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Sovereignty's promise:the state as fiduciary /
No full textArguing that the state and its people stand in a fiduciary relationship, 'Sovereignty's Promise' puts forward an account of political authority and its legal limits. In doing so it presents an argument for common law constitutionalism and a theoretical framework for understanding the requirements of the rule of law
Sovereignty's promise: The state as fiduciary
Get PDFThe subject of this thesis is the justification of sovereignty, legal order and the rule of law. That justification, I argue, is best articulated within a vision of the state as an entrusted and authorised fiduciary of each person subject to its powers. As fiduciary, the state is authorised to exercise public powers for the purpose of securing and administering legal order. But because this authorisation---the state's legal authority---flows from a fiduciary relationship with those subject to it, state authority is encumbered with an overarching obligation to use public powers exclusively for the public good. Seeing the state as fiduciary explains its authority to legislate, conduct administration, adjudicate and otherwise guarantee legal order. The fiduciary relationship also explains the default limits of that authority, limits which constitute the rule of law and manifest themselves as free-standing public duties such as fairness and reasonableness. Those common law duties guarantee that exercises of public power necessarily take place within an institutional legal framework that locates its legitimacy in the fiduciary principle's authorisation of it. When exercises of public power conform to the demands of this authorisation---the demands of the rule of law, of fairness and reasonableness---they respect the autonomy and dignity of the persons in whom the fiduciary justification of public authority ultimately lies.Ph.D
Democratizing Common Law Constitutionalism
No full textCommon law constitutionalism is the theory that legal principles such as fairness and equality reside within the common law, are constitutive of legality, and inform (or should inform) statutory interpretation on judicial review. This article looks to Justice Rand’s judgment in Roncarelli v. Duplessis to develop a democratic and relational conception of common law constitutionalism. By “democratic” the author means a version of the theory that governs judicial review but which is available to frontline decision makers independently of the history and contemporary practice of review. By “relational” the author means a theory that presupposes a trust-like and legally significant relationship between public authorities and the persons subject to their power.Under the democratic and relational theory, the legality of administrative action is assessed in light of legal principles constitutive of the trust-like relationship and without reference to the separation of powers. These principles flow from the trust-like nature of the relationship and the implications of working out how public authorities can hold discretionary power over individuals without subjecting them to domination or instrumentalization.Le constitutionnalisme de common law est la théorie selon laquelle les principes juridiques tels que l’équité et l’égalité résident dans la common law, sont constitutifs de la légalité et guident (ou devraient guider) l’interprétation des lois lors du contrôle judiciaire. Cet article se base sur le jugement du juge Rand dans l’affaire Roncarelli c. Duplessis pour développer une conception démocratique et relationnelle du constitutionnalisme de common law. Par « démocratique », l’auteur entend une version de la théorie qui gouverne le contrôle judiciaire mais qui est mise à la disposition des principaux décideurs indépendamment de l’histoire ou de la pratique contemporaine du contrôle. Par « relationnelle », l’auteur entend une théorie qui présuppose une relation quasi-fiduciaire et significative d’un point de vue juridique entre les autorités publiques et les personnes qui sont assujetties à leur pouvoir.Selon la théorie démocratique et relationnelle, la légalité de l’action administrative est examinée à la lumière des principes juridiques constitutifs de la relation quasi-fiduciaire et sans faire référence à la séparation des pouvoirs. Ces principes sont issus non seulement de la nature quasi-fiduciaire de la relation, mais aussi de la recherche d’une façon pour les autorités publiques de détenir un pouvoir discrétionnaire sur les individus sans toutefois les assujettir à la domination ou à l’instrumentalisation
A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens
No full textIn international law, the term "jus cogens" (literally, "compelling law") refers to norms that command peremptory authority, superseding conflicting treaties and custom. The influential Restatement on Foreign Relations of the United States (Restatement) defines jus cogens to include, at a minimum, the prohibitions against genocide; slavery or slave trade; murder or disappearance of individuals; torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; prolonged arbitrary detention; systematic racial discrimination; and "the principles of the United Nations Charter prohibiting the use of force." Jus cogens norms are considered peremptory in the sense that they are mandatory, do not admit derogation, and can be modified only by general international norms of equivalent authority
Rethinking the Process/Substance Distinction: Baker v. Canada
No full textThe authors argue that in Baker v. Canada, the Supreme Court of Canada set out a unified theory of judicial review which seeks to rest review on substantive ideals related to fundamental values such as human rights and the best interests of children. The Court's reliance on substantive criteria to guide review places stress on the traditional process/substance distinction under which reviewing courts would generally review procedural matters with some intensity, but would resist reviewing the substance or merits of a decision with the same intensity. The authors argue that the newfound stress on the process/substance distinction is welcome, and to some extent can be mitigated, because the reasons underlying review of procedure equally justify review of cases in which human rights and other fundamental values are at stake
The Fiduciary Constitution of Human Rights
Get PDFWe argue that human rights are best conceived as norms arising from a fiduciary relationship that exists between states (or statelike actors) and the citizens and noncitizens subject to their power. These norms draw on a Kantian conception of moral personhood, protecting agents from instrumentalization and domination. They do not, however, exist in the abstract as timeless natural rights. Instead, they are correlates of the state’s fiduciary duty to provide equal security under the rule of law, a duty that flows from the state’s institutional assumption of irresistible sovereign powers
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