966 research outputs found
Un’applicazione del Modello AHP per la valutazione del Risk of Management Fraud
No full textNel lavoro viene analizzata un’applicazione del Processo Gerarchico Analitico (Analytic Hierarchy Process, AHP) allo Statement on Auditing Standards No.82 ed, in particolare, ai fattori di rischio che i revisori dei conti dovrebbero considerare in una verifica di rendiconto finanziario. Le caratteristiche generali sono correntemente valutate in un processo di confronti a coppie che danno luogo a risultati che consentono di analizzare il processo in termini di importanza in un contesto di sintesi dei giudizi e di analisi delle differenti fonti di rischio del management all’interno della rischiosità globale d’azienda
Fast payment schemes for truthful mechanisms with verification
No full textIn this paper we study optimization problems with verifiable one-parameter selfish agents introduced by Auletta et al. [V. Auletta, R. De Prisco, P. Penna, P. Persiano, The power of verification for one-parameter agents, in: Proceedings of the 31st International Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming, ICALP, in: LNCS, vol. 3142, 2004, pp. 171–182]. Our goal is to allocate load among the agents, provided that the secret data of each agent is a single positive real number: the cost they incur per unit load. In such a setting the payment is given after the load completion, therefore if a positive load is assigned to an agent, we are able to verify if the agent declared to be faster than she actually is. We design truthful mechanisms when the agents’ type sets are upper-bounded by a finite value. We provide a truthful mechanism that is cdot operator(1+epsilon (Porson))-approximate if the underlying algorithm is c-approximate and weakly-monotone. Moreover, if type sets are also discrete, we provide a truthful mechanism preserving the approximation ratio of its algorithmic part. Our results improve the existing ones which provide truthful mechanisms dealing only with finite type sets and do not preserve the approximation ratio of the underlying algorithm. Finally, we give applications for our payment schemes. Firstly, we give a full characterization of the View the MathML source problem by using our techniques. Even if our payment schemes need upper-bounded type sets, every instance of View the MathML source can be “mapped” into an instance with upper-bounded type sets preserving the approximation ratio. In conclusion, we turn our attention to binary demand games. In particular, we show that the Minimum Radius Spanning Tree admits an exact truthful mechanism with verification achieving time (and space) complexity of the fastest centralized algorithm for it. This contrasts with a recent truthful mechanism for the same problem [G. Proietti, P. Widmayer, A truthful mechanism for the non-utilitarian minimum radius spanning tree problem, in: Proceedings of the 17th ACM Symposium on Parallelism in Algorithms and Architectures, SPAA, ACM Press, 2005, pp. 195–202] which pays a linear factor with respect to the complexity of the fastest centralized algorithm. Such a result is extended to several binary demand games studied in literature
Aggregation and consensus in multiobjective and multiperson decision making
No full textThe subject of the paper is related with the decision making problems with several objectives and a
committee of experts. Models for aggregating opinions of experts and consensus reaching on the
alternatives with respect to different objectives are presented. A modeling in a metric space is
studied and a game theoretic interpretation is introduced. In this framework a procedure for
monitoring and enhancing consensus is considered.
Keywords: Multiobjective decision making; aggregation; consensus; cooperative games; metric
spaces
An Application of the Analytic Hierarchy/Network Process to Enhancing Consensus in Multiagent Decision Making
No full text
The intertemporal choice behaviour: Classical and alternative delay discounting models and control techniques
No full textHyperbolic discounting refers to the tendency for people to increasingly choose a smaller-sooner reward over a larger-later reward as the delay occurs sooner rather than later in time. When offered a larger reward in exchange for waiting a set amount of time, people act less impulsively (i.e., choose to wait) as the rewards happen further in the future. Put another way, people avoid waiting more as the wait nears the present time
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