208,038 research outputs found
Intorno a casa mia
No full textbreve opera in versi di Fatima Sharafeddine e disegni di Rebecca Luciani traduzione Francesca M. Corra
An analysis of feasible solutions for multi-issue negotiation involving non-linear utility functions
No full textThis paper analyzes bilateral multi-issue negotiation between self- interested agents. Specifically, we consider the case where issues are divisible, there are time constraints in the form of deadlines and discount factors, and the agents have different preferences over the issues. Given these differing preferences, it is possible to reach Pareto-optimal agreements by negotiating all the issues together using a package deal procedure (PDP). However, finding equilibrium strategies for this procedure is not always computationally easy. In particular, if the agents utility functions are nonlinear, then equi-librium strategies may be hard to compute. In order to overcome this complexity, we explore two different solutions. The first is to use the PDP for linear approximations of the given nonlinear utilities. The second solution is to use a simultaneous procedure (SP) where the issues are discussed in parallel but independently of each other. We then compare these two solutions both in terms of their computational properties (i.e., time complexity of computing an approximate equilibrium and the associated error of approximation) and their economic properties (i.e., the agents utilities and social welfare of the resulting outcome). By doing so, we show that an approximate equilibrium for the PDP and the SP can be found in polynomial time. In terms of the economic properties, although the PDP is known to generate Pareto optimal outcomes, we show that, in some cases, which we identify, the SP is better for one of the two agents and also increases the social welfare. Copyright © 2009, International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
Sequential auctions for common value objects with budget constrained bidders
Get PDFThis paper analyzes sequential auctions for budget constrained bidders, for multiple heterogeneous common value objects. In most auctions, bidders not only have valuations for objects but also have budget constraints (i.e., constraints on how much they can actually spend in an auction). Given these constraints, the bidders’ problem is to determine how much to bid in each auction. To this end, this paper analyzes the strategic behavior of bidders and determines the equilibrium bidding strategies for the individual auctions that constitute a series. We do this in an incomplete information setting where the bidders are uncertain about their budget constraints, and obtain equilibrium bidding strategies for the participants in individual auctions in a series
On Optimal Agendas for Multi-Issue Negotiation
No full textThis paper analyzes bilateral multi-issue negotiation where the issues are divisible, there are time constraints in the form of deadlines and discount factors, and the agents have different preferences over the issues. The issues are negotiated using the package deal procedure. The set of issues to be negotiated is a choice variable in that the agents can decide what issues to negotiate. This set is called the negotiation agenda. Since the outcome of negotiation depends on the agenda, it is important to determine what agenda maximizes an agent’s utility and is therefore its optimal agenda. To this end, this paper presents polynomial time methods for finding an agent’s optimal agenda
An agenda based framework for multi-issues negotiation
No full textThis paper presents a new model for multi-issue negotiation under time constraints in an incomplete information setting. The issues to be bargained over can be associated with a single good/service or multiple goods/services. In our agenda-based model, the order in which issues are bargained over and agreements are reached is determined endogenously, as part of the bargaining equilibrium. In this context we determine the conditions under which agents have similar preferences over the implementation scheme and the conditions under which they have conflicting preferences. Our analysis shows the existence of equilibrium even when both players have uncertain information about each other, and each agent’s information is its private knowledge. We also study the properties of the equilibrium solution and determine conditions under which it is unique, symmetric, and Pareto-optimal
Optimal negotiation of multiple issues in incomplete information settings
No full textThis paper studies bilateral multi-issue negotiation between self-interested agents. The outcome of such encounters depends on two key factors: the agenda (i.e., the set of issues under negotiation) and the negotiation procedure (i.e., whether the issues are discussed together or separately). Against this background, this paper analyses such negotiations by varying the agenda and negotiation procedure. This analysis is carried out in an incomplete information setting in which an agent knows its own negotiation parameters, but has incomplete information about its opponent’s. We first determine the equilibrium strategies for two negotiation procedures: issue-by-issue and package deal. On the basis of these strategies we determine the negotiation outcome for all possible agenda–procedure combinations and the optimal agenda–procedure combination for each agent. We determine those conditions for which agents have identical preferences over the optimal agenda and procedure and those for which they do not, and for both conditions we show the optimal agenda and procedure
Comparing equilibria for game theoretic and evolutionary bargaining models
