1,313 research outputs found
Author Lili Mendoza discusses intellectual freedom in her work
No full textHear Lili Mendoza describe how intellectual freedom motivates her creative endeavors. Lili Mendoza is a fiction writer, poet, translator and was born in Panama. She is the author of the short story collection Corazón de charol a-go-gó (2009). Her stories and poetry have been anthologized in Panama, Costa Rica, Spain, Peru, and the U.S., and showcased at literary events in Europe. An active member of the Theater Guild of Ancon, Mendoza also collaborates in musical and dance performances.
Interviewer Brian JK Mille
Chapter 22 Predatory Pricing: Rare Like a Unicorn?
No full textIsaac and Smith's (1985) single market design did not produce predatory pricing. Such pricing was observed in the single multi-market session reported in Harrison (1988), but this pattern did not emerge in three replications run by Goeree and Gomez (1998). In a simpler design with prices being chosen after entry decisions are made and announced, the incumbents knew when to enjoy monopoly profits and when to punish entrants. This setup resulted in reliable predation in most markets. The lesson that predatory pricing experiments provide to date depends on an assessment of the realism of the design characteristics. What is clear is that predatory prices can be generated reliably, both in stylized signaling games and in rich market settings. © 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved
On the equivalence of bayesian and dominant strategy implementation
No full textWe consider a standard social choice environment with linear utilities and independent, one-dimensional, private types. We prove that for any Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism there exists an equivalent dominant strategy incentive compatible mechanism that delivers the same interim expected utilities for all agents and the same ex ante expected social surplus. The short proof is based on an extension of an elegant result due to Gutmann et al. (Annals of Probability, 1991). We also show that the equivalence between Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation generally breaks down when the main assumptions underlying the social choice model are relaxed, or when the equivalence concept is strengthened to apply to interim expected allocations
Market Design and the Stability of General Equilibrium
No full textThis is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from Elsevier via the DOI in this record.We employ laboratory methods to study the stability of competitive equilibrium in Scarf’s economy (International Economic Review, 1960). Tatonnement theory predicts that prices are globally unstable for this economy, i.e. unless prices start at the competitive equilibrium they oscillate without converging. Anderson et al. (Journal of Economic Theory, 2004) report that in laboratory double auction markets, prices in the Scarf economy do indeed oscillate with no clear sign of convergence. We replicate their experiments and confirm that tatonnement theory predicts the direction of price changes remarkably well. Prices are globally unstable with adverse effects for the economy’s efficiency and the equitable distribution of the gains from trade. We also introduce a novel market mechanism where participants submit demand schedules and prices are computed using Smale’s global Newtonian dynamic (American Economic Review, 1976). We show that for the Scarf economy, submitting a competitive schedule, i.e. a set of quantities that maximize utility taking prices as given, is a weakly dominant strategy. The resulting outcome is the unique competitive equilibrium of the Scarf economy. In experiments using the schedule market, prices converge quickly to the competitive equilibrium. Besides stabilizing prices, the schedule market is more efficient and results in highly egalitarian outcomes.We would like to thank the Swiss National Science Foundation (SNSF 138162) and the European
Research Council (ERC Advanced Investigator Grant, ESEI-249433) for financial support. We are
grateful for useful suggestions we received from seminar participants at University of Nottingham and
the ESA meeting in New Yor
Handbook of Spectrum Auction Design
No full textFollowing the successful PCS Auction conducted by the US Federal Communications Commission in 1994, auctions have replaced traditional ways of allocating valuable radio spectrum, a key resource for any mobile telecommunications operator. Spectrum auctions have raised billions of dollars worldwide and have become a role model for market-based approaches in the public and private sectors. The design of spectrum auctions is a central application of game theory and auction theory due to its importance in industry and the theoretical challenges it presents. Several auction formats have been developed with different properties addressing fundamental questions about efficiently selling multiple objects to a group of buyers. This comprehensive handbook features classic papers and new contributions by international experts on all aspects of spectrum auction design, including pros and cons of different auctions and lessons learned from theory, experiments, and the field, providing a valuable resource for regulators, telecommunications professionals, consultants, and researchers. Comprehensive coverage of classic and new auctions saves regulators, telecoms, consultants, and academics time in preparing for spectrum auctions Discusses recent developments and summarizes pros and cons of auction designs such as SMRA, CCA, and newer alternatives Looks forward to possible designs for secondary markets
Profitability of milk production and its impact factors at JK Otsa Talu Ltd in 2009 - 2011
No full textKäesoleva bakalaureusetöö eesmärgiks oli välja selgitada OÜ JK Otsa Talu piimatootmise kulud ja analüüsida piimatootmise tasuvust mõjutavaid tegureid aastatel 2009 - 2011 ning esitada autoripoolseid ettepanekuid piima tootmise tasuvuse tõstmiseks uuritavas ettevõttes.
