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Spór między Sądem Najwyższym a Najwyższym Trybunałem Administracyjnym w przedmiocie wykładni art. 126 Konstytucji marcowej w świetle polityki wyznaniowej Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej
No full textThe decision about of the political system to be implemented in Poland after it regained independence in 1918 was largely determined by the existing legal systems of the states that had earlier occupied Poland\u27s territories. The task before the Polish legislators was therefore to evaluate the existing laws and to decide how they were finally to be eflected in the March Constitution, of which Article 126 was of capital importance. That article provided, among other things, for reconciliation, before the first anniversary of the adoption of the Constitution, of the laws that were binding in the occupant states with the new legislation provided by the Constitution. The Supreme Court and the Highest Administrative Court had different opinions as to the model according to which the harmonisation of the two was to be done. The Supreme Court\u27s stance was that the provisions of the Constitution had a direct influence on the binding legal order and therefore the regulations that were contradictory to or incompatible with its provisions were automatically ineffective. Thus the Constitution itself was to play the harmonising role in the whole process. The Highest Administrative Court, on the other hand, claimed that the discrepancies, if any. were to be resolved by relevant legislation that needed to be adopted. The model proposed by the Supreme Court prevailed. The conflict between the existing laws inherited from the occupant states and those included in the March Constitution was particularly acute in the sphere of religious policy and its regulations. The analysis of the judicial decisions arrived at pursuant to Article 126 shows that its provisions were construed in a manner that served the current political interests of the Polish state. Certain solutions of the former legal system regarding the state\u27s policy towards religion turned out to be very useful and in line with Poland\u27s policy once it had regained independence. They allowed the completion of goals that were concurrent with the policy of the former occupant states. Thus, paradoxically, once independent, the Polish state benefited from them. They served the Polish interests and were therefore frequently relied on, leading to the actual suspension of some of the principles of the March Constitution.La définition du régime constitutionnel de la Pologne indépendante est établie en grande partie en opposition au système existant sous le régime des pays occupants. Cela entraîne pour le pouvoir constituant une nécessité de se positionner par rapport à la situation juridique en vigueur. Ce postulat est finalement réalisé par les dispositions de la Constitution de mars. La signification principale est donnée à l\u27art. 126 qui prévoit, entre autres, de mettre la législation des pays occupants en rapport avec la constitution dans un délai maximum de un an après l\u27entrée en vigueur de cette dernière. Le litige entre la Cour suprême et la Cour administrative suprême concerne le modèle d\u27adaptation de la législation des pays occupants à la constitution. La Cour suprême force l\u27idée que la constitution a une influence directe sur la situation juridique en vigueur. Par conséquent, toute disposition contraire à la constitution, qui n\u27est pas adaptable à celle-ci, cesse d\u27être valable. Dans une telle situation juridique, la constitution ellemême jouerait tout simplement le rôle de loi d\u27adaptation. Compte tenu de la non publication des dispositions d\u27adaptation, ce modèle devient prépondérant dans la vie pratique de l\u27entredeux-guerres. L\u27opposition entre la législation des pays occupants et la Constitution de mars est fortement visible dans le domaine de régulation des rapports confessionnels. L\u27analyse de la juridiction concernant l\u27art. 126 de la Constitution démontre que son interprétation servait à réaliser l\u27intérêt politique existant. Certaines solutions de l\u27ancienne législation en matière de la politique confessionnelle se sont avérées très utiles après le recouvrement de l\u27indépendance par la Pologne. Elles ont permis la réalisation des objectifs communs à la politique des états occupants. Ainsi, paradoxalement, après le recouvrement de l\u27indépendance, certaines dispositions se sont avérées favorables à la réalisation des intérêts de l\u27État polonais. D\u27où la longueur de vie inattendue de cette législation qui