262,507 research outputs found
Corporate Governance in IPOs
Full text linkIt is increasingly recognized in the management literature that the initial public off ering
(IPO) is an important stage in the life cycle of privately held and entrepreneurial fi rms.
At this critical juncture, a fi rm has overcome the fi rst challenges of its entrepreneurial
phase and entered a growth stage. As Fama and French ( 2004 : 229) emphasize, an IPO
“is the point of entry that gives fi rms expanded access to equity capital, allowing them to
emerge and grow.” An IPO can provide an entrepreneurial fi rm with critical resources
for its future expansion. It can also provide the entrepreneur with the fi rst substantive
access to cash from their investment of time and resources in the entrepreneurial eff ort.
Despite the growing awareness of the importance of IPOs among both academics and
the investor community, the process by which a privately held fi rm transforms itself into
a publicly traded company is still not well understood. While numerous studies have
investigated the determinants of the going public decision (e.g. Booth and Smith, 1986 ;
Jain and Kini, 1999 ) and post-issue performance (e.g. Beatty and Ritter, 1986 ; Brav,
Geczy, and Gompers, 2000 ; Espenlaub and Tonks, 1998 ; Michaely and Shaw, 1994 ), there
is relatively little research on the related but equally important issue of what factors
infl uence the corporate governance mechanism of a fi rm at IPO stage, and how the specifi
c characteristics of this mechanism such as board composition, executive incentives,
and ownership interests of private equity investors may aff ect the IPO’s performance
Founder retention as CEO at IPO in emerging economies: the role of private equity owners and national institutions
Full text linkWe integrate the institutional perspective with research on the governance role of private equity firms in an investigation of Founder-CEO successions in Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) in emerging markets. Using a unique, hand-collected and comprehensive sample of 191 firms having undertaken IPOs in 21 markets across the African continent between January 2000 and August 2016, we apply instrumental variable (IV) Probit methodology and find that higher levels ofprivate equity ownership are positively associated with the probability of the founder's retention as CEO, especially in the context of low-quality formal institutions. Further, in societies with high tribalism, higher private equity ownership is associated with an increased likelihood of founder retention. Voids in the institutional architecture underscore the importance of the founder as akey organizational resource for the firm and a source of institutionalized legitimacy, which in turn confers on the firm an ability to access required resources
Venture capitalists, business angels, and performance of entrepreneurial IPOs in the UK and France
No full textUsing a unique sample of 444 entrepreneurial IPOs in the UK and France, this paper analyses the investment patterns and the stock-market performance effects of two types of early stage investors: venture capitalists (VCs) and business angels (BAs). Extending existing research, we identify important endogeneity and institutional effects. Our findings indicate that UK IPOs have a higher retained ownership and lower participation ratio by BAs, but a lower retained ownership and participation ratio by VCs than in France. BA and VC investments are substitutes, and they are endogenously determined by a number of firm- and founder-related factors, such as founder ownership and external board 'interlocks', and underwriter reputation. UK VCs are effective third-party certifying agents who reduce underpricing in UK IPOs, whereas in French IPOs they increase it by appearing