relationships among parties to the trust; rather, the principal benefit of trust law lies in its ordering of relationships between these parties and third parties with whom they dea; relationships that cannot be rearranged easily by contract. Particularly, trust law allows the parties to the trust to partition off a discrete set of assets for separate treatment in relationships formed with creditors. The essential role of the trust, therefore, is to perform a property law-like, rather than a contract law-like, function. Moreover, the trust provides flexibility in organizational structure unavailable under even the more liberal business corporation statutes. The authors close by noting the convergence of trust and corporate law and questioning whether the roles performed by the two organizational types could just as well be served by a single legal form
The Functions of Trust Law: A Comparative Legal and Economic Analysis
No full textIn this Article, Professors Henry Hansmann and Ugo Mattei analyze the functions served by the law of trusts and ask, first, whether the basic tools of contract and agency law could fulfill the same functions and, second, whether trust law provides benefits that are not provided by the law of corporations. The authors\u27 analysis is motivated in part by the inreasing interest in the trust, a familiar feature of common- law jurisdictions, in a number of civil law countries, and in part by the important role that trusts, for example pension and mutual finds, have come to play in capital markets. The authors conclude that the important contribution of trust law lies not in its well-recognized role of ordering, via default rules of contract, the relationships among parties to the trust; rather, the principal benefit of trust law lies in its ordering of relationships between these parties and third parties with whom they dea; relationships that cannot be rearranged easily by contract. Particularly, trust law allows the parties to the trust to partition off a discrete set of assets for separate treatment in relationships formed with creditors. The essential role of the trust, therefore, is to perform a property law-like, rather than a contract law-like, function. Moreover, the trust provides flexibility in organizational structure unavailable under even the more liberal business corporation statutes. The authors close by noting the convergence of trust and corporate law and questioning whether the roles performed by the two organizational types could just as well be served by a single legal form
Recommended from our members
Agency Problems, Legal Strategies, and Enforcement
No full textThis article is the second chapter of the second edition of "The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A Comparative and Functional Approach," by Reinier Kraakman, John Armour, Paul Davies, Luca Enriques, Henry Hansmann, Gerard Hertig, Klaus Hopt, Hideki Kanda and Edward Rock (Oxford University Press 2009). The book as a whole provides a functional analysis of corporate (or company) law in Europe, the U.S., and Japan. Its organization reflects the structure of corporate law across all jurisdictions, while individual chapters explore the diversity of jurisdictional approaches to the common problems of corporate law. In its second edition, the book has been significantly revised and expanded. "Agency Problems and Legal Strategies" establishes the analytical framework for the book as a whole. After further elaborating the agency problems that motivate corporate law, this chapter identifies five legal strategies that the law employs to address these problems. Describing these strategies allows us to more accurately map legal similarities and differences across jurisdictions. Some legal strategies are "regulatory" insofar as they directly constrain the actions of corporate actors: for example, a standard of behavior such as a director's duty of loyalty and care. Other legal strategies are "governance-based" insofar as they channel the distribution of power and payoffs within companies to reduce opportunism. For example, the law may accord direct decision rights to a vulnerable corporate constituency, as when it requires shareholder approval of mergers. Alternatively, the law may assign appointment rights over top managers to a vulnerable constituency, as when it accords shareholders - or in some jurisdictions, employees - the power to select corporate directors. We then consider the relationship between different enforcement mechanisms - public agencies, private actors, and gatekeeper control - and the basic legal strategies outlined. We conclude that regulatory strategies require more extensive enforcement mechanisms - in the form of courts and procedural rules - to secure compliance than do governance strategies. However, governance strategies, for efficacy, require shareholders to be relatively concentrated so as to be able to exercise their decisional rights effectively.Version of Recor
- …
