1,721,256 research outputs found
Do the Retired Elderly in Europe Decumulate Their Wealth? The Importance of Bequest Motives, Precautionary Saving, Public Pensions, and Homeownership
Get PDFIn this paper, we use micro data on a large number of European countries from the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) to examine the wealth accumulation (saving) behavior of the retired elderly in Europe. To summarize our main findings, we find that less than half of the retired elderly in Europe are decumulating their wealth and that the average wealth accumulation rate of the retired elderly in Europe is positive though relatively moderate (6.6% over a 3-year period). These findings strongly suggest that the Wealth Decumulation (or Retirement Saving) Puzzle (the tendency of the retired elderly to not decumulate their wealth or to decumulate their wealth more slowly than expected) applies in the case of Europe. Moreover, our regression results suggest that bequest motives, generous public pension systems, and the reluctance of retired elderly homeowners to sell or borrow against their owner-occupied housing are the primary explanations for the existence of the Wealth Decumulation Puzzle in Europe
A Survey of Household Saving Behavior in Japan
Get PDFThis paper presents data on Japan's household saving rate, considers the reasons for Japan's high household saving rate in the past and the reasons for the recent decline therein, projects future trends in Japan's household saving rate, and consider the implications of my findings. It finds that Japan's high household saving rate was a temporary phenomenon and that it was high in both absolute and relative terms during the 1955-95 period (especially during the 1960s and 1970s) but that it was not unusually high during the prewar and early postwar periods or after 1995; second, that Japan's temporarily high household saving rate was due not to culture but to temporary economic, demographic, and institutional factors; third, that the decline in Japan's household saving rate since the mid-1970s is due to the weakening of these factors and that Japan's household saving rate can be expected to decline even further as these factors become even less applicable and that the rapid aging of Japan's population has played the most important role; and fourth, that there is nothing to worry about even if Japan's household saving rate falls to zero or even negative levels.
The Flow of Household Funds in Japan
Get PDFIn this paper, I consider why Japans household saving rate was so high in the past and why it has shown a downward trend in more recent years, and based on this analysis, I project future trends in Japans household saving rate. To preview my main findings, I find, first, that Japans household saving rate used to be high but that it has declined sharply in recent years and that it is no longer high in either absolute or relative terms. Moreover, Japans household saving rate will continue its decline due to the rapid aging of her population and other factors and may well become zero or negative within a few years. However, the governments fiscal deficits (government dissaving) as well as corporate investment in plant and equipment can be expected to decline at the same time, and moreover, there is always the option of borrowing from abroad, so the sharp decline in the household saving rate will not necessarily cause any problems.household saving, Japan
Do Bequests Increase or Decrease Wealth Inequalities?
Get PDFThis paper finds that individuals in Japan do not leave very significant bequests, that parents often require a quid pro quo for bequests to their children, and that wealthier individuals leave less bequests, meaning that bequests ameliorate wealth inequalities.
Recent Trends in Consumption in Japan and the Other Group of Seven (G7) Countries
Get PDFIn this paper, we present data on recent trends in private consumption and in possible determinants of private consumption (such as GDP, household incomes, household saving rates, household wealth, and employment conditions) in the Group of Seven (G7) countries and find that there has been significant variability among the G7 countries not only in their private consumption growth rates but also in the determinants of private consumption growth during the 2002-07 period. With respect to Japan, we find that private consumption has been relatively stagnant during the 2002-07 period and that the stagnation of private consumption has been due to the stagnation of household income and of household wealth and the relative stability of the household saving rate
Are Americans and Indians More Altruistic than the Japanese and Chinese? Evidence from a New International Survey of Bequest Plans
Get PDFThis paper discusses three alternative assumptions concerning household preferences (altruism, self-interest, and a desire for dynasty building) and shows that these assumptions have very different implications for bequest motives and bequest division. After reviewing some of the literature on actual bequests, bequest motives, and bequest division, the paper presents data on the strength of bequest motives, stated bequest motives, and bequest division plans from a new international survey conducted in China, India, Japan, and the United States. It finds striking inter-country differences in bequest plans, with the bequest plans of Americans and Indians appearing to be much more consistent with altruistic preferences than those of the Japanese and Chinese and the bequest plans of the Japanese and Chinese appearing to be much more consistent with selfish preferences than those of Americans and Indians. These findings have important implications for the efficacy and desirability of stimulative fiscal policies, public pensions, and inheritance taxes
Bequest motives and parent-child relations in the U.S., Japan, China and India (keynote speech)
No full textThe stagnation of household consumption in Japan
Get PDFIn this paper, I consider the extent to which the stagnation of household consumption is responsible for the decade-long recession in Japan during the 1990s and early 2000s and the reasons for the stagnation of household consumption during this period and find that the stagnation of private investment (and inventory investment) rather than that of household consumption was the major cause of the decade-long recession, that household consumption was nonetheless relatively stagnant during this decade, and that the stagnation of household consumption was due primarily to the stagnation of household disposable income, the decline in household wealth (which in turn was due primarily to the collapse of land and equity prices), and to a lesser extent, increased uncertainty about the future (especially about old age in general and public old-age pensions in particular), the deterioration of future prospects, and deflationary expectations concerning consumer prices
The Feldstein-Horioka Puzzle or Paradox after 44 Years : A Fallacy of Composition
No full textThe finding of Feldstein and Horioka (1980) that domestic saving and domestic investment are highly correlated across countries despite the rapid globalization and liberalization of financial markets in recent decades has been regarded as a Puzzle or Paradox. However, in this paper, we show that countries as a whole may not be able to transfer their capital abroad and that the Feldstein-Horioka Finding of domestic saving and domestic investment being highly correlated across countries may arise even if there are no frictions in financial markets and even if individual investors can freely transfer their capital abroad if there are frictions in goods markets such as transport costs, tariffs, nontariff barriers, the cost of regulatory compliance, etc. In fact, there is evidence that frictions in goods markets are a more serious impediment to countries as a whole being able to transfer their capital abroad than frictions in financial markets, especially in the short run
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