2,585 research outputs found
Correre e ultracorrere. Saremo tutti ultramaratoneti?
No full textLa corsa sembra un atto estremamente pragmatico, ma cela in sé dimensioni mentali ed esistenziali tanto profonde quanto lunga è la distanza che si percorre. Correre ultradistanze è diventata una forma di espressione singolare degli umani dei nostri tempi, che mettono a durissima prova il proprio corpo, cercando di silenziare la loro mente. Gabriele Ferretti fa il punto su corsa e ultracorsa, sul mutamento antropologico che l'ultramaratona porta con sé e sulle ragioni biologiche, psicologiche e filosofiche che spingono ad arrivare al limite, per poi continuare a correre
Action at first sight
No full textThe usual formulation of Molyneux’s question (MQ) famously asks whether a newly sighted
subject might immediately recognize, by sight alone, shapes that were already familiar to her from
a tactile point of view. Due to the complex nature of visual recognition, such a question can be
considered with diff erent methodologies, both empirical and conceptual (Jacomuzzi et al. 2003 ;
Occelli 2014 ; Degenaar and Lokhorst 2014 ; Degenaar 1996 ; Glenney 2013 ; Ferretti 2017c , 2019a ;
Toribio, Chapter 16) giving way to many diff erent formulations (Matthen and Cohen 2019 ).
In this chapter, I focus on a rather neglected formulation of the question, concerning action
processing. In the fi rst part of the chapter, I present and review possible answers to such a formulation of the question, only recently discussed in the literature. In the second part I off er brand
new insights on this analysis, starting from new assumptions on the way vision- for- action works
Two visual systems in Molyneux subjects
No full textMolyneux’s question famously asks about whether a newly sighted subject might immediately recognize, by sight alone, shapes that were already familiar to her from a tactile point of view. This paper addresses three crucial points concerning this puzzle. First, (a) the presence of two different questions: the classic one concerning visual recognition and another one concerning vision-for-action (the second question has been almost completely neglected in the literature and even those who mention this second formulation do not fully investigate it). Second, (b) the explicit distinction, reported in the literature, between ocular and cortical blindness. Third, (c) the importance of making reference to our best neuroscientific account on vision, ‘the two visual systems model’, in order to better address Molyneux’s problem(s). Then, by offering a new, deeper analysis of the relation between (a), (b) and (c), this paper suggests that the subjects of Molyneux’s two different questions show the same visual impairment as brain-damaged subjects with different lesions of the visual cortex. In particular, the subject of the first (classic) question shows the same impairment in visual recognition as a visual agnosic subject, while the subject of the second question shows the same visual impairment in visuomotor processing as an optic ataxic subject. These impairments still hold even if ocular processing is restored. Therefore, I suggest the following. For the first classic question, the required experimental setting cannot be properly reached. By contrast, concerning the second question, based on the interpretation we select, either the answer is negative, or, as with the first question, the experimental setting cannot be properly reached. This proposal constitutes, with the other approaches offered in the literature, a further attempt to tackle the enormous complexity of Molyneux’s puzzl
On Plant Affordances
No full textThere is a big debate about which perceptual capacities plants may be endowed with. The chapter offers some reflections that may guide future research interested in the claim that plants perceive affordances, i.e., action possibilities offered by the environment. It does so by offering a description of the notion of affordance, addressing the pieces of evidence that are relevant for the study of affordances in plants, and listing some crucial questions for future research in the field of plant affordances
Pictures, Emotions, and the Dorsal/Ventral Account of Picture Perception
No full textEveryday life suggests that picture seeing is sometimes infused by an emotional charge. However, nobody has addressed the importance of explaining this emotional charge in picture perception. Even our best model of picture perception, the dorsal/ventral account of picture perception, which integrates the most important empirical results coming from our best model on vision in neuroscience, the two visual systems model, lacks a reference to this emotional charge. The aim of the present paper is to offer an account of picture perception that is able to regain and explain this neglected emotional charge. My claim is that, as for face-to-face perception, during picture perception, we are not only in a visual perceptual state, but also in an emotional state, which is directly connected to our visual perceptual state. I also show that it is possible to offer this integration while remaining in the philosophical/empirical framework of the dorsal/ventral account of picture perception, whose explanatory power is confirmed and improved
The Neural Dynamics of Seeing-In
