1,721,476 research outputs found

    Intellectual Property Rights and Development

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    Edited by Mario Cimoli, Giovanni Dosi, Keith E. Maskus, Ruth L. Okediji, Jerome H. Reichman, and Joseph E. Stiglitz: + Offers a comprehensive discussion of the role of Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) and their relation with innovative activities from a historical perspective + In-depth analysis of the current IPR regime and its impact on catching up countries + Proposes effective alternatives to the current IPR system heavily biased toward patents and copyright

    On the Evolutionary and Behavioral Theories of Organizations: A Tentative Roadmap

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    Cyert and March’s A Behavioral Theory of the Firm has been acknowledged as one of the most fundamental pillars on which evolutionary theorizing in economics is built. Nelson and Winter’s 1982 book is pervaded by the philosophy and concepts previously developed by Cyert, March, and Simon. Behavioral notions, such as bounded rationality are also at the heart of economic theories of institutions such as transaction costs economics. In this paper, after briefly reviewing the basic concepts of evolutionary economics, we discuss its implications for the theory of organizations (and business firms in particular), and we suggest that evolutionary theory should coherently embrace an “embeddedness” view of organizations, whereby the latter are not simply efficient solutions to informational problems arising from contract incompleteness and uncertainty, but also shape the “visions of the world,” interaction networks, behavioral patterns, and the identity of the agents. After outlining the basic features of this perspective, we analyze its consequences and empirical relevance

    The dynamics of organizational structures and performances under diverging distributions of knowledge and different power structures

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    In this work we analyze the characteristics and dynamics of organizations wherein members diverge in terms of capabilities and visions they hold, and interests which they pursue. How does society put together such distributed and possibly coflicting knowledge? The question is Hayekian in its emphasis on the distributed features of the latter. However, our analytical point of departure is quite anti-Hayekian in that it focuses on how organizations aggregate and put to use such knowledge by means of different combinations among power of allocation of decisions and exercise of authority. Together, organizational power shapes the very preferences of organizational members. More specifically, we study the efficiency of different balances between the three foregoing mechanisms. In all that, organization for sure aggregate and make compatible different pieces of distributed knowledge, but the causation arrow goes also the other way round: organizations shape the characteristics and distribution of knowledge itself, and of the micro visions and judgements

    Division of Labor, Organizational Coordination and Market Mechanisms in Collective Problem-Solving

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    This paper builds upon a view of economic organizations as problem-solving arrangements and presents a simple model of adaptive problem-solving driven by trial-and-error learning and collective selection. Institutional structures and, in particular, their degree of decentralization, determine which solutions are tried out and undergo selection. It is shown that if the design problem at hand is “complex” (in terms of interdependencies between the elements of the system), then a decentralized institutional structure is unlikely ever to generate optimal solutions and, therefore, no selection process can ever select them.We also show that nearly-decomposable structures have, in general, a selective advantage in terms of speed in reaching (good) locally optimal solutions
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