to engage in grandstanding. This certification effect is more significant in UK IPOs involving both high VC and BA ownership. Finally, underpricing increases with VC participation ratio, where the higher exit of VCs seems to increase the risk premium required by outside investors, in particular in the UK. © 2007 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.AERNOUDT R, 2001, BUSINESS ANGELS MAGA; BARRY CB, 1990, J FINANC ECON, V27, P447, DOI 10.1016-0304-405X(90)90064-7; ARMOUR J, 2006, IN PRESS OXFORD EC P; BAKER M, 2003, J LAW ECON, V46, P1097; BHAGAT S, 2004, UNPUB DETERMINANTS I; BIRLEY S, 2000, BLACKWELL HDB ENTERP; Black BS, 1998, J FINANC ECON, V47, P243, DOI 10.1016-S0304-405X(97)00045-7; Certo ST, 2001, STRATEGIC MANAGE J, V22, P641, DOI 10.1002-smj.182; CHAHINE S, 2006, IN PRESS INT REV FIN; CHAHINE S, 2005, VENTURE CAPITALISTS; CUMMING DJ, 2006, IN PRESS J CORPORATE; CUMMING DJ, 2003, CONTRACTS EXITS VENT; CUMMINGS DJ, 2004, LEGALITY VENTURE GOV; EHRLICH SB, 1994, J BUS VENTURING, V9, P67, DOI 10.1016-0883-9026(94)90027-2; Espenlaub S., 1999, VENTURE CAPITAL INT, V11, P325, DOI 10.1080-136910699295848; *EVCA, 2003, EVCA YB 2003; FIET JO, 1995, J MANAGE STUD, V32, P551, DOI 10.1111-j.1467-6486.1995.tb00788.x; Filatotchev I, 2006, SMALL BUS ECON, V26, P337, DOI 10.1007-s11187-005-2051-3; Filatotchev I., 2005, LIFE CYCLE CORPORATE; FILATOTCHEV I, 2002, STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT, V28, P941; FRANCIS B, 2000, UNDERPRICING VENTURE; FREEAR J, 1994, J BUS VENTURING, V9, P109, DOI 10.1016-0883-9026(94)90004-3; Giudici G., 2004, RISE FALL EUROPES NE; Goergen M, 2006, J BUS FINAN ACCOUNT, V33, P79, DOI 10.1111-j.1468-5957.2006.00657.x; GOMPERS PA, 1995, J FINANC, V50, P1461; GORMAN M, 1989, J BUS VENTURING, V4, P231, DOI 10.1016-0883-9026(89)90014-1; Granlund M, 1996, BRIT J DEV DISABIL, V42, P1; Habib MA, 2001, REV FINANC STUD, V14, P433, DOI 10.1093-rfs-14.2.433; Hellmann G, 2002, INT POLITIK, V57, P1; HOCHBERG YV, 2003, VENTURE CAPITAL CORP; Jelic R, 2005, J BUS FINAN ACCOUNT, V32, P643, DOI 10.1111-j.0306-686X.2005.00608.x; Jeng Leslie A., 2000, J CORP FINANC, V6, P241, DOI DOI 10.1016-S0929-1199(00)00003-1; JENSEN MC, 1976, J FINANC ECON, V3, P305, DOI 10.1016-0304-405X(76)90026-X; Johnson S, 2000, AM ECON REV, V90, P22, DOI 10.1257-aer.90.2.22; KAPLAN S, 2004, LEGAL DIFFERENCES LE; Kaplan SN, 2003, REV ECON STUD, V70, P281, DOI 10.1111-1467-937X.00245; LaPorta R, 1997, J FINANC, V52, P1131; Larcker D. F., 2005, USE INSTRUMENTAL VAR; LEE PM, 2003, AC MAN ANN C SEATTL; LELAND HE, 1977, J FINANC, V32, P371, DOI 10.2307-2326770; Lerner J., 1999, VENTURE CAPITAL CYCL; LERNER J, 1995, J FINANC, V50, P301, DOI 10.2307-2329247; Lerner J, 1998, J BANK FINANC, V22, P773, DOI 10.1016-S0378-4266(98)00043-0; LERNER J, 1994, FINANC MANAGE, V23, P16, DOI 10.2307-3665618; Lins KV, 2003, J FINANC QUANT ANAL, V38, P159, DOI 10.2307-4126768; Lockett A, 2001, OMEGA-INT J MANAGE S, V29, P375, DOI 10.1016-S0305-0483(01)00024-X; Lockett A, 2002, RES POLICY, V31, P1009, DOI 10.1016-S0048-7333(01)00174-3; Macmillan I.C., 1985, J BUSINESS VENTURING, V1, P119, DOI DOI 10.1016-0883-9026(85)90011-4; Manigart S., 2000, EUROPEAN FINANCIAL M, V6, P389, DOI 10.1111-1468-036X.00130; MEGGINSON W, 1991, J FINANC, V96, P879; Prowse S, 1998, J BANK FINANC, V22, P785, DOI 10.1016-S0378-4266(98)00044-2; RINDERMAN G, 2003, VENTURE CAPITALIST P; RITTER JR, 1984, J FINANC, V39, P1231, DOI 10.2307-2327627; Sapienza HJ, 1996, J BUS VENTURING, V11, P439, DOI 10.1016-S0883-9026(96)00052-3; SAPIENZA HJ, 1994, ACAD MANAGE J, V37, P1618, DOI 10.2307-256802; van Osnabrugge M., 1998, ENTREP THEORY PRACT, V22, P23; Wong A., 2002, ANGEL FINANCE OTHER; Wright M, 2003, J MANAGE STUD, V40, P2073, DOI 10.1046-j.1467-6486.2003.00412.x; Wright M., 1998, J BUSINESS FINANCE A, V25, P521, DOI 10.1111-1468-5957.00201; Zahra S. A., 2004, J MANAGE STUD, V41, P88330282
