1,721,274 research outputs found
Do Trompe l'oeils Look Right When Viewed from the Wrong Place?
No full textPicture perception and ordinary perception of real objects differ in several respects. Two of their main differences are: (1) Depicted objects are not perceived as present and (2) We cannot perceive significant spatial shifts as we move with respect to them. Some special illusory pictures escape these visual effects obtained in usual picture perception. First, trompe l’oeil paintings violate (1): the depicted object looks, even momentarily, like a present object. Second, anamorphic paintings violate (2): they lead to appreciate spatial shifts resulting from movement. However, anamorphic paintings do not violate (1): they are still perceived as clearly pictorial, that is, nonpresent. What about the relation between trompe l’oeil paintings and (2)? Do trompe l’oeils allow us to perceive spatial shifts? Nobody has ever focused on this aspect of trompe l’oeil perception. I offer the first speculation about this question. I suggest that, if we follow our most recent theories in philosophy and vision science about the mechanisms of picture perception, then, the only plausible answer, in line with phenomenological intuitions, is that, differently from nonillusory, usual picture perception, and similarly to ordinary perception, trompe l’oeil perception does allow us to perceive spatial shifts resulting from movement. I also discuss the philosophical implications of this claim
Visual feeling of presence
No full textAbstract: Everyday visual experience constantly confronts us with things we can interact with in the real world. We literally feel the outside presence of physical objects in our environment via visual perceptual experience. The visual feeling of presence is a crucial feature of vision that is largely unexplored in the philosophy of perception, and poorly debated in vision neuroscience. The aim of this article is to investigate the feeling of presence. I suggest that visual feeling of presence depends on the visual representation of a very particular spatial relation with the object we interact with: the visual representation of absolute egocentric depth, which is due to stereoscopic vision
Why Trompe l'oeils Deceive Our Visual Experience
No full textPhilosophers suggested that usual picture perception requires the simultaneous occurrence of the perception of the surface and of the depicted object. However, there are special cases of picture perception, such as trompe l’oeil perception, in which, unlike in usual picture perception, the object looks like a real, present object we can interact with, of the kind we are usually acquainted with in face-to-face perception. While philosophers suggested that usual picture perception and trompe l’oeil perception must differ with respect to the perception of the surface, nobody has ever proposed a final explanatory account for such a difference. Here, I propose such an account. I consider the two possible options as candidates for the explanation of the illusory power of trompe l’oeil perception. The first is that, with trompe l’oeils, we perceive the surface unconsciously. The second is that, with trompe l’oeils, we cannot perceive the surface at all, that is, we cannot perceive it either consciously or unconsciously. I show that the second option is the unique plausible option, as it is in line with vision science, and with our received view about the nature of usual picture perception
What stereoblindness teaches us about visual reality
Full text linkOur experience seems to be populated by mind-independent objects. These very same objects are also experienced as offering the possibility of motor interactability. Thus, one may be tempted, prima facie, to consider these two experiences as always related. In this paper, I propose that this idea is not tenable, by invoking evidence from vision science and ophthalmology about a special case of blindness, stereoblindness. Stereoblind subjects cannot rely on stereopsis. Stereopsis is the visual mechanisms responsible for the experience of motor interactability with objects. Nonetheless, as I argue, stereoblind subjects can experience objects as mind-independent (notwithstanding the diminished quality of the experience of their spatial features for action). This claim is crucial for the literature. First, it explicitly suggests that the visual experience of motor interactability and the experience of mind-independence do not always correlate, and can be disjointed, though they may be usual..
Understanding reality and presence in dreams through imagery
No full textIt is generally said that dreams are experienced as real. But the notion of reality is often used, in the philosophical literature, along with that of presence. A big problem, in this respect, is that both these terms may assume different meanings.
