1,721,003 research outputs found
Indicative conditionals, restricted quantification, and naive truth
Full text linkThis paper extends Kripke’s theory of truth to a language with a variably strict conditional operator, of the kind that Stalnaker and others have used to represent ordinary indicative conditionals of English. It then shows how to combine this with a different and independently motivated conditional operator, to get a substantial logic of restricted quantification within naive truth theory
Indicative conditionals, restricted quantification, and naive truth
No full textThis paper extends Kripke’s theory of truth to a language with a variably strict conditional operator, of the kind that Stalnaker and others have used to represent ordinary indicative conditionals of English. It then shows how to combine this with a different and independently motivated conditional operator, to get a substantial logic of restricted quantification within naive truth theory
Well-Behaved Truth
Full text linkCommon-sense reasoning with truth involves both (i) the use of classical logic and (ii) the assumption of the transparency of truth (the equivalence between a sentence and the attribution of truth to it). The semantic paradoxes show that at least one of these must go, and different theorists make different choices. But whatever one’s choice, it’s valuable to carve out one or more domains where common sense reasoning ((i) and (ii) together) can be safely used; domains where everything is well-behaved. The paper explores adding a predicate of well-behavedness to various truth theories, both classical and nonclassical (including non-classical theories with special conditionals). With such a predicate, one can reason more easily, and formulate important generalizations that are unavailable without such a predicate. The paper explores general model-theoretic techniques that can be applied to both classical and non-classical theories of truth to get corresponding accounts of well-behaved truth, and some of the important generalizations that such model theories validate. It has incidental remarks about axiomatic theories that might be associated with the model theories, and their proof-theoretic strength
What Is Logical Validity
No full textWhat are people who disagree about logic disagreeing about? The paper argues that (in a wide range of cases) they are primarily disagreeing about how to regulate their degrees of belief. An analogy is drawn between beliefs about validity and beliefs about chance: both sorts of belief serve primarily to regulate degrees of belief about other matters, but in both cases the concepts have a kind of objectivity nonetheless
Going Beyond Counting First Authors in Author Co-citation Analysis
Full text linkThe present study examines one of the fundamental aspects of author co-citation analysis (ACA) - the way co-citation
counts are defined. Co-citation counting provides the data on which all subsequent statistical analyses and mappings
are based, and we compare ACA results based on two different types of co-citation counting - the traditional type that
only counts the first one among a cited work's authors on the one hand and a non-traditional type that takes into
account the first 5 authors of a cited work on the other hand. Results indicate that the picture produced through this non-traditional author co-citation counting contains more coherent author groups and is therefore considerably clearer. However, this picture represents fewer specialties in the research field being studied than that produced through the traditional first-author co-citation counting when the same number of top-ranked authors is selected and analyzed. Reasons for these effects are discussed
Naive truth and restricted quantification: saving truth a whole lot better
No full textRestricted quantification poses a serious and under-appreciated challenge for nonclassical approaches to both vagueness and the semantic paradoxes. It is tempting to explain “All A are B” as “For all x, if x is A then x is B”; but in the nonclassical logics typically used in dealing with vagueness and the semantic paradoxes (even those where ‘if … then’ is a special conditional not definable in terms of negation and disjunction or conjunction), this definition of restricted quantification fails to deliver important principles of restricted quantification that we’d expect. If we’re going to use a nonclassical logic, we need one that handles restricted quantification better.The challenge is especially acute for naive theories of truth—roughly, theories that take True(〈A〉) to be intersubstitutable with A, even when A is a “paradoxical” sentence such as a Liar-sentence. A naive truth theory inevitably involves a somewhat nonclassical logic; the challenge is to get a logic that’s compatible with naive truth and also validates intuitively obvious claims involving restricted quantification (for instance, “If S is a truth stated by Jones, and every truth stated by Jones was also stated by Smith, then S is a truth stated by Smith”). No extant naive truth theory even comes close to meeting this challenge, including the theory I put forth in Saving Truth from Paradox. After reviewing the motivations for naive truth, and elaborating on some of the problems posed by restricted quantification, I will show how to do better. (I take the resulting logic to be appropriate for vagueness too, though that goes beyond the present paper.)In showing that the resulting logic is adequate to naive truth, I will employ a somewhat novel fixed point construction that may prove useful in other contexts.<br/
제 80 차 Saving the Truth Schema from paradox
Full text link「Q인 경우 오직 그 경우만 -T()」인 Q가 존재함을 보이는 여러 방법들이 있다. 자기 자신이 참이 아님을 주장하는 역설적 문장이 이러한 Q의 대표적인 예이다. 이에 덧붙여, 만약 우리가 고전적인 참 이론을 받아들이면, 「Tr()인 경우 오직 그 경우만 Q」(참 도식)도 받아들여야 하는데, 그럼 결국 「Q인 경우 오직 그 경우만 -Q」를 받아들여야 한다. 그러나, 이는 고적적인 논리학에서는 모순이다. 자 이제 우리에게는 세 가지 선택지가 있는데, 이러한 Q가 존재하지 않도록 하는 해결책과 고전적인 참 이론을 포기하는 해결책은 별로 설득력이 없다. 따라서, 나는 고적전인 논리학을 포기하고 새로운 논리학을 받아들이는 해결책을 제시하겠다
The Power of Naive Truth
No full textWhile non-classical theories of truth that take truth to be transparent have some obvious advantages over any classical theory that evidently must take it as non-transparent, several authors have recently argued that there's also a big disadvantage of non-classical theories as compared to their “external” classical counterparts: proof-theoretic strength. While conceding the relevance of this, the paper argues that there is a natural way to beef up extant internal theories so as to remove their proof-theoretic disadvantage. It is suggested that the resulting internal theories should seem preferable to their external counterparts
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