24 research outputs found
D-Spaces and L-Special Trees
No full textThis dissertation concerns D-spaces and set-theoretic trees. A topological space, X, is a D-space if for every neighbornet of the space there is a closed, discrete set from X whose images in the neighbornet are a cover for X. A set-theoretic tree is a poset where for any element the set of its predecessors is well-ordered.
In this dissertation it is shown that certain L-special trees are D-spaces and some of them are hereditarily so.In particular, let L=[0,1]α with α a countable ordinal be given the lexicographic order. For α \u3c ω+1, the author shows that any L-special tree is hereditarily a D-space. For certain α with ω \u3c α \u3c ω1 the author shows that any L-special tree is a D-space. For the remaining countable ordinals α, the current progress is shown
Hayek and Rawls about social justice: are the differences "more verbal than substantial"?
No full textHayek (theoretician of "the mirage of social justice") seems to be completely opposed to Rawls (author of "Theory of justice"), but the economist can have written that the differences between himself and the philosopher are "more verbal than substantial". In spite of opposed paradigms (evolutionism versus contractualism), the stages are quite comparable in the setting of norms (anti-utilitarianism, impartiality, experimentation) and induce two versions of the same conception of justice in society, through the content and the hierarchy of norms the two authors put forward (priority of liberty, fair increase of opportunity for everyone, better condition for the poorest people).
Northern Light, April 26, 1999
No full textThe staff (3)
Place to nurture futures is a necessity By: Echo Gamel (4)
Letters to the editor (4)
Pulitzer Prize-winning author speaks at UAA By: Gonzalo Medina 96)
Corrections (6)
Perspectives By: Jeff DeMartino (7)
Awards ceremonies perk up spirits at UAA By: Echo Gamel (8)
News Briefs (9)
Justice career fair brings the law to the Campus Center By: Echo Gamel (10)
Campus Scanner (11)
Students take to the streets to rally for university funding By: Echo Gamel (12)
Professor says goodbye to UA after 26 years of teaching By: Kathleen Tessaro (12)
Devilish Fun By: James Lobb (14)
KRUA Top 10 (14)
So Now What? By: Unknown (16-17)
Planning, relaxation key to stress-free finals By: Fran Victor (18)
Come one, come all By: Stephanie Tripp (20)
Art exhibition showcases gamut of themes By: Michael Conti (21)
Campus Calendar (22)
Box Seat (22)
Look, Ma By: Unknown (23)
Classified (24)
Know the facts about hepatitis C By: Daryl young (25)
P.S. Mueller By: Mueller (26)
Single Slices By: Peter Kohlsaat (26)
Rubes By: Leigh Rubin (26)
Comics (26)
Gutless comedy buried by slow-moving plot By: Erick Hayden (27)
‘Picasso’ offers robust blend of love, art, science By: Erick Hayden (27)
The thrill is in being there By: Patrick J. Paul (28)
Intramural Challenge more than just competition By: Patrick J. Paul (28)
Banquet honors women’s basketball By: Patrick J. Paul (28)
Ski team ends up in 6th place By: Justin Theriot (29)
NCAA lawsuit abuses race card By: Brian Winter (30
Tudor women writers fashioning masculinity
No full textThis thesis contributes to the growing interest in early modern masculinity and its literary representations by introducing texts by women writers into dialogue with their male-authored counterparts. It argues for a more nuanced approach that recognises that the concepts of masculinity and femininity can only be fully understood when studied in relation with each other.
The first chapter explores how, notwithstanding the wisdom of conduct books and marriage guides, the demands of the state may not always be commensurate with those of the domestic realm and shows that this conflict necessitates a rethinking of existing definitions of masculinity by focusing on selected writings of the Tudor sisters Mary and Elizabeth and Jane Fitzalan’s *Tragedie of Iphigeneia*. The second chapter identifies how Elizabeth’s unique discursive strategies were designed to elicit support from her male subjects and subdue the belligerence that simmered under polemic like John Stubbs’ *Gaping Gulf*. In her letters to Anjou, the chapter examines how Elizabeth manoeuvred around her position as a beloved and as a monarch to fashion a husband who would not only be sympathetic but also subordinate to her political authority. This chapter also shows how the fabulous world of John Lyly’s *Galatea* consummates the Queen’s desire for the ideal male subject. The final chapter investigates the construction of martial manhood. It juxtaposes Mary Sidney’s *The Tragedy of Antonie* with William Shakespeare’s *Antony and Cleopatra* to determine how the figure of Cleopatra, common to both plays, challenges and revises the martial code of masculinity as embodied by Antony. By examining the authorial position appropriated by Cleopatra in the plays and its impact on the narrative, this chapter also extends this thesis’ interest in the extent to which female characters within texts compete for diegetic control with male protagonists
Hayek et Rawls sur la justice sociale : les différences sont-elles «plus verbales que substantielles» ?
