16,057,857 research outputs found
Coalition formation in simple Games. the semistrict core
Get PDFDimitrov D, Haake C-J. Coalition formation in simple Games. the semistrict core. Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics. Vol 378. Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld; 2006.We consider the class of proper monotonic simple games and study coalition formation when an exogenous share vector and a solution concept are combined to guide the distribution of coalitional worth. Using a multiplicative composite solution, we induce players' preferences over coalitions in a hedonic game, and present conditions under which the semistrict core of the game is nonempty
Dividing by Demanding: Object Division through Market Procedures
Get PDFHaake C-J. Dividing by Demanding: Object Division through Market Procedures. Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics. Vol 359. Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld; 2004.We discuss a model, in which two agents may distribute finitely many objects among themselves. The conflict is resolved by means of a market procedure. Depending on the specifications, this procedure serves to implement bargaining solutions such as the discrete Raiffa solution, the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution and the Perles-Maschler solution. The latter is axiomatized using the superadditivity axiom, which in the present context is readily interpreted as resolving a specific source of conflict potential
Two support results for the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution in small object division markets
Get PDFHaake C-J. Two support results for the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution in small object division markets. Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics. Vol 366. Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld; 2005.We discuss two support results for the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution in the context of an object division problem involving two agents. Allocations of objects resulting from strategic interaction are obtained as a demand vector in a specific market. For the first support result games in strategic form are derived that exhibit a unique Nash equilibrium. The second result uses subgame perfect equlibria of a game in extensive form. Although there may be multiple equilibria, coordination problems can be removed
Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couples
Get PDFHaake C-J, Klaus B. Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couples. Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics. Vol 399. Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld; 2008.We consider two-sided matching markets with couples. First, we extend a result by Klaus and Klijn (2005, Theorem 3.3) and show that for any weakly responsive couples market there always exists a "double stable" matching, i.e., a matching that is stable for the couples market and for any associated singles market. Second, we show that for weakly responsive couples markets the associated stable correspondence is (Maskin) monotonic and Nash implementable. In contrast, the correspondence that assigns all double stable matchings is neither monotonic nor Nash implementable
COMPARISON OF VISCOSITY MEASUREMENT WITH INSTRUMENTS HAAKE VT550 AND HAAKE VISCOTESTER IQ
Get PDFV diplomskem delu je prikazan postopek uvajanja nove aparature v delovni proces.
Kot referenčno aparaturo smo uporabili viskozimeter Haake VT550, ki se trenutno uporablja za merjenje viskoznosti šamponov in tekočih mil, ter z njo primerjali meritve izmerjene na novem aparatu Haake viscotester iQ.
Meritve viskoznosti na obeh aparatih smo izvajali v skladu z že vpeljano interno metodo, ki smo jo prenesli s Haake VT550 na Haake viscotester iQ.
Cilj raziskave je s pomočjo statističnega programa SPSS analizirat izmerjene vrednosti in se tako na podlagi pridobljenih rezultatov odločiti, ali je aparat primeren za uporabo merjenja viskoznosti. Ter ali lahko zagotovimo, da je meritev izmerjena z novim Haake viscotester iQ aparatom enakovredna meritvi izmerjeni z že uveljavljenim starejšim modelom Haake VT550 in kaj moramo ob tej odločitvi upoštevati.The thesis describes the introduction of a new device in the working process.
The Haake VT550 viscometer, which is currently used to measure the viscosity of shampoos and liquid soaps, was used as a reference device. Its measurements were compared with the ones measured with the new device Haake viscotester iQ.
Viscosity measurements on both devices were carried out in accordance with a pre-established internal method used on Haake VT550 and then also on Haake viscotester iQ.
The aim of this research was to analyze the measured values with the SPSS statistical program, and to determine whether the device is suitable for measuring viscosity on the basis of the obtained results. We also wanted to find out if it is possible to guarantee that the measurements taken with the new Haake viscotester iQ are equivalent to the measurements taken with the already established older model Haake VT550 and what do we need to take into account when making this decision
An axiomatic approach to composite solutions
Get PDFDimitrov D, Haake C-J. An axiomatic approach to composite solutions. Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics. Vol 385. Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld; 2006.We investigate a situation in which gains from cooperation are represented by a cooperative TU-game and a solution proposes a division of coalitional worths. In addition, asymmetries among players outside the game are captured by a vector of exogenous weights. If a solution measures players' payoffs inherent in the game, and a coalition has formed, then the question is how to measure players' overall payoffs in that coalition. For this we introduce the notion of a composite solution. We provide an axiomatic characterization of a specific composite solution, in which exogenous weights enter in a proportional fashion
TERMODIN-10
Get PDFUn baño de agua es un dispositivo de laboratorio diseñado para mantener una temperatura constante en muestras sumergidas en agua. Haake Gebrüde Berlin GmbH fue un fabricante alemán experto en baños de agua, reómetros y otros dispositivos de control de temperatura y análisis de viscosidad. Estos baños de agua son conocidos por su precisión y fiabilidad en el control de la temperatura. Están formados por un recipiente principal donde se coloca el agua y las muestras a ser calentadas o enfriadas, un sistema de calefacción y, en algunos modelos, de refrigeración para mantener un rango específico de temperaturas, un sistema de circulación para asegurar una distribución uniforme del calor y una serie de sensores de temperatura además de la cubierta o la tapa para reducir la evaporación y la pérdida de calor.
Tamaño (alto x largo x ancho):39.8x30.5x15 cmHaake es en la actualidad una línea de productos de Thermo Fisher Scientific, una empresa que fabrica equipos científicos y de laboratorio. El baño de agua fue distribuido en España por la empresa Orejas y Maillo, S.A. como parte del instrumental científico incluido en su catálogo de material de laboratori desde 1970. Los baños de agua controlados térmicamente, también llamados baños termostáticos, surgieron de avances tecnológicos en laboratorios para mantener temperaturas precisas en experimentos científicos. En la actualidad están equipados con controladores digitales para ajustar y monitorear con precisión, ofrecen características avanzadas como temporizadores programables, alarmas de seguridad y sistemas de circulación para distribuir el calor uniformemente. Esenciales en laboratorios de biología, química y medicina, donde el control térmico garantiza la precisión y repetibilidad de los experimentos. La refrigeración es crucial para una variedad de aplicaciones científicas e industriales, como incubaciones, reacciones químicas, ensayos enzimáticos y pruebas de materiales
Addressing Interoperability in Open Hypermedia: the Design of the Open Hypermedia Protocol
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On Maskin monotonicity of solution based social choice rules
Get PDFHaake C-J, Trockel W. On Maskin monotonicity of solution based social choice rules. Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics. Vol 393. Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld; 2007.Howard (1992) argues that the Nash bargaining solution is not Nash implementable, as it does not satisfy Maskin monotonicity. His arguments can be extended to other bargaining solutions as well. However, by defining a social choice correspondence that is based on the solution rather than on its realizations, one can overcome this shortcoming. We even show that such correspondences satisfy a stronger version of monotonicity that is even sufficient for Nash implementability
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