957 research outputs found
Studi sul repubblicanesimo. In onore di Maurizio Viroli
No full textMaurizio Viroli è Professor Emeritus of Politics alla Princeton University e Professor of Government alla University of Texas at Austin. Nel suo lungo e prolifico percorso di ricerca, sviluppatosi in diversi ambiti di studio pur gravitando sempre intorno alla tradizione politica del repubblicanesimo e alla figura di Machiavelli, ha costantemente dialogato con studiose e studiosi europei e americani. Questo volume, curato da Marcello Gisondi e Giorgio Volpe, vuole rendere omaggio a quel percorso intellettuale ravvivando quel dialogo grazie ai contributi di Gennaro Maria Barbuto, Gianfranco Borrelli, Thomas Casadei, Hilary Gatti, Robert P. George, Tommaso Greco, Jorge Islas López, Giacomo Jori, Fabrizio Lomonaco, Harvey C. Mansfield, Jean-Jacques Marchand, Sauro Mattarelli, Dino Mengozzi, Thomas L. Pangle, Nicola Panichi, Gianfranco Pasquino, Quentin Skinner, Lorraine Smith Pangle, Pasquale Stoppelli, David L. Tubbs, Jeffrey K. Tulis e Gianfrancesco Zanetti. Il volume contiene inoltre una bibliografia degli scritti di Viroli, utile a chi voglia accostarsi o approfondire la sua opera
Sequence-Form and Evolutionary Dynamics: Realization Equivalence to Agent Form and Logit Dynamics
No full textEvolutionary game theory provides the principal tools to model the dynamics of multi-agent learning algorithms. While there is a long-standing literature on evolutionary game theory in strategic-form games, in the case of extensive-form games few results are known and the exponential size of the representations currently adopted makes the evolutionary analysis of such games unaffordable. In this paper, we focus on dynamics for the sequence form of extensive-form games, providing three dynamics: one realization equivalent to the normal-form logit dynamic, one realization equivalent to the agent-form replicator dynamic, and one realization equivalent to the agent-form logit dynamic. All the considered dynamics require polynomial time and space, providing an exponential compression w.r.t. the dynamics currently known and providing thus tools that can be effectively employed in practice. Moreover, we use our tools to compare the agent-form and normal-form dynamics and to provide new "hybrid" dynamics
Investment banking e corporate finance in Italia
No full textUn'analisi dei fabbisogni professionali emergenti nel settore creditizio nell'ambito delle operazioni di finanza straordinari
Towards automated bargaining in electronic markets: A partially two-sided competition model
No full textExtensive-form games with heterogeneous populations: solution concepts, equilibria characterization, learning dynamics
No full textEvolutionary dynamics of Q-learning over the sequence form
No full textMulti-agent learning is a challenging open task in artificial intelligence. It is known an interesting connection between multi-agent learning algorithms and evolutionary game theory, showing that the learning dynamics of some algorithms can be modeled as replicator dynamics with a mutation term. Inspired by the recent sequence-form replicator dynamics, we develop a new version of the Q-learning algorithm working on the sequence form of an extensive-form game allowing thus an exponential reduction of the dynamics length w.r.t. those of the normal form. The dynamics of the proposed algorithm can be modeled by using the sequence-form replicator dynamics with a mutation term. We show that, although sequence-form and normal-form replicator dynamics are realization equivalent, the Q-learning algorithm applied to the two forms have non-realization equivalent dynamics. Originally from the previous works on evolutionary game theory models form multi-agent learning, we produce an experimental evaluation to show the accuracy of the model
Towards Automated Bargaining in Electronic Markets: a Partially Two-Sided Competition Model
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