166,712 research outputs found

    An Extension to the Model of Inequity Aversion by Fehr and Schmidt

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    The aim of this paper is to improve on the model by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) by developing a non-linear model (that leads to interior rather than corner solutions) and by taking into account that different levels of income imply different reactions of fair-minded people. We suggest to modify the inequity-aversion utility function proposed by Fehr and Schmidt by taking into account not only the difference between players' payoffs, but also their absolute value. This allows for a non-linear utility function where different stakes lead to different unique optimal interior solutions.

    Plan des verschütteten Thals zwischen dem Lowerzer u. Zuger-See

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    J. Fehr del. ; F. Hegi sculp.NordwestorientiertKoloriertTitelkartusche unten rechts in Form einer FelsinschriftAus: Neujahrsblatt der Gesellschaft zum Schwarzen Garten auf 180

    Golf Trophy

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    The Caldwell-Lewis Trophy for the Association of Independent Optical Wholesalers Handicap Champion awarded to Kenneth C. Fehr

    Gesundheit im politischen Diskurs am Beispiel der Parlamentsdatenbank des Stadtstaates Hamburg

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    Fehr R, Gatting S, Kuhn J, Ritzinger S, Hornberg C. Gesundheit im politischen Diskurs am Beispiel der Parlamentsdatenbank des Stadtstaates Hamburg. In: Fehr R, Augustin J, eds. Nachhaltige StadtGesundheit Hamburg II. Edition nachhaltige Gesundheit in Stadt und Region. Vol 5. München: oekonom; 2022: 198-208

    [Report to Chief J. E. Curry, by an unknown author #1]

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    Report to Chief J. E. Curry, by an unknown author. The report contains a list of officers who gave depositions to the United States Attorney

    [Report to Chief J. E. Curry, by an unknown author #2]

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    Report to Chief J. E. Curry, by an unknown author. The report contains a list of officers who gave depositions to the United States Attorney

    On Inequity Aversion - A Reply to Binmore and Shaked

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    In this paper we reply to Binmore and Shaked’s criticism of the Fehr-Schmidt model of inequity aversion. We put the theory and their arguments into perspective and show that their criticism is not substantiated. Finally, we briefly comment on the main challenges for future research on social preferences.Experiments; other-regarding preferences; inequity aversion;

    On Inequity Aversion - A Reply to Binmore and Shaked

    No full text
    In this paper we reply to Binmore and Shaked’s criticism of the Fehr-Schmidt model of inequity aversion. We put the theory and their arguments into perspective and show that their criticism is not substantiated. Finally, we briefly comment on the main challenges for future research on social preferences

    Plan des verschütteten Thals zwischen dem Lowerzer u. Zuger:See

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    J. Fehr del. ; F. Hegi sculp.Aus "Neujahrsgeschenk der Gesellschaft zum Schwarzen Garten in Zürich", 1807Karte über den Goldauer-BergsturzAus der Sammlung von Heinrich Appenzeller (1854-1921) Exemplar der Zentralbibliothek Zürich, Graphische Sammlung und Fotoarchi

    Competition and relational contracts: The role of unemployment as a disciplinary device

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    When workers are faced with the threat of unemployment, their relationship with a particular firm becomes valuable. As a result, a worker may comply with the terms of a relational contract that demands high effort even when performance is not enforceable by a third party. But can relational contracts motivate high effort when workers can easily find alternative jobs? We examine how competition for labor affects the emergence of relational contracts and their effectiveness in overcoming moral hazard in the labor market. We show that effective relational contracts do emerge in a market with excess demand for labor. Long-term relationships turn out to be less frequent when there is excess demand for labor than they are in a market characterized by exogenous unemployment. However, stronger competition for labor does not impair labor market efficiency: higher wages induced by competition lead to higher effort out of concerns for reciprocity
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