1,355,157 research outputs found
Dynamics of Network Formation Processes in the Co-Author Model
Full text linkThis article studies the dynamics in the formation processes of a mutual consent network in game theory setting: the Co-Author Model. In this article, a limited observation is applied and analytical results are derived. Then, 2 parameters are varied: the number of individuals in the network and the initial probability of the links in the network in its initial state. A simulation result shows a finding that is consistent with an analytical result for a state of equilibrium while it also shows different possible equilibria.Dynamics, Network, Game Theory, Model,Simulation, Equilibrium, Complexity
The rational weakness of strong ties: Failure of Group Solidarity in a Highly Cohesive Group of Rational Agents
Full text linkRecent research (Flache, 1996; Flache and Macy, 1996) suggests a "weakness of strong ties." Cohesive social networks may undermine group solidarity, rather than sustain it. In the original analysis, simulations showed that adaptive actors learn cooperation in bilateral exchanges faster than cooperation in more complex group exchanges, favoring ties at the expense of the common good. This article uses game theory to demonstrate that cognitive simplicity is not a scope condition for the result. The game theoretical analysis identifies a new condition for the failure of group solidarity in a cohesive group. Task uncertainty may make rational cooperation increasingly inefficient in common good production. Accordingly, rational actors may increasingly sacrifice benefits from common good production in order to maintain social ties, as their dependence on peer approval rises.
The rational weakness of strong ties: Failure of group solidarity in a highly cohesive group of rational agents
No full textRecent research (Flache 1996; Flache and Macy 1996) suggests a "weakness of strong ties." Cohesive social networks may undermine group solidarity, rather than sustain it. In the original analysis, simulations showed that adaptive actors learn cooperation in bilateral exchanges faster than cooperation in more complex group exchanges, favoring ties at the expense of the common good. This article uses game theory to demonstrate that cognitive simplicity is not a scope condition for the result. The game theoretical analysis identifies a new condition for the failure of group solidarity in a cohesive group. Task uncertainty may make rational cooperation increasingly inefficient in common good production. Accordingly, rational actors may increasingly sacrifice benefits from common good production in order to maintain social ties, as their dependence on peer approval rises
Solidarity in collaboration networks when everyone competes for the strongest partner: a stochastic actor-based simulation model
Full text linkThis article examines the emergence of solidarity from interactions between professionals competing for collaboration. Research on multiplex collaboration networks has shown that economic exchange can elicit solidarity when mediated by trust but did not consider the effect of competition. To fill this gap, we built an agent-based model that simulates the evolution of a multiplex network of collaboration, trust, and support expectations. Simulations show that while resource heterogeneity is key for collaboration, competition for attractive collaboration partners penalizes low-resource professionals, who are less connected and highly segregated. Heterogeneous resource distribution can trigger segregation because of preferential selection of resourceful peers and reciprocity. Interestingly, we also found that low-resource professionals can reduce their marginalization by building in-group mutual support expectations
Does Competition Always Undermine solidarity? Cohesion and Integration of Support Networks among Business Partners
No full textThis study aims to understand the consequences of competition between collaborating partners on the emergence of solidarity relations. Previous research has suggested that peers engaging in successful economic exchanges, e.g. professional collaboration between independent workers, can develop expectations of social support that eventually give rise to mutual solidarity (Bianchi et al. 2017; see also Molm et al. 2007, 2009; Kuwabara 2011). This can occur via the formation of trust based on experiences of successful cooperation, which in turn fosters confidence in receiving social support. Yet, this mechanism may hinge upon the beneficial condition of absence of competition among partners, i.e., a complication that previous research has not yet explored theoretically.
Here, we modelled a network of independent economic agents with a mix of incentives for competition and cooperation. Potential collaboration partners often compete over highest-skilled or most attractive partners, due to the unequal distribution of cognitive or material resources in a network. To understand if heterogeneity between actors may influence the structure of solidarity relations, we developed a computational model that derives the dynamics of network structure from interdependent actions of economic agents. We conducted experiments that vary heterogeneity of the distribution of both resource endowment and need for support between agents.
To look at network dynamics, we are drawing on an adaptation of the computational modelling component of Snijders’ Stochastic Actor-Based Model (1996; see also Snijders & Steglich 2015). Our model includes a multiplex network of interdependent dynamics of three types of networks, including relations of collaboration, trust and social support expectations. Our computational experiments allowed us to study effects of heterogeneity on the connectivity and integration of the emergent social support networks.
Preliminary results show that competition in collaboration is detrimental for the connectivity of the emergent social support network if resource heterogeneity is sufficiently high. Moreover, the emergent networks are highly segregated along differences in resource levels. This gives rise to a core-periphery structure in which resource rich actors find the most attractive partners to relate to. However, once heterogeneity in need for support is added, the effect of resource heterogeneity is neutralized by a ‘double-edge’ effect of heterogeneity on social support relations. Resource poor but needy actors establish mutual help relations due to their stronger social activity in search for attractive partners, which makes them less peripheral in the emergent network than without heterogeneity in neediness. Finally, in our model resource inequality can also generate networks where the level of integration between high- and low-resource agents is similar to what is produced in absence of competition
Understanding the Joint Effects of Interdependence and Diversity on Solidarity in Work Teams
Full text linkReply: Collective Action and the Empirical Content of Stochastic Learning Models
Full text linkWe are grateful for the opportunity that Bendor, Diermeier, and Ting
(hereafter BDT) have provided to address important questions about the
empirical content of learning theoretic solutions to the collective action
problem. They discuss two well-known classes of adaptive models—
stochastic learning models like that of Bush and Mosteller (1955) that
have been applied to collective action and social exchange (Macy 1990,
1991a, 1991b, 1993; Macy and Flache 2002; Flache and Macy 2002) and
theories of satisficing in organizational behavior advanced by Simon
(1955) and Cyert and March (1963).
According to Popper (1974, p. 986), when ad hoc assumptions are introduced
“to explain a particular difficulty” and these assumptions “cannot
be tested independently,” the theory is immunized from refutation. A
theory that can explain anything can explain nothing, hence it lacks empirical
content. Popper pointed to Darwinism as an example of a theory
that is “almost tautological” (Popper 1978). Consequentialist explanations—
such as those based on rational choice, natural selection, or reinforcement
learning—lack empirical content when any outcome can be
explained by proposing some preference, fitness, or aspiration that cannot
be tested independently of the outcomes they explain.
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