No full textIn contemporary liberal thought, Hayek seems to be completely opposed to Rawls : the first one is an economist known as the theoretician of « the mirage of social justice », the second one is a philosopher, who is the author of « Theory of justice » ; but Hayek can have written that the differences between himself and Rawls are « more verbal than substantial ». In spite of strong opposition between them about paradigm (evolutionism versus contractualism), the paper tries to find elements which might support such an opinion : the steps are quite comparable in the setting of norms (anti-utilitarianism, impartiality, experimentation) and lead to two versions of the same conception of justice in society. These two versions converge in the content of norms as well as in their hierarchy (priority of liberty, fair increase of opportunity for everyone, better condition for the poorest people).social justice, liberalism, evolutionism, contractualism, equality of opportunity, minimum income.
L'articulation "justice globale"/"justice locale". Commentaires sur l'ouvrage d'ELSTER (1992).
No full textInternational audienceJon Elster’s book "Local Justice. How Institutions Allocate Scarce Goods and Necessary Burdens" (1992) is a very original work among recent ones published on the general theme of social justice. Elster’s initial purpose seemed to build a general theory of local justice, a both positive and normative one, but the author gave up the project by the way (I). From this very stimulating attempt remain meaningful lessons about the difficulties encountered in such an approach (II). Furthermore, careful observation of local justice practices leads to the “commonsense conception of justice” Elster develops in a few pages. That conception can be considered as a synthesis of the dominant theories of global justice, which are both normative and deductive (III).L’ouvrage de Jon Elster "Local Justice. How Institutions Allocate Scarce Goods and Necessary Burdens" (1992) occupe une place très originale parmi les œuvres récemment parues sur le thème général de la justice sociale. Le propos initial d’Elster était, semble-t-il, de construire une théorie générale de la justice locale, à la fois positive et inductive, projet auquel l’auteur a dû renoncer en chemin (I). De cette tentative très stimulante, il reste des enseignements riches de sens sur les obstacles rencontrés par une telle approche (II). Par ailleurs, l’observation minutieuse des pratiques de justice locale débouche sur la « conception de sens commun de la justice » qu’Elster développe en quelques pages, laquelle peut être perçue comme une synthèse des théories dominantes, normatives et déductives, de la justice globale (III)
POURQUOI LA THEORIE DE LA « MACROJUSTICE » MÉRITE-T-ELLE QU'ON EN DEBATTE ?
No full textTheory of "macrojustice" [Kolm (2005)] is a stimulating contribution to the debate on the macroeconomic incomes distribution. The solution proposed by the author is the result of a three stages construction : first, agreement on the scheme of labour incomes redistribution, second, agreement on the degree of equalization to be chosen in that framework and, third, control by everyone of the intensity with which his own productive capacities (at the root of his labour income) are exploited. To begin with the core of the theory of macrojustice is defined (1.), and two specially original features are recorded (2.). Finally, five points must be questioned, because of their significance for further investigation (3)La théorie de la « macrojustice » [Kolm (2005)] est une contribution stimulante au débat contemporain sur la répartition macroéconomique des revenus. La solution préconisée ? les transferts redistributifs ELIE (« Equal Labor Income Equalization ») - résulte d'une construction à trois étages : consensus sur un schéma général de redistribution des revenus du travail, consensus sur l'intensité de l'égalisation à opérer dans ce cadre général, maîtrise par l'individu de l'intensité avec laquelle il exploite ses capacités productives personnelles, source de ces revenus. Le c?ur de la théorie de la macrojustice est d'abord présenté en ces termes (1.), puis soumis à un examen critique du double point de vue de la philosophie économique et de l'économie publique : sont recensés deux traits particulièrement originaux (2.) et cinq points controversés, mais riches de sens, pour de futurs approfondissements (3.)
POURQUOI LA THEORIE DE LA « MACROJUSTICE » MÉRITE-T-ELLE QU'ON EN DEBATTE ?