a conduit à une suspension réelle de certains principes prévus par la Constitution de mars.Przystąpienie do kształtowania ustroju państwa polskiego wymagało określenia jego charakteru, który niekoniecznie musiał pokrywać się z charakterem ustroju państw zaborczych. W konsekwencji określenie ustroju niepodległej Polski odbywało się w znacznym stopniu w opozycji do zastanego ustawodawstwa zaborczego. Pociągało to za sobą konieczność ustosunkowania się polskiego ustrojodawcy do obowiązującego stanu prawnego, zwłaszcza że nawet pobieżny przegląd ustaw zaborczych pozwalał stwierdzić w szeregu kwestiach jego sprzeczność z interesami lub projektowanym ustrojem państwa polskiego. Postulat ten doczekał się ostatecznej realizacji w postanowieniach konstytucji marcowej. Spośród kilku zasadniczych przepisów konstytucji, które wchodzą w omawianej kwestii w grę, podstawowe znaczenie miał art. 126. W ramach tego zagadnienia istotne znaczenie miała również relacja art. 126 do art. 38 konstytucji. Określenie tej relacji rozstrzygało bowiem kwestię bezpośredniego stosowania konstytucji, co zarazem przesądzało o jej stosunku do ustaw państw zaborczych
Problem wykładni art. 114 konstytucji marcowej w świetle orzecznictwa kościelnego w sprawach małżeńskich
Get PDFJurysdykcja sądu konsystorskiego w świetle przepisów prawa małżeńskiego z 1836 roku
Get PDFThe paper discusses jurisdiction of the Consistory in matrimonial matters in the central part of Poland between 1919-1939, where, pursuant to the matrimonial law of 1836, jurisdiction in matters such as separation, divorce and nullification of marriage was vested in certain church courts. Decisions issued by those churches were recognised as binding and effective decisions in civil law as well. The main considerations focus of the scope of civil jurisdiction of church courts, and, in particular, their jurisdiction as demarcated by the law. Under that law, matrimonial matters were submitted to a church court that was relevant for the religious faith of the spouses in question. Where spouses were of two different denominations, proper jurisdiction for them was determined by the interdenominational matrimonial law of 1836. However, adjudications of church courts other than RC church court were not always accepted by the dominant RC church. This led to frequent disputes regarding their recognition by civil courts. The key subject of the research is the denominational aspect of the jurisdiction of a church court. The paper also includes different interpretations of the interdenominational provisions formulated by leading theoreticians of the interwar period. As can be seen, the differences of their opinions as well as incoherent jurisdiction of the Supreme Court created many doubts with regards to the enforcement of a decision in a matrimonial matter issued by a church court with improper jurisdiction. And so, in its decision of 8 November 1926 the Supreme Court adjudicated that a state court was empowered to investigate the jurisdiction of a church court which has issued a decision in a matrimonial matter. At the same time, however, it took a stance that the provisions of the state interdenominational law should be absolutely binding. And yet, in some other cases it tended to marginalise the state law and allowed to base civil jurisdiction of a RC court entirely on canon law. These examples illustrate a tendency of the Supreme Court to favour broad construction of the principle laid down in Article 114 of the Constitution that the Roman Catholic Church in Poland should be governed by its own laws.L\u27article concerne le problème de la juridiction ecclésiastique au sujet du mariage dans la Pologne centrale dans la période du 1918 au 1939. Dans ce territoire, on appliqua la loi de mariage de 1836, qui confia aux tribunaux ecclésiastiques de certaines confessions religieuses la juridiction dans les cas de la nullité du mariage, du divorce et de la séparation. La particularité de cette juridiction fut liée au caractère du tribunal ecclésiastique qui était l\u27organe de l\u27association religieuse. Selon le droit d\u27Etat, les jugements de ce tribunal prenaient leurs effets également en droit civil. La question importante porte sur l\u27étendue de la juridiction civile du tribunal ecclésiastique. En particulier, il s\u27agissait du problème de ses limites déterminées par la lois de l\u27État. En principe, outre le sujet de l\u27affaire, la juridiction du tribunal ecclésiastique fut déterminée par la confession des conjoints. Dans le cas des conjonts apartenants aux diverses confesssions, la juridiction fut définie par les prescriptions „interconfessionelles" de la loi