No full textGame-theoretic models of bargaining are typically based on the assumption that players have perfect rationality and that they always play an equilibrium strategy. In contrast research research in experimental economics shows that in bargaining between human subjects, participants do not always play the equilibrium strategy. Such agents are said to be boundedly rational. In playing a game against a boundedly rational opponent, a player's most effective strategy is not the equilibrium strategy, but the one that is the best reply to the opponent's actual strategy. Against this background, this paper studies the bargaining behaviour of boundedly rational agents byusing genetic algorithms. Since bargaining involves players with different utility functions, we have two subpopulations - one represents the buyer, and the other represents the seller (i.e., the population is asymmetric). We study the competitive co-evolution of strategies in the two subpopulations for an incomplete information setting, and compare the results with those prescribed by game theory. Our analysis leads to two main conclusions. Firstly, our study shows that although each agent in the game-theoretic model has a strategy that is dominant at every period at which it makes a move, the stable state of the evolutionary model does not always match the game-theoretic equilibrium outcome. secondly, as the players mutually adapt to each other's strategy, the stable outcome depends on the initial population
Fatima Jinnah
No full textAlthough fifty years have passed since the death of Fatima Jinnah - author, activist and stateswoman known in Pakistan as the &apos;mother of the nation&apos; - this is the first scholarly biography to tackle her life in full. Her background and contribution to Muslim nationalism under the British Raj, as well as her various efforts to consolidate the state, including a run for president in 1964, are told through previously untapped archival sources. Examining her life in the context of scholarship on South Asia and on women in Islam, Pirbhai assesses Fatima Jinnah&apos;s role through the theoretical lens of the colonial &apos;new woman&apos;. This is essential reading for all those interested in modern South Asian and Islamic history, particularly the themes of gender and colonialism, the roots of Muslim nationalism and the early challenges facing the Pakistani state, as shown through the extraordinary lived experience of its most influential female activist.</jats:p
Multi-issue negotiation with deadlines.
Get PDFThis paper studies bilateral multi-issue negotiation between self-interested autonomous agents. Now, there are a number of different procedures that can be used for this process; the three main ones being the package deal procedure in which all the issues are bundled and discussed together, the simultaneous procedure in which the issues are discussed simultaneously but independently of each other, and the sequential procedure in which the issues are discussed one after another. Since each of them yields a different outcome, a key problem is to decide which one to use in which circumstances. Specifically, we consider this question for a model in which the agents have time constraints (in the form of both deadlines and discount factors) and information uncertainty (in that the agents do not know the opponent's utility function). For this model, we consider issues that are both independent and those that are interdependent and determine equilibria for each case for each procedure. In doing so, we show that the package deal is in fact the optimal procedure for each party. We then go on to show that, although the package deal may be computationally more complex than the other two procedures, it generates Pareto optimal outcomes (unlike the other two), it has similar earliest and latest possible times of agreement to the simultaneous procedure (which is better than the sequential procedure), and that it (like the other two procedures) generates a unique outcome only under certain conditions (which we define)
Approximate and online multi-issue negotiation.
Get PDFThis paper analyzes bilateral multi-issue negotiation between self interested autonomous agents. The agents have time constraints in the form of both deadlines and discount factors. There are m > 1 issues for negotiation where each issue is viewed as a pie of size one. The issues are “indivisible” (i.e., individual issues cannot be split between the parties; each issue must be allocated in its entirety to either agent). Here different agents value different issues differently. Thus, the problem is for the agents to decide how to allocate the issues between themselves so as to maximize their individual utilities. For such negotiations, we first obtain the equilibrium strategies for the case where the issues for negotiation are known a priori to the parties. Then, we analyse their time complexity and show that finding the equilibrium offers is an NP-hard problem, even in a complete information setting. In order to overcome this computational complexity, we then present negotiation strategies that are approximately optimal but computationally efficient, and show that they form an equilibrium. We also analyze the relative error (i.e., the difference between the true optimum and the approximate). The time complexity of the approximate equilibrium strategies is O(nm=2) where n is the negotiation deadline and the relative error. Finally, we extend the analysis to online negotiation where different issues become available at different time points and the agents are uncertain about their valuations for these issues. Specifically, we show that an approximate equilibrium exists for online negotiation and show that the expected difference between the optimum and the approximate is O(pm) . These approximate strategies also have polynomial time complexity
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