So understanding the nature of presence and reality in dreams depends on the way we conceive these two notions. This paper contributes to the literature on dreaming by describing the experience of presence and reality in dreams in a very specific sense. I consider the experience of presence as related to the experience
of possibility of motoric interaction, and the experience of reality as related to the experience of mind-independence. Then, endorsing that dream experiences are different from perception, and similar to imagery, I suggest that the dreamer can experience reality but not presence, with three lines of argument, concerning
visual determinacy, stereopsis and peripersonal localization
Pictures, action properties and motor related effects
No full textAbstract: The most important question concerning picture perception is: what perceptual state are we in when we see an object in a picture? In order to answer this question, philosophers have used the results of the two visual systems model, according to which our visual system can be divided into two streams, a ventral stream for object recognition, allowing one to perceive from an allocentric frame of reference, and a dorsal stream for visually guided motor interaction, thus allowing one to perceive from an egocentric frame of reference. Following this model, philosophers denied that we can be in a dorsal perceptual state when perceiving a depicted object. This is because a depicted object is not physically graspable or manipulable and, in turn, it cannot be egocentrically localized, as a normal object, by the dorsal stream. Thus, the impossibility of manipulating depicted objects and of localizing them from an egocentric frame of reference has led some people to be sceptical about the possibility of a representation of action properties in the perception of objects in pictures, which pertains to the dorsal visual system. The aim of the present paper is to show that it is possible for the depicted object to be represented by dorsal perception. That means that we can ascribe action properties to depicted objects as well, even if depicted objects cannot be egocentrically localized-at least, not as much as normal objects can
On the content of Peripersonal visual experience
No full textIn a recent paper, ‘Peripersonal perception in action’ (Synthese, 2018), Frédérique de Vignemont tackles the problem of defining what is peculiar to the visual perception of objects falling within the peripersonal space of the observer, i.e. the space immediately surrounding the body, and which is commonly described as the space in which action takes place. In this paper, I first discuss the proposal offered by de Vignemont about what characterizes peripersonal perception. Then, I suggest an extension of this account that offers a meticulous description of the nature of the Content of Peripersonal Visual Experience - a topic never explicitly considered in the philosophical literature on vision - by discussing some peculiar features of it that, as recognized also by de Vignemont’s account, still need to be explained. In particular, I offer a philosophical examination of the specificity of peripersonal visual experience, in relation to its phenomenological dimension, its optical mechanisms and its neurophysiological underpinnings, in the light of our best theories from vision science, and in comparison to the visual experience of other visual spaces
For an Epistemology of Stereopsis
No full textPhilosophers and cognitive scientists try to understand, from different perspectives, the nature of the experience of reality. Given this shared, interdisciplinary interest, it would be beneficial to have a coherent story about the experience of reality, in which there is reciprocal contribution from both philosophy and cognitive science.
This paper wants to pave the way for this shared enterprise on the investigation of the experience of reality. I first distinguish between two indicators of reality. (1) The experience of availability to motor interaction. (2) The experience of mind-independence. I then show how invoking an analysis of the results from vision science, concerning the visual mechanisms of stereopsis, which is related to the visual impression of a solid, three-dimensional world available to motor interaction, successfully provides a coherent description of the first indicator. Furthermore, I suggest that the analysis of the evidence about the first indicator is very informative
in preparing the ground for the investigation of the second indicator. This is shown by discussing experimental evidence directly related to stereopsis, as well as some perceptual phenomena that are usually described by invoking the story from vision science about stereopsis. Thus, the epistemological analysis of the results from vision science on stereopsis, offered in this paper, is beneficial in a twofold manner, for the interdisciplinary enterprise aimed at understanding the experience of reality.
It is explicitly beneficial in the description of the first indicator, and implicitly beneficial to understand the second indicator. Finally, it also suggests future research about their relation
The Nature of Pictorial Representations.
Full text linkA crucial question in the study of picture perception asks about whether, when perceiving an object in
a picture, we see only the depicted scene or, rather, we simultaneously see both the depicted scene and
the surface. Two different views have fueled the debate since a long time. According to Wollheim, we see
both the depicted scene and the picture’s surface simultaneously. Call this the ‘simultaneous account
of picture perception’ (SA). SA is in contrast with Gombrich’s view that, during picture perception, we
do not simultaneously see both the depicted scene and the surface, but we alternate between these two
visual states. Call this the ‘non-simultaneous account of picture perception’ (NA). The debate between
these two positions still persists in the contemporary literature on picture perception. In this paper, I first
analyze the notion of vision SA and NA are committed to. Then, by discussing empirical evidence from
vision science, I offer an argument that supports SA
A distinction concerning vision-for-action and affordance perception
No full textIn this paper, I offer a discussion concerning the conceptual connection between the notion of
vision-for-action and the one of affordance perception. I first analyze the notion of vision-for-action. I
then analyze a notion usually coupled with it: the notion of affordance perception, the main insights
behind which are guiding several current neuroscientific enterprises and the related
philosophical speculations. Then, I argue that we should not couple these two notions with a light
heart: though these two processes can be, from a theoretical point of view, related, we should be
careful in inferring the actual and effective occurrence of the latter in the presence of the former.
This will be done by carrying out a conceptual analysis of the experimental evidence coming from
the ‘Two Visual Systems Model’
, which is the main reference in the literature on affordance
perception and vision-for-action. My point has strong philosophical implications for our view
concerning the best interpretation of how vision-for-action really works, and the specific relation it
actually entertains with affordance perception
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