de 1836. L\u27interprétation de celles-ci faisait l\u27objet de nombreuses controversions. A cause portantes sur la question de la reconnaissance des effets civiles des jugements ecclésiastiques. Dans l\u27article on a élaboré l\u27aspect confessionel de la juridiction du tribunal ecclésiastique. On présenta les interprétations des prescriptions „intraconfessionelles" proposées par les théoriciens réputés de l\u27époque d\u27avant la guerre. On réfléchissait aussi sur les arrêts de la Cour Suprême concernants le mariage réglé par la loi de 1836.The paper discusses jurisdiction of the Consistory in matrimonial matters in the central part of Poland between 1919-1939, where, pursuant to the matrimonial law of 1836, jurisdiction in matters such as separation, divorce and nullification of marriage was vested in certain church courts. Decisions issued by those churches were recognised as binding and effective decisions in civil law as well. The main considerations focus of the scope of civil jurisdiction of church courts, and, in particular, their jurisdiction as demarcated by the law. Under that law, matrimonial matters were submitted to a church court that was relevant for the religious faith of the spouses in question. Where spouses were of two different denominations, proper jurisdiction for them was determined by the interdenominational matrimonial law of 1836. However, adjudications of church courts other than RC church court were not always accepted by the dominant RC church. This led to frequent disputes regarding their recognition by civil courts. The key subject of the research is the denominational aspect of the jurisdiction of a church court. The paper also includes different interpretations of the interdenominational provisions formulated by leading theoreticians of the interwar period. As can be seen, the differences of their opinions as well as incoherent jurisdiction of the Supreme Court created many doubts with regards to the enforcement of a decision in a matrimonial matter issued by a church court with improper jurisdiction. And so, in its decision of 8 November 1926 the Supreme Court adjudicated that a state court was empowered to investigate the jurisdiction of a church court which has issued a decision in a matrimonial matter. At the same time, however, it took a stance that the provisions of the state interdenominational law should be absolutely binding. And yet, in some other cases it tended to marginalise the state law and allowed to base civil jurisdiction of a RC court entirely on canon law. These examples illustrate a tendency of the Supreme Court to favour broad construction of the principle laid down in Article 114 of the Constitution that the Roman Catholic Church in Poland should be governed by its own laws
Przeszkoda katolicyzmu (impedimentum catholicismi) w prawie wojewodztw południowych II Rzeczypospolitej
Get PDFW XIX w. przesłanki ważności małżeństwa przynajmniej częściowo wywodziły się z zasad religijnych. Prawo państwowe przewidywało przeszkody takie jak różność wiary czy święcenia kapłańskie. Małżeństwo zyskiwało przez to religijne oblicze. Pozostałe przesłanki nie wynikały jednak wprost z charakteru określonej doktryny religijnej. Przeszkody wieku lub pokrewieństwa nie mają ściśle religijnego podłoża. Impedimentum catholicismi nie mieści się jednak w tej grupie. Przeszkoda ta, podobnie jak przeszkoda różności wiary (disparitas cultus), wynikała wprost z zasad doktryny katolickiej. Prawo małżeńskie obowiązujące w II Rzeczypospolitej pochodziło z okresu zaborów. Oblicze małżeństwa ukształtowane w ustawach pochodzących z tego okresu wynikało z charakteru byłych państw zaborczych, a w szczególności z ich stosunku do religii. Wyznaniowy charakter państwa przekładał się na kształt małżeństwa w prawie cywilnym. W Austrii i Rosji doszło do recepcji małżeńskiego prawa kościelnego. Natomiast w Prusach małżeństwouzyskało świecki charakter. W konsekwencji w poszczególnych częściach odrodzonego państwa polskiego obowiązywały przepisy cechujące się różnym stosunkiem do małżeństwa wyznaniowego
Małżeństwo niechrześcijańskie i sektanckie w świetle prawa województw centralnych II Rzeczypospolitej
Get PDFMałżeństwo niechrześcijańskie i sektanckie w świetle prawa województw centralnych II Rzeczypospolite
Artur Mezglewski, Anna Tunia, Wyznaniowa forma zawarcia małżeństwa cywilnego, 2007
Get PDFArtur Mezglewski, Anna Tunia, Wyznaniowa forma zawarcia małżeństwa cywilnego, 200
DISPUTE BETWEEN THE SUPREME COURT AND THE HIGHEST ADMINISTRATIVE COURT REGARDING THE CONSTRUCTION OF ART. 126 OF THE MARCH CONSTITUTION IN LIGHT OF THE RELIGIOUS POLICY OF THE SECOND REPUBLIC OF POLAND.