No full textPhilosophers have suggested that, in order to understand the particular visual state we are in during picture perception, we should focus on experimental results from vision neuroscience—in particular, on the most rigorous account of the functioning of the visual system that we have from vision neuroscience, namely, the ‘Two Visual Systems Model’. According to the initial version of this model, our visual system can be dissociated, from an anatomo-functional point of view, into two streams: a ventral stream subserving visual recognition, and a dorsal stream sub- serving the visual guidance of action. Following this model, philosophers have suggested that, since the two streams have different functions, they represent dif- ferent properties of a picture. However, the original view proposed by the ‘Two Visual Systems Model’ about the presence of a strong anatomo-functional disso- ciation between the two streams has recently been questioned on both philosophical and experimental grounds. Indeed, the analysis of several new pieces of evidence seems to suggest that many visual representations in our visual system, related to different tasks, are the result of a deep functional interaction between the streams. In the light of the renewed status of the ‘Two Visual Systems Model’, also our best philosophical model of picture perception should be renewed, in order to take into account a view of the process of picture perception informed by the new evidence about such interaction. Despite this, no account fulfilling this role has been offered yet. The aim of the present paper is precisely to offer such an account. It does this by suggesting that the peculiar visual state we are in during picture perception is subserved by interstream interaction. This proposal allows us to rely on a rigorous philosophical account of picture perception that is, however, also based on the most recent results from neuroscience. Unless the explanation offered in this paper is endorsed, all the recent evidence from vision neuroscience will remain unexplained under our best empirically informed philosophical theory of picture perception
Are Pictures Peculiar Objects of Perception?
No full textABSTRACT:Are face-to-face perception and picture perception different perceptual phenomena? The question is controversial. On the one hand, philosophers have offered several solid arguments showing that, despite some resemblances, they are quite different perceptual phenomena and that pictures are special objects of perception. On the other hand, neuroscientists routinely use pictures in experimental settings as substitutes for normal objects, and this practice is successful in explaining how the human visual system works. But this seems to imply that face-to-face perception and picture perception are very similar, if not actually the same. How can we decide between these two opposite intuitions? Here I offer a regimentation of the notion of picture perception that can reconcile these two apparently conflicting ideas about pictures. It follows that philosophers and neuroscientists can maintain their respective stances without any theoretical conflict.</jats:p
The Philosophy of Plant Cognition. Introduction
No full textEmpirical research has shown that plants interact with their environment in complex ways. However, it is a matter of great controversy whether the empirical data also support the ascription of cognitive capacities to plants. In this introduction, we first provide a brief outline of this controversy, focusing on the central debates about cognition, perception and consciousness in plants. We then sketch how the individual contributions in this volume address these debates
Neurophysiological states and perceptual representations : the case of action properties detected by the ventro-dorsal visual stream
No full textAbstract: Philosophers and neuroscientists often suggest that we perceptually represent objects and their properties. However, they start from very different background assumptions when they use the term "perceptual representation". On the one hand, sometimes philosophers do not need to properly take into consideration the empirical evidence concerning the neural states subserving the representational perceptual processes they are talking about. On the other hand, neuroscientists do not rely on a meticulous definition of "perceptual representation" when they talk about this empirical evidence that is supposed to show that we perceptually represent such and such properties. It seems that, on both sides, something is missed. My aim is to show that, in the light of empirical evidence from neuroscience, the case of action properties is a good candidate in order to properly talk of perceptually represented properties. My claim is that the neurophysiological states encoding action properties are perceptual processes and that these perceptual processes are representational processes. That is, in the case of those neurophysiological states involved in the detection of action properties, it is correct to speak of perceptual representational states, and hence, ipso facto, of perceptually represented properties. First, I describe a reasonable and widely agreed upon conception of perceptual representation in the philosophical literature. Then, I report evidence from vision and motor neuroscience concerning the perception of action properties, which is subserved by the ventro-dorsal stream, a portion of the dorsal visual system. Finally, I show that a strong connection can be found between the philosophical idea of perceptual representation I have reported before and the neuroscientific evidence concerning the activity of the ventro-dorsal stream, whose job is, as said, to detect action properties
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