Tasuvuse analüüsimiseks on teostatud Osaühingu JK Otsa Talu piimakarjakulude struktuuri ja -dünaamika analüüs, piima kokkuostuhinna analüüs ning piimatootmise tootlikkuse analüüs. Aastate 2009 – 2011 kohta on teostatud analüüs, kus käsitletakse ettevõtte koondnäitajaid: kogukulusid ja –tulusid, käibe- ja kulurentaablust ning ühe haru st piimatootmise osanäitajaid nagu piima tootmisomahind, lehma produktiivsus ja kattetulu looma kohta.The aim of the current bachelors thesis was to find out what the milk production costs of JK Otsa Talu Ltd. were and to analyse milk production profitability impact factors in 2009 – 2011 and to search for opportunities to increase the profitability of milk production.
To analyse the profitability in JK Otsa Talu Ltd. the author has carried out an analysis of livestock costs structure and dynamics, milk prices, productivity and gross margin, comparisons have been made between enterprise production costs, dairy cows productivity, enterprise total costs and revenue, profit margin and cost margin analysis in 2009 – 2011. Also a comparison has been made between the data of JK Otsa Talu Ltd. and the data of other mixed producers type and milk producers belonging to the same group based on the FADN database
Modulation of hole-injection in GaInN-light emitting triodes and its effect on carrier recombination behavior
No full textThe effects of the hole injection modulated by using a three-terminal GaInN-based light emitter, light-emitting triode (LET), on carrier recombination behavior and efficiency droop are investigated. It was found that the lateral electric field created by applying voltage bias between the two anodes effectively reduces efficiency droop as well as dynamic conductance of LETs. Detailed analyses of LETs under various operation conditions by APSYS simulations reveal that the asymmetry in carrier transport between electrons and holes is alleviated by promoted injection of hot holes over the potential barrier, increasing the hole concentration as well as the radiative recombination rate in the multiple quantum well active region. (C) 2015 Author(s). All article content, except where otherwise noted, is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported License.110Ysciescopu
Communication & competition
No full textCharness and Dufwenberg (Am. Econ. Rev. 101(4):1211-1237, 2011) have recently demonstrated that cheap-talk communication raises efficiency in bilateral contracting situations with adverse selection. We replicate their main finding and extend their design to include competition between agents. We find that communication and competition act as "substitutes:" communication raises efficiency in the absence of competition but not with competition, and competition raises efficiency without communication but lowers efficiency with communication. We briefly review some behavioral theories that have been proposed in this context and show that each can explain some but not all features of the observed data patterns. Our findings highlight the fragility of cheap-talk communication and may serve as a guide to refine existing behavioral theories. © 2013 Economic Science Association
Optimal Privatisation Using Qualifying Auctions
No full textThis article explores use of auctions for privatising public assets. In our model, a single 'insider' bidder possesses information about the asset's common value. Bidders are privately informed about their costs of exploiting the asset. Due to the insider's presence, uninformed bidders face a strong winner's curse in standard auctions. We show that the optimal mechanism discriminates against the informationally advantaged bidder. It can be implemented via a two-stage 'qualifying auction'. In the first stage, non-binding bids are submitted to determine who enters the second stage, which consists of a standard second-price auction augmented with a reserve price. Copyright � The Author(s). Journal compilation � Royal Economic Society 2009.
One man, one bid
No full text© 2016 Elsevier Inc. We compare two mechanisms to implement a simple binary choice, e.g. adopt one of two proposals. We show that when neither alternative is ex ante preferred, simple majority voting cannot implement the first best outcome. We introduce a simple bidding mechanism where votes can be bought at a quadratic cost and voters receive rebates equal to the average of others' payments. This mechanism is budget-balanced, individually rational, and fully efficient in the limit. Moreover, the mechanism redistributes from those that gain from the outcome to those that lose and everyone is better off under bidding compared to voting. We test the two mechanisms in the lab using an environment with “moderate” and “extremist” voters. The observed efficiency losses under voting are close to theoretical predictions and significantly larger than under bidding. Because of redistribution, the efficiency gain from bidding benefits mostly the moderate voters
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