283 research outputs found
Oggetti, non domande: la proposta filosofica del Manifesto del nuovo realismo di Maurizio Ferraris
No full textIn questo articolo presento i contenuti del Manifesto del nuovo realismo di Maurizio Ferraris. Dopo una disamina dei contenuti e una illustrazione sia della pars construens sia della pars destruens del Manifesto, cerco di valutarlo criticamente. Alla pars destruens si può obiettare che la ricostruzione usa una definizione non neutrale di «ontologia» e, parlando di spettacolarizzazione, presenta un punto di vista troppo pessimista sull’accesso all’informazione. Per quanto riguarda la pars costruens pongo invece il seguente interrogativo: la proposta filosofica di Ferraris si può ancora considerare filosofia? Se è così, perchè è così difficile benificiare di que- sti insegnamenti in una facoltà di filosofia
Ought implies can : counter-examples and intentions
No full textPublished online: 06 April 2017The paper tackles Ought Implies Can (OIC) from a slightly different angle compared to the one that is often adopted in the contemporary OIC sub-debates. I am mainly concerned with the thought according to which, even if the action we ought to do is impossible, it is still possible to intend to do it. This possibility of intending is used as a strategy to rescue OIC from possible counter-examples. I explore two different ways to rescue the principle: (i) OIC rescue by implicating intending in action and (ii) OIC rescue by separation, and show they both face problems
Dovere implica potere a tutela dei diritti?
No full textIn questo breve lavoro presento un’estensione della tesi “dovere implica potere” capace di andare oltre il classico ad impossibilia nemo tenetur e in grado di essere utilizzata anche a tutela dei diritti fondamentali e dei diritti sociali.
Per fare questo presento la tesi “dovere implica potere”, la sua relazione con ad impossibilia nemo tenetur e le interpretazioni che si possono rinvenire nella letteratura (gius)filosofica relativa ai suoi utilizzi
Meta-meta-institutional Concepts? A Tale on Schwyzer and the Force of Technical Ends (Live from Ruritania)
No full textThe paper is a critical analysis of Hubert Schwyzer’s idea of meta-institutional
concepts. First, I isolate a presupposition in Schwyzer’s example of chess as ritual. I then show how Schwyzer’s idea of meta-institutional concepts is far from being the endgame in the research on levels of institutionality. In fact, we can iterate
on meta-institutional concepts. Schwyzer’s idea has to face an infinite regress. I
try to avoid such a regress by introducing the concept of technical end of game. A
game defines its own terminal status. People playing the game can then attach different meanings to this norm-dependent terminal status. Hence, meta-institutional
concepts are not conditions of possibility: they belong to pragmatics, not to an extra ontological layer. I conclude the paper sketching a classification of games
based on different kinds of technical ends and I advocate the need to adopt a pluralistic conception on games and practices
Quattro tipi di paranomia [Four kinds of paranomy]
No full textIn this paper, I inquire into the concept of paranomy (hinted at by Georg Henrik von Wright and developed by Amedeo Giovanni Conte) by distinguishing four kinds of paranomy. The main question of the paper is: how can worldly situations determine an incompatibility between two norms that are not in an antinomic relation? What are the ways of normative incompatibility due to the Sein? In order to address these questions, I inquiry into four different ways in which the Sein can make the norms interact, determining incompatibilities between them. These four ways determine four kinds of paranomy
Marcel van Ackeren and Michael Kühler (eds.), The Limits of Moral Obligation: Moral Demandingness and Ought Implies Can (New York: Routledge, 2016), pp. ix + 210
No full textThe "Ought'' Implies "Can'' Principle : A Challenge to Collective Intentionality
No full textIn my paper I investigate collective intentionality (CI ) through the “Ought” implies “Can” (OIC )
principle. My leading question is does OIC impose any further requirement on CI ? In answering the
challenge inside a Searlean framework, I realize that we need to clarify what CI 's structure is and
what kind of role the agents joining a CI -act have. In the last part of the paper, I put forward an
(inverted) Hartian framework to allow the Searlean CI theory to be agent sensitive and cope with
the problems that emerged
Network Analysis Formalism and the Construction of a Traceability System for Payments : a Sketch of its Legal and Sociological Aspects
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