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Literal means and hidden meanings : a new analysis of skillful means
Skillful means is usually used by scholars and Buddhists to denote the following simple
idea: the Buddha skillfully adapted his teaching to the level of his audience.1
This very broad and somewhat oversimplified definition tries to incorporate the
whole range of Buddhist views on the subject. However, it does not help to explain
why there is an extensive use of the term in central Mahayana su tras while
pre-Mahayana texts are almost completely silent on this issue. I suggest that skillful
means has not always been an all-Buddhist concept; rather, it was developed by
Mahayanists as a radical hermeneutic device. As such, skillful means is a provocative
and sophisticated idea that served the purpose of advancing a new religious ideology
in the face of an already established canonical knowledge. The Mahayana use
of the concept exhibits an awareness, not found in pre-Mahayana thought, of a gap
between what texts literally say and their hidden meaning
What kind of free will did the Buddha teach?
The modern version of the problem of free will is usually described as a collision
between two beliefs: the belief that we are free to choose our actions and the belief
that our actions are determined by prior necessary causes. Determinism—the view
that events are determined by specific causes—makes most aspects of reality intelligible.
It works quite well, for example, when explaining aspects of the natural world
(quantum physics aside). When heat, fuel, and oxygen come together there is fire.
There must be fire. To borrow a famous Buddhist simile, when a mango seed is given
the right conditions, it will grow to become a mango tree. It cannot grow to be anything
else. However, we do not usually think of agents as being caused in the same
way. We tend to think that agents somehow transcend natural causation by their
ability to choose freely. If we also think that agents are part of the natural order, we
face a paradox. This is, in short, the problem of free will
Going Beyond Counting First Authors in Author Co-citation Analysis
The present study examines one of the fundamental aspects of author co-citation analysis (ACA) - the way co-citation
counts are defined. Co-citation counting provides the data on which all subsequent statistical analyses and mappings
are based, and we compare ACA results based on two different types of co-citation counting - the traditional type that
only counts the first one among a cited work's authors on the one hand and a non-traditional type that takes into
account the first 5 authors of a cited work on the other hand. Results indicate that the picture produced through this non-traditional author co-citation counting contains more coherent author groups and is therefore considerably clearer. However, this picture represents fewer specialties in the research field being studied than that produced through the traditional first-author co-citation counting when the same number of top-ranked authors is selected and analyzed. Reasons for these effects are discussed
From a self that controls to self-control: paradigm shifts in early Buddhism and in cognitive science
This thesis describes two similar paradigm shifts––one between Brahmanism and Buddhism and the other between Cartesian and non-Cartesian perspectives in contemporary mind-science. These shifts are characterized by a similar transition from the view that there is a Self that exercises ultimate control, to the view that the entire person engages in limited self-control. Both the Cartesian and the Brahmanical perspectives accommodate notions of ultimate free will, immaterial souls, a ‘Self’ that transcends mundane causality and bears similitude to the divine; control is seen metaphorically as the power of an absolute monarch. On the other hand, both the Buddhist and the cognitive-scientific perspectives reject ultimate free will, ultimate Selves and divine transcendence. Instead, they promote the idea that self-control is possible within causally regulated reality, and that people have limited free will; control is seen as a property of the whole agent, not as an ultimate power of an internal monarch.
These similarities may explain why Buddhism appeals to cognitive science: both systems are situated at similar positions within similar paradigm shifts. For different reasons, and reflecting different motivations, Buddhism and cognitive science have developed similar outlooks on self-hood and on self-control. The comparison of these two frameworks also helps to clarify a particular conceptual issue regarding self-control and determinism. It exposes the Cartesian assumption under some scholarly concerns that the Buddhist not-Self doctrine practically eliminates the possibility of self-control, self-development, free will, and moral responsibility. Contemporary compatibilist arguments are used to show why this is not so and that in both early Buddhism and in cognitive science self-control can exist in a deterministic reality
From a self that controls to self-control : paradigm shifts in early Buddhism and in cognitive science
This thesis describes two similar paradigm shifts––one between Brahmanism and Buddhism and the other between Cartesian and non-Cartesian perspectives in contemporary mind-science. These shifts are characterized by a similar transition from the view that there is a Self that exercises ultimate control, to the view that the entire person engages in limited self-control. Both the Cartesian and the Brahmanical perspectives accommodate notions of ultimate free will, immaterial souls, a ‘Self’ that transcends mundane causality and bears similitude to the divine; control is seen metaphorically as the power of an absolute monarch. On the other hand, both the Buddhist and the cognitive-scientific perspectives reject ultimate free will, ultimate Selves and divine transcendence. Instead, they promote the idea that self-control is possible within causally regulated reality, and that people have limited free will; control is seen as a property of the whole agent, not as an ultimate power of an internal monarch. These similarities may explain why Buddhism appeals to cognitive science: both systems are situated at similar positions within similar paradigm shifts. For different reasons, and reflecting different motivations, Buddhism and cognitive science have developed similar outlooks on self-hood and on self-control. The comparison of these two frameworks also helps to clarify a particular conceptual issue regarding self-control and determinism. It exposes the Cartesian assumption under some scholarly concerns that the Buddhist not-Self doctrine practically eliminates the possibility of self-control, self-development, free will, and moral responsibility. Contemporary compatibilist arguments are used to show why this is not so and that in both early Buddhism and in cognitive science self-control can exist in a deterministic reality.EThOS - Electronic Theses Online ServiceUniversity of Warwick (UoW)GBUnited Kingdo
Variations on the Author
“Variations on the Author” discusses two of Eduardo Coutinho’s recent films (Um Dia na Vida, from 2010, and Últimas Conversas, posthumously released in 2015) and their contribution to the general question of documentary authorship. The director’s filmography is characterized by a consistent yet self-effacing form of authorial self-inscription: Coutinho often features as an interviewer that rather than express opinions propels discourses; an interviewer that is good at listening. This mode of self-inscription characterizes him as an author who is not expressive but who is nonetheless markedly present on the screen. In Um Dia na Vida, however, Coutinho is completely absent form the image, while Últimas Conversas, on the contrary, includes a confessional prologue that moves the director from the margins to the center of his films. This article examines the ways in which these works stand out in the filmography of a director who offers new insights into the notion of cinematic authorship
Appropriate Similarity Measures for Author Cocitation Analysis
We provide a number of new insights into the methodological discussion about author cocitation analysis. We first argue that the use of the Pearson correlation for measuring the similarity between authors’ cocitation profiles is not very satisfactory. We then discuss what kind of similarity measures may be used as an alternative to the Pearson correlation. We consider three similarity measures in particular. One is the well-known cosine. The other two similarity measures have not been used before in the bibliometric literature. Finally, we show by means of an example that our findings have a high practical relevance.information science;Pearson correlation;cosine;similarity measure;author cocitation analysis
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