196,099 research outputs found
The Diversity of Internationalization Strategies and Trajectories of Automobile Sector Firms
No full text
The deregulation of employment and finance: the Big Three in crisis
No full textEnglish translation of the article published in French in: Freyssenet M., and Jetin Bruno (2011). "Conséquence de la crise financière ou crise d’une forme de capitalisme : la faillite des Big Three". Revue de la régulation, n° 9, 1er semestre.International audienceSome have said that the demise of America’s three leading automakers (General Motors, Ford and Chrysler; referred to hereafter as the “Big Three”) can be explained by a financial crisis that has revealed the inadequacy of the companies’ cost-cutting and profit adaptation efforts. The parties responsible for this disaster are generally considered to be arrogant executives and inflexible unions focused solely on members’ interests. If this were true, however, it is hard to see how the Big Three were able to make profits between 1983 and 2000 (asides from a temporary downturn in 1991-1992) nor how, in the new millennium, they made money in 2003-2005. The standard explanation also does not explain Ford and General Motors’s good performance in Latin America and China since 2004 (Jetin, 2009), nor why GM, which basically had no presence in the Chinese market in 2000, has since become the leader there. The real questions are how GM achieved this remarkable success in a - and how to explain that a company widely acclaimed as a universal model for more than 30 years now - Toyota - has spilled so much red ink over the past two years, largely due to losses in the American market (Freyssenet 2009).Les constructeurs automobiles américains n’ont pas été les victimes malheureuses de la crise financière qui les aurait empêchés de se redresser à temps. L’aggravation des inégalités sociales à partir des années 1980 a fait émerger notamment une demande de véhicules onéreux, les light-trucks. Elle s’est révélée très rentable pour GM, Ford et Chrysler et leur a permis de prospérer tout au long des années 1990 malgré la concurrence des constructeurs japonais. L’externalisation d’une part croissante de la production et la diversification dans les services devait en outre renforcer la profitabilité. L’éclatement de la bulle internet en 2000 révéla le mirage de la « nouvelle économie » et l’externalisation, combinée aux engagements de l’entreprise pour assurer les pensions de retraite, entraîna une hausse inexorable des coûts salariaux des Big Three et une baisse des profits dès 2005. L’accroissement de l’endettement des ménages maintint artificiellement les ventes jusqu’au dénouement final. Les Big Three ont directement contribué à ce que la crise advienne, en adhérant à la « nouvelle économie » et en mettant en œuvre ses recettes. La question est de savoir s’ils avaient une alternative
The deregulation of employment and finance: the Big Three in crisis
No full textEnglish translation of the article published in French in: Freyssenet M., and Jetin Bruno (2011). "Conséquence de la crise financière ou crise d’une forme de capitalisme : la faillite des Big Three". Revue de la régulation, n° 9, 1er semestre.Some have said that the demise of America’s three leading automakers (General Motors, Ford and Chrysler; referred to hereafter as the “Big Three”) can be explained by a financial crisis that has revealed the inadequacy of the companies’ cost-cutting and profit adaptation efforts. The parties responsible for this disaster are generally considered to be arrogant executives and inflexible unions focused solely on members’ interests. If this were true, however, it is hard to see how the Big Three were able to make profits between 1983 and 2000 (asides from a temporary downturn in 1991-1992) nor how, in the new millennium, they made money in 2003-2005. The standard explanation also does not explain Ford and General Motors’s good performance in Latin America and China since 2004 (Jetin, 2009), nor why GM, which basically had no presence in the Chinese market in 2000, has since become the leader there. The real questions are how GM achieved this remarkable success in a - and how to explain that a company widely acclaimed as a universal model for more than 30 years now - Toyota - has spilled so much red ink over the past two years, largely due to losses in the American market (Freyssenet 2009).Les constructeurs automobiles américains n’ont pas été les victimes malheureuses de la crise financière qui les aurait empêchés de se redresser à temps. L’aggravation des inégalités sociales à partir des années 1980 a fait émerger notamment une demande de véhicules onéreux, les light-trucks. Elle s’est révélée très rentable pour GM, Ford et Chrysler et leur a permis de prospérer tout au long des années 1990 malgré la concurrence des constructeurs japonais. L’externalisation d’une part croissante de la production et la diversification dans les services devait en outre renforcer la profitabilité. L’éclatement de la bulle internet en 2000 révéla le mirage de la « nouvelle économie » et l’externalisation, combinée aux engagements de l’entreprise pour assurer les pensions de retraite, entraîna une hausse inexorable des coûts salariaux des Big Three et une baisse des profits dès 2005. L’accroissement de l’endettement des ménages maintint artificiellement les ventes jusqu’au dénouement final. Les Big Three ont directement contribué à ce que la crise advienne, en adhérant à la « nouvelle économie » et en mettant en œuvre ses recettes. La question est de savoir s’ils avaient une alternative