Corporate governance and financial constraints on strategic turnarounds
Full text linkThe paper extends the Robbins and Pearce (1992) two-stage turnaround response model to include governance factors. In addition to the retrenchment and recovery, the paper proposes the addition of a realignment stage, referring specifically to the re-alignment of expectations of principal and agent groups. The realignment stage imposes a threshold that must be crossed before the retrenchment and hence recovery stage can be entered. Crossing this threshold is problematic to the extent that the interests of governance-stakeholder groups diverge in a crisis situation. The severity of the crisis impacts on the bases of strategy contingent asset valuation leading to the fragmentation of stakeholder interests. In some cases the consequence may be that management are prevented from carrying out turnarounds by governance constraints. The paper uses a case study to illustrate these dynamics, and like the Robbins and Pearce study, it focuses on the textile industry. A longitudinal approach is used to show the impact of the removal of governance constraints. The empirical evidence suggests that such financial constraints become less serious to the extent that there is a functioning market for corporate control. Building on governance research and turnaround literature, the paper also outlines the general case necessary and sufficient conditions for successful turnarounds
Building Perceived Quality of Founder-Involved IPO Firms: Founders' Effects on Board Selection and Stock Market Performance
No full textResearch on governance has focused on large corporations, giving far less attention to smaller and younger companies especially those moving from founder-controlled start-ups to professionally managed public companies. Emphasizing founder-involved firms (i.e., firms that are floated by their original founders), this article examines interlinks between founders' prestige and selection of inside and outside directors, and short-term performance measured in terms of IPO underpricing. The results provide evidence of positive association between founders' and directors' prestige, but there is substitution between inside and outside directors' prestige. Top management team's external board experiences reduce IPO underpricing. © 2009 Baylor University.AMIT R, 1990, MANAGE SCI, V36, P1232; BARRY CB, 1990, J FINANC ECON, V27, P447, DOI 10.1016-0304-405X(90)90064-7; Arthurs JD, 2008, ACAD MANAGE J, V51, P277; BEATTY RP, 1986, J FINANC ECON, V15, P213, DOI 10.1016-0304-405X(86)90055-3; BEATTY RP, 1994, ADMIN SCI QUART, V39, P313, DOI 10.2307-2393238; Brennan MJ, 1997, J FINANC ECON, V45, P391, DOI 10.1016-S0304-405X(97)00022-6; Brooks C., 2002, INTRO ECONOMETRICS F; Carpenter MA, 2003, STRATEGIC MANAGE J, V24, P803, DOI 10.1002-smj.338; CARTER R, 1990, J FINANC, V45, P1045, DOI 10.2307-2328714; Certo ST, 2003, ACAD MANAGE REV, V28, P432; Certo T. S., 2001, ENTREP THEORY PRACT, V25, P33; CHAHINE S, 2008, J MULTINATIONAL FINA, V18, P180, DOI 10.1016-j.mulfin.2007.08.001; Chahine S, 2007, J BUS FINAN ACCOUNT, V34, P505, DOI 10.1111-j.1468-5957.2007.02045.x; Chahine S., 2004, FINANCIAL MARKETS PO, V18, P143, DOI 10.1007-s11408-004-0203-0; Coakley J, 2009, EUR J FINANC, V15, P421, DOI 10.1080-13518470802560915; Cohen BD, 2005, STRATEGIC MANAGE J, V26, P683, DOI 10.1002-smj.463; Daily C. M., 1992, J SMALL BUS MANAGE, V30, P25; Daily CM, 2003, ENTREP THEORY PRACT, V27, P271, DOI 10.1111-1540-8520.t01-1-00004; Deeds D. L., 1998, ENTREP THEORY PRACT, V22, P55; Filatotchev I., 2008, GLOBAL FINANCE J, V18, P351, DOI 10.1016-j.gfj.2007.03.001; Filatotchev I, 2002, STRATEGIC MANAGE J, V23, P941, DOI 