No full textThe decision about of the political system to be implemented in Poland after it regained independence in 1918 was largely determined by the existing legal systems of the states that had earlier occupied Poland’s territories. The task before the Polish legislators was therefore to evaluate the existing laws and to decide how they were finally to be eflected in the March Constitution, of which Article 126 was of capital importance. That article provided, among other things, for reconciliation, before the first anniversary of the adoption of the Constitution, of the laws that were binding in the occupant states with the new legislation provided by the Constitution,. The Supreme Court and the Highest Administrative Court had different opinions as to the model according to which the harmonisation of the two was to be done.
The Supreme Court’s stance was that the provisions of the Constitution had a direct influence on the binding legal order and therefore the regulations that were contradictory to or incompatible with its provisions were automatically ineffective. Thus the Constitution itself was to play the harmonising role in the whole process. The Highest Administrative Court, on the other hand, claimed that the discrepancies, if any. were to be resolved by relevant legislation that needed to be adopted. The model proposed by the Supreme Court prevailed.
The conflict between the existing laws inherited from the occupant states and those included in the March Constitution was particularly acute in the sphere of religious policy and its regulations. The analysis of the judicial decisions arrived at pursuant to Article 126 shows that its provisions were construed in a manner that served the current political interests of the Polish state. Certain solutions of the former legal system regarding the state’s policy towards religion turned out to be very useful and in line with Poland’s policy once it had regained independence. They allowed the completion of goals that were concurrent with the policy of the former occupant states. Thus, paradoxically, once independent, the Polish state benefited from them. They served the Polish interests and were therefore frequently relied on, leading to the actual suspension of some of the principles of the March Constitution
Zawarcie małżeństwa mieszanego wyznaniowo według prawa małżeńskiego z 1836 roku
Get PDFThe thesis discusses the signifi cant question of inter-denominational marriages in Poland prior to 1946. Until the end of 1945, the laws in force in Poland were the 19th-century statutes. They had been enacted by the neighbouring countries (Austria, Russia and Prussia) that partitioned the Polish territory in the second half of the 18th century. In the Polish lands enjoying some autonomy in the Russian Empire, the regulation of marriage was based on the religious principles of 1836. Under the 1836 statute, there could be no civil marriage that would not produce a confessional effect. Consequently, the regulation of marriage had to combine confessional and civil effects into single norms and the legislative authorities had to provide for mechanisms correlating such effects. This applied to both the conclusion and dissolution of marriage. In these matters, the Roman Catholic Church adopted an uncompromising stance following from its belief in the special theological character of the sacrament of marriage
JURISDICTION OF THE CONSISTORY IN THE LIGHT OF MATRIMONIAL LAW OF 1836.
No full textThe paper discusses jurisdiction of the Consistory in matrimonial matters in the central part of Poland between 1919-1939, where, pursuant to the matrimonial law of 1836, jurisdiction in matters such as separation, divorce and nullification of marriage was vested in certain church courts. Decisions issued by those churches were recognised as binding and effective decisions in civil law as well. The main considerations focus of the scope of civil jurisdiction of church courts, and, in particular, their jurisdiction as demarcated by the law. Under that law, matrimonial matters were submitted to a church court that was relevant for the religious faith of the spouses in question. Where spouses were of two different denominations, proper jurisdiction for them was determined by the interdenominational matrimonial law of 1836. However, adjudications of church courts other than RC church court were not always accepted by the dominant RC church. This led to frequent disputes regarding their recognition by civil courts. The key subject of the research is the denominational aspect of the jurisdiction of a church court. The paper also includes different interpretations of the interdenominational provisions formulated by leading theoreticians of the interwar period. As can be seen, the differences of their opinions as well as incoherent jurisdiction of the Supreme Court created many doubts with regards to the enforcement of a decision in a matrimonial matter issued by a church court with improper jurisdiction. And so, in its decision of 8 November 1926 the Supreme Court adjudicated that a state court was empowered to investigate the jurisdiction of a church court which has issued a decision in a matrimonial matter. At the same time, however, it took a stance that the provisions of the state interdenominational law should be absolutely binding. And yet, in some other cases it tended to marginalise the state law and allowed to base civil jurisdiction of a RC court entirely on canon law. These examples illustrate a tendency of the Supreme Court to favour broad construction of the principle laid down in Article 114 of the Constitution that the Roman Catholic Church in Poland should be governed by its own laws
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