The deregulation of employment and finance. The Big Three in crisis
No full textAbstract American carmakers were not unfortunate victims of some financial crisis that got in the way of their recovery. Quite the contrary, they were direct contributors to their own problems, first and foremost through their adherence to "new economy" precepts and efforts to implement its recipes. The question is whether they ever had an alternative. Some have said that the demise of America's three leading automakers (General Motors, Ford and Chrysler; referred to hereafter as the "Big Three") can be explained by a financial crisis that has revealed the inadequacy of the companies' cost-cutting and profit adaptation efforts. The parties responsible for this disaster are generally considered to be arrogant executives and inflexible unions focused solely on members' interests. If this were true, however, it is hard to see how the Big Three were able to make profits between 1983 and 2000 (asides from a temporary downturn in 1991-1992) nor how, in the new millennium, they made money in [2003][2004][2005]. The standard explanation also does not explain Ford and General Motors's good performance in Latin America and China since 2004 (Jetin, 2009), nor why GM, which basically had no presence in the Chinese market in 2000, has since become the leader there. The real questions are how GM achieved this remarkable success in a -and how to explain that a company widely acclaimed as a universal model for more than 30 years now -Toyota -has spilled so much red ink over the past two years, largely due to losses in the American market (Freyssenet 2009)
Focal adhesion kinase is a load-dependent governor of the slow contractile and oxidative muscle phenotype
No full textStriated muscle exhibits a pronounced structural-functional plasticity in response to chronic alterations in loading. We assessed the implication of focal adhesion kinase (FAK) signalling in mechano-regulated differentiation of slow-oxidative muscle. Load-dependent consequences of FAK signal modulation were identified using a multi-level approach after electrotransfer of rat soleus muscle with FAK-expression plasmid vs. empty plasmid-transfected contralateral controls. Muscle fibre-targeted over-expression of FAK in anti-gravitational muscle for 9 days up-regulated transcript levels of gene ontologies underpinning mitochondrial metabolism and contraction in the transfected belly portion. Concomitantly, mRNA expression of the major fast-type myosin heavy chain (MHC) isoform, MHC2A, was reduced. The promotion of the slow-oxidative expression programme by FAK was abolished after co-expression of the FAK inhibitor FAK-related non-kinase (FRNK). Elevated protein content of MHC1 (+9%) and proteins of mitochondrial respiration (+165-610%) with FAK overexpression demonstrated the translation of transcript differentiation in targeted muscle fibres towards a slow-oxidative muscle phenotype. Coincidentally MHC2A protein was reduced by 50% due to protection of muscle from de-differentiation with electrotransfer. Fibre cross section in FAK-transfected muscle was elevated by 6%. The FAK-modulated muscle transcriptome was load-dependent and regulated in correspondence to tyrosine 397 phosphorylation of FAK. In the context of overload, the FAK-induced gene expression became manifest at the level of contraction by a slow transformation and the re-establishment of normal muscle force from the lowered levels with transfection. These results highlight the analytic power of a systematic somatic transgene approach by mapping a role of FAK in the dominant mechano-regulation of muscular motor performance via control of gene expression
Autour du “Modèle” japonais. Automatisation, nouvelles formes d'organisation et de relations de travail, Hirata, Helena (éd.) Auteurs : B. Coriat, C. Dejours, A. Fleury, M.T. Leme Fleury, M. Freyssenet, E. Souza-Lobo Garcia, H. Hirata, J. Humphrey, D. Kergoat, J. Magaud, M. Osawa, R. Ruas, J.A. Antunes, M. Roese, E. Bortolaia Silva, M. S. Salerno, K. Sugita, S. Volkoff, S. Wood, P. Zarifian. Collection Dynamiques d’entreprises. Paris, ed. L’Harmattan, 1992
No full textAutour du “Modèle” japonais. Automatisation, nouvelles formes d'organisation et de relations de travail, Hirata, Helena (éd.) Auteurs : B. Coriat, C. Dejours, A. Fleury, M.T. Leme Fleury, M. Freyssenet, E. Souza-Lobo Garcia, H. Hirata, J. Humphrey, D. Kergoat, J. Magaud, M. Osawa, R. Ruas, J.A. Antunes, M. Roese, E. Bortolaia Silva, M. S. Salerno, K. Sugita, S. Volkoff, S. Wood, P. Zarifian. Collection Dynamiques d’entreprises. Paris, ed. L’Harmattan, 1992. In: Cahiers du GEDISST (Groupe d'étude sur la division sociale et sexuelle du travail), N°6, 1993. Individu et collectif. Séminaire 1991-1992. pp. 93-94
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