10.1002-smj.269; Finkle T.A., 1998, ENTREP THEORY PRACT, V22, P5; Ford R. H., 1988, ENTREP THEORY PRACT, P49; Geletkanycz MA, 1997, ADMIN SCI QUART, V42, P654, DOI 10.2307-2393653; Higgins MC, 2006, STRATEGIC MANAGE J, V27, P1, DOI 10.1002-smj.495; Higgins MC, 2003, ORGAN SCI, V14, P244, DOI 10.1287-orsc.14.2.244.15160; Jain BA, 2001, J BUS RES, V52, P223, DOI 10.1016-S0148-2963(99)00112-5; Jayraman N., 2000, STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT, V21, P1215; Loughran T., 2003, WHY HAS IPO UNDERPRI; MCBAIN ML, 1989, J BUS VENTURING, V4, P419, DOI 10.1016-0883-9026(89)90011-6; MICHAELY R, 1994, REV FINANC STUD, V7, P279, DOI 10.1093-rfs-7.2.279; Mikkelson WH, 1997, J FINANC ECON, V44, P281, DOI 10.1016-S0304-405X(97)00006-8; Nelson T, 2003, STRATEGIC MANAGE J, V24, P707, DOI 10.1002-smj.328; O'Brien RM, 2007, QUAL QUANT, V41, P673, DOI 10.1007-s11135-006-9018-6; PFEFFER J, 1972, ACAD MANAGE J, V15, P317, DOI 10.2307-254856; Ritter JR, 2002, J FINANC, V57, P1795, DOI 10.1111-1540-6261.00478; Sanders G. W., 2004, STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT, V25, P167; Staiger D, 1997, ECONOMETRICA, V65, P557, DOI 10.2307-2171753; Steier L, 2000, ORGAN STUD, V21, P163, DOI 10.1177-0170840600211002; Welbourne TM, 1996, ACAD MANAGE J, V39, P891, DOI 10.2307-256716; WILLARD GE, 1992, J BUS VENTURING, V7, P181, DOI 10.1016-0883-9026(92)90025-M; Zajac EJ, 1996, ADMIN SCI QUART, V41, P507, DOI 10.2307-239394064
Network positioning and R&D activity: a study of Italian groups
No full textNetwork positioning and R&D activity: a study of Italian group
Exporting Activity in Transitional Economies: An Enterprise-Level Study
No full textThis study represents the first enterprise level analysis of the determinants of exporting in transitional economies, and focuses on privatised manufacturing firms in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. Employing models developed from the existing literature on enterprise-level trade, results derived from longitudinal data suggest that the most important influences on a firm's decision to export are company size and the non-monotonic, curvilinear influence of managerial ownership and control. Comparisons are made with studies of less developed countries.Enterprise-Level Analysis, Transitional Economies, Exports, Trade,
Darwinism, organizational evolution and survival: key challenges for future research
No full textHow do social organizations evolve? How do they adapt to environmental pressures? What resources and capabilities determine their survival within dynamic competition? Charles Darwin’s seminal work The Origin of Species (1859) has provided a significant impact on the development of the management and organization theory literatures on organizational evolution. This article introduces the JMG Special Issue focused on Darwinism, organizational evolution and survival. We discuss key themes in the organizational evolution research that have emerged in recent years. These include the increasing adoption of the co-evolutionary approach, with a particular focus on the definition of appropriate units of analysis, such as routines, and related challenges associated with exploring the relationship between co-evolution, re-use of knowledge, adaptation, and exaptation processes. We then introduce the three articles that we have finally accepted in this Special Issue after an extensive, multi-round, triple blind-review process. We briefly outline how each of these articles contributes to understanding among scholars, practitioners and policy makers of the continuous evolutionary processes within and among social organizations and systems
FDI by Firms from Newly Industrialized Economies in Emerging Markets: Corporate Governance, Entry Mode and Location
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