No full textTheory of "macrojustice" [Kolm (2005)] is a stimulating contribution to the debate on the macroeconomic incomes distribution. The solution proposed by the author is the result of a three stages construction : first, agreement on the scheme of labour incomes redistribution, second, agreement on the degree of equalization to be chosen in that framework and, third, control by everyone of the intensity with which his own productive capacities (at the root of his labour income) are exploited. To begin with the core of the theory of macrojustice is defined (1.), and two specially original features are recorded (2.). Finally, five points must be questioned, because of their significance for further investigation (3)La théorie de la « macrojustice » [Kolm (2005)] est une contribution stimulante au débat contemporain sur la répartition macroéconomique des revenus. La solution préconisée ? les transferts redistributifs ELIE (« Equal Labor Income Equalization ») - résulte d'une construction à trois étages : consensus sur un schéma général de redistribution des revenus du travail, consensus sur l'intensité de l'égalisation à opérer dans ce cadre général, maîtrise par l'individu de l'intensité avec laquelle il exploite ses capacités productives personnelles, source de ces revenus. Le c?ur de la théorie de la macrojustice est d'abord présenté en ces termes (1.), puis soumis à un examen critique du double point de vue de la philosophie économique et de l'économie publique : sont recensés deux traits particulièrement originaux (2.) et cinq points controversés, mais riches de sens, pour de futurs approfondissements (3.)
Hayek et Rawls sur la justice sociale : les différences sont-elles «plus verbales que substantielles» ?
No full textIn contemporary liberal thought, Hayek seems to be completely opposed to Rawls : the first one is an economist known as the theoretician of « the mirage of social justice », the second one is a philosopher, who is the author of « Theory of justice » ; but Hayek can have written that the differences between himself and Rawls are « more verbal than substantial ». In spite of strong opposition between them about paradigm (evolutionism versus contractualism), the paper tries to find elements which might support such an opinion : the steps are quite comparable in the setting of norms (anti-utilitarianism, impartiality, experimentation) and lead to two versions of the same conception of justice in society. These two versions converge in the content of norms as well as in their hierarchy (priority of liberty, fair increase of opportunity for everyone, better condition for the poorest people).Dans la pensée libérale contemporaine, Hayek, économiste théoricien du « mirage de la justice sociale » et Rawls, philosophe auteur d'une « Théorie de la justice », semblent en opposition complète ; pourtant le premier a pu affirmer que les différences qui le séparaient du second étaient « plus verbales que substantielles ». En dépit d'une opposition frontale de paradigme (évolutionnisme versus contractualisme), le présent article cherche à repérer les éléments qui pourraient étayer une telle remarque : dans la gestation des normes, les étapes sont comparables (anti-utilitarisme, impartialité, expérimentation) et aboutissent à deux versions d'une même conception de la justice en société, tant au niveau des normes retenues que de leur hiérarchie (prééminence de la liberté, réelle augmentation des chances de chacun, amélioration du sort des plus démunis)
Hayek et Rawls sur la justice sociale: les différences sont-elles "plus verbales que substantielles" ?
No full textInternational audienceIn contemporary liberal thought, Hayek seems to be completely opposed to Rawls : the first one is an economist known as the theoretician of « the mirage of social justice », the second one is a philosopher, who is the author of « Theory of justice » ; but Hayek can have written that the differences between himself and Rawls are « more verbal than substantial ». In spite of strong opposition between them about paradigm (evolutionism versus contractualism), the paper tries to find elements which might support such an opinion : the steps are quite comparable in the setting of norms (anti-utilitarianism, impartiality, experimentation) and lead to two versions of the same conception of justice in society. These two versions converge in the content of norms as well as in their hierarchy (priority of liberty, fair increase of opportunity for everyone, better condition for the poorest people)Dans la pensée libérale contemporaine, Hayek, économiste théoricien du « mirage de la justice sociale » et Rawls, philosophe auteur d’une « Théorie de la justice », semblent en opposition complète ; pourtant le premier a pu affirmer que les différences qui le séparaient du second étaient « plus verbales que substantielles ». En dépit d’une opposition frontale de paradigme (évolutionnisme versus contractualisme), le présent article cherche à repérer les éléments qui pourraient étayer une telle remarque : dans la gestation des normes, les étapes sont comparables (anti-utilitarisme, impartialité, expérimentation) et aboutissent à deux versions d’une même conception de la justice en société, tant au niveau des normes retenues que de leur hiérarchie (prééminence de la liberté, réelle augmentation des chances de chacun, amélioration du sort des plus démunis)
