1,721,630 research outputs found
Punish Once or Punish Twice: A Theory of the Use of Criminal Sanctions in
Full text linkThough clearly distinct in nature and procedure, both Regulatory Agencies and Courts frequently rely on similar instruments to sanc- tion the same or very similar kinds of illegal behavior. In this paper, we develop a theory of the use of criminal sanctions in addition to regulatory penalties. We show that it is generally more effective to have a penalty imposed by a Regulatory Agency rather than by the Courts. We extend our analysis by considering imprisonment sen- tences, legal error, and collusion between a Regulatory Agency and an offender. We claim that regulatory penalties become less effective in these contexts. The objective of the paper, though, is not limited to the determination of the theoretical conditions that can make the use of both sanctioning schemes optimal. Our analysis is also relevant to the application of a specific legal doctrine, the Double Jeopardy clause.Economics of Law Enforcement, Regulatory Agency, Courts, Double Jeopardy.,
davips/garoupa: Release v2.211207.5
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Delays in medical malpractice litigation in civil law jurisdictions: Some evidence from the Italian Court of Cassation
No full textMedical malpractice law and tort reform are contentious issues. In this paper, we focus on Italy as an example of a civil law jurisdiction. Italian medical malpractice law is essentially judge-made law. However, its effectiveness is likely to be curtailed by excessive delays in litigation. Several reforms have been enacted since the late 1980s to correct this situation. By making use of the decisions of the Italian Court of Cassation (which have shaped medical malpractice law) from 1970 to 2009, we show that these reforms had no general statistically significant impact on delays. Recent reduction of delays does not seem to be related to legal reforms but rather explained by other factors
Keeping Stigma Out of Administrative Law: An Explanation of Consistent Beliefs
Full text linkWe provide an interpretation based on consistent beliefs for the widely accepted observation that a criminal conviction generates more stigma than an administrative penalty. Implications for the criminalization of administrative noncompliance are discussed
davips/garoupa: Release v2.211207.2
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davips/garoupa: Release v2.211225.1
No full textAdd 5x5 matrices to 3x3, 4x4 as confirmed known number of conjugacy classe
Judicial review and political partisanship: Moving from consensual to majoritarian democracy
No full textDue to the collapse of the party system during the mid-nineties, Italy represents an interesting case study to test the effects of a transition from a consensual to a majoritarian model of democracy on judicial behavior at the level of the Constitutional Court. Using a dataset of 972 cases of substantive judicial review (. ricorsi in via principale) from 1985 to 2005, and proposing new measures of political alignment within constitutional review, we analyze the effect of a change in the political party system on judicial behavior. Our results show that political alignment is a stronger predictor of judicial decision making under majoritarian than consensual model of democracy
A law and economics perspective on terrorism
Full text linkThis paper reviews the existing law and economics literature on crime, noting where various models might apply to the terror context. Specifically, it focuses on two strands of the literature, deterrence and incapacitation. It considers anti-terror measures enacted by different countries, highlighting how the details of the laws correspond to the insights from economic models of crime. In conclusion, the paper proposes an efficient sorting mechanism in which individuals will be provided with incentives to reveal their type to law enforcement authorities. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2006Terrorism, Penalty enhancements, Communal liability, Organized crime, Basic crime model, Deterrence